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ABSTRACT
The theory of the firm's production and selling decisions is 
traced from the eighteenth century until the death of Marshall.
Some tentative judgments are proposed as to the goodness and badness 
of the principal strands in this development. -Apart from the first 
chapter (devoted to method) and the final chapter (devoted to 
post-Marshallian developments and empirical evidence), the thesis 
consists of three studies based on Adam Smith, J.S.MiU, and 
Alfred Marshall respectively. Each of these writers is considered 
in relation to preceding and contemporaneous work.
Adam Smith outlines a model in which the long-run equilibrium 
of resource allocation between industries requires that the rate of 
return on capital be equal among industries (making allowance for 
differences in agreeableness and risk). Monopoly is defined as an 
impediment to the resource flow which would otherwise bring the 
equilibrium about.
Following The Wealth of Nations, writers increase the empirical 
content of this model by elaborations with respect to observed 
phenomena (J .S.Mill) end with respect to the time path by which 
equilibrium is approached (Marshall).
An alternative approach to the theory of price is to classify 
markets according to certain structural characteristics and to 
derive equilibrium and stability conditions for each market structure 
The multiplication of these models since the time of Cournot has 
robbed them, of empirical content. Further, the structural 
assumptions of the models seem to limit the outcomes of modelled 
behaviour to actions which do not: alter that structure.
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, METHOD AND ORGANISATION
I "      ■ ■  — N mmnm.m   i ■ i» m 1 1 1 1 .1 .  »: 1 . . . .
This study analyses the way in which the theory of the firm's 
production and selling decisions emerges from the eighteenth century 
until the death of Marshall in 1924, By the time of Marshall's 
death the broad outlines of present debates in the field had been 
drawn. The penultimate chapter substantiates this proposition 
and reviews the evidence to determine whether we can distinguish 
good theory from bad.
f ,
The study focusses on the choices firms make within the
environment of a market system. Adam Smith produced one of. the
most lucid "explanations of how individual décisions mesh together
in that pattern of unconscious co-ordination which we call the
market system. Operating within that system, firms can be defined
as units for the conscious co-ordination of r e s o u r c e s O r ,
using D.H. Robertson's metaphors, they are '...islands of conscious
power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation, like lumps of butter
2coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.'
.The determinants of the decisions of firms constitute the 
theory of the firm. Such determinants may include tlje past decisions’
f.  S '
inade by firms, their internal structure, the^personalities influencing 
policy within the firm, the policies of close competitors and the 
framework of law provided by government.
A study of the historical development of the complete theory
of the firm would be redundant. It would be redundant because
there already exist standard historical treatments of the firm's
3decisions m  factor markets. So the present study relates only to
' . • CHARTER I
the literature of those decisions of the firm which relate directly^ 
to product markets - the pricing,and production decisions.
Because the firm is one of the least aggregated units recognised
in economic theory, hypotheses as to firm behaviour are embedded in
/
that economic theory which moves on higher levels of. aggregation. 
Indeed, von Hayek suggests that practitioners of the social sciences 
reason from their experiences of how individuals operate 
(methodological individualism). For this reason he characterises
the method of the social sciences as compositive (from Menger)
. ' 4 .or synthetic. _
• f
. Keynes appears to be one leading economist who,eschewed the path
5of methodological individualism. Although he may have derived 
his macro-economic propositions from observations of the behaviour of 
disaggregated units, he did not argue for his propositions from an 
analysis of disaggregated behaviour. But social science concerns 
the interactions among the behaviour of individuals. So hidden 
behind Keynes* functions of consumption and of the demand for money 
there are propositions as to the behaviour of individuals. The 
inadequacy of the General Theory in synthesising individual behaviour 
has necessitated much effort in the post-Keynesian period devoted 
to elaborating the micro-foundations of macro-theory. -
Because social science concerns the interactions among the
\ .behaviour of individuals, the theory of the firm is (along with " ..
> ■* » ■ .
consumption theory) 'one of the basic building blocks of the theory 
of markets. The primacy of this theory makes it imperative for
' - ■ _ V  . ’•
economists to understand the precise nature of the debates between 
theoreticians and to try to assess the'relative merits of the 
various hypotheses. . ' ’ «>
\Froblem Shifts / ' . -' ■ a *
Lakatos has pleaded for an •internal * retelling of the history of
*■
science. In arguing for the importance of- internal history as 
compared with external histor3’ he argues two propositions. In the 
■first place, he argues that the selection of topics for research is 
determined primarily by the nature of the research programme (i.e., 1 
the selection is internally determined). Any research programme 
will consist of a hard core (propositions which are not tested 
directly), a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses (which bear 
the brunt of testing and are adjusted or replaced so as to defend 
the hard core), and a positive heuristic. '...the positive 
heuristic consists of a partially articulated" set of suggestions or
t
limits on how to change, develop the "refutable variants" of the 
research-programme, how to modify, sophisticate, the "refutable" 
protective belt.1^
One issue discussed in this study is the extent to which the 
history of the theory of the firm is internally directed in this 
sense: the extent to which the work of J.S.Mill, Senior and Mai.shall.
r i
was suggested by the model of Adam Smith, and the extent to which it 
was directed by factors external to that model.
Chief among the external influences is public condern with the 
problems of economic policy. This stimulus presents to economists 
problems which may not be suggested directly by their current research
, * * gprogramme. Adam Smith's outrage at government grants of monopoly 
marked the culmination of a long line of earlier public debate which 
led to a developing analysis. The re-kindling of this moral fire 
(particularly in the United States) towards the end of the nineteenth
century led to the production' of valuable case studies and to the '
• ' '■..■■■ , . .. .. improved analysis of price discrimination and of joint costs.
The study gives some support to von Hayek's generalisation:
'It is probably true that economic analysis has never been the product/
of detached intellectual curiosity about the why of social phenomena,
but of an intense urge to reconstruct a world which gives rise to
9profound dissatisfaction.' Not only does political debate suggest 
problems for economists to solve, but also political debate imposes
on scientists standards_ojf clarity and of truth likeness. If an
economist suggests that political decisions should be based on
predictions which turn out to be wrong, the adviser will then be
confronted (often in public) with the wrongness of the predictions.
An illustration of the salutary effect of political debate can be
found in those economists who have undertaken industry studies or
1 *
given government specific advice on monopoly policy. These have 
been much less ready to accept the doubtful proposition that the 
number of firms is the most significant determinant, of monopoly 
power than have the pure theorists.
10
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Rational Reconstruction
In the previous section it was noted that Lakatos argues for the
I
primacy of internally-directed problem selection. The second meaning 
he gives to his plea for an internal account of history is that the 
historian should tell the logical development of a story with the 
benefit of hindsight. Important developments in the story wiil be 
those, developments which, with hindsight, can be seen to have been 
good. Developments in the story which were bad, but of contemporary 
influence, should be treated much more cursorily. Lakatos terms 
thjs approach, the rational reconstruction of history. He suggests: 1 
'One way to indicate discrepancies between history and its rational 
reconstruction is to relate the internal history in the text, and 
indicate in the footnotes how actual history "misbehaved" in the
light of its rational; reconstruction.-' 1 1
Lakatos argues that history '.'..without some theoretical "bias"
1 2is impossible.' The present writer accepts this dictum and will 
proceed to a rational reconstruction. Because this study was '
I ,
undertaken so as to learn about the behaviour of firms, the results of 
the study will be presented so as to show that which has been learned. 
The material selected will be that which teaches us something about 
firms; and the material will.be rationally reconstructed in the 
sense that it will be interpreted in the light of what it can teach 
us. This positive approach to rational reconstruction may be 
contrasted with the approach of Cannan and of Stigler, in their books 
on production and distribution theories mentioned above, who have 
reconstructed history so as to illustrate the mistakes and the' 
confusions of earlier writings.
This study's approach to the literature is not that of linguistic 
analysis: it does not pretend to report the 'true' meaning of Adam 
Smith or Alfred Marshall; that would be both dishonest and unhelpful. 
The approach will be to see whether we can learn anything from the 
writings as to regularities in social behaviour.
The Methodology of Scientific*Research Programmes
\
, To engage in the rational reconstruction of history one 
requires a clear indicatiori as to what one regards as rational - as , 
to*what one regards as good and bad science.
Popper has always argued that the goodness of a conjecture 
must be assessed, by comparison with observations. But he has always 
been aware that,, when confronted by an .-apparent refutation, a ' 
'conventionalist' can always"make his theory fit the facts by
■ . • . /' . , N  ■ -
! ' X 3 ' - ! fchanging an hypothesis. Such adjustments (by means of.auxiliary
hypotheses) may lead to improvements in the theoretical structure -
*
they may bring us closer to the truth; but, they may be a 
conventio'nalist ploy to save bad conjectures.
To sort acceptable from unacceptable adjustments Popper proposed
the following criterions 'As regards auxiliary hypotheses we propose
to lay down the rule that only those are acceptable whose introduction
does not diminish the degree of falsifiability or testabilitjr of the
14 "system m  question, but, on the contrary increases it.*
This criterion for the demarcation of auxiliary hypotheses
provides Lakatos with an important launching pad for a new set of
*■ ...
normative standards. By permitting certain auxiliary hypotheses, 
Popper has admitted that a 'direct hit' by confronting a conjecture
with an observation is very difficult to achieve. If bodies of
1 . /
hypotheses are allowed to adjust in response to anomalies, then we 
must assess the direction in which the theory is moving.
, Lakatos rejects Popper's standards for assessment because, in 
the first place ¿JLopper's approach does not admit anomalies to be 
aeknowledged^temporarily as exceptions to be clarified by later 
developments in the theory (a process which Lakatos regards as both
■V v
normal and healthy); and, secondly, Popper's demarcation criterion
permits the grafting of a previously unrelated theory on to an
. ‘ ' 1 5 ■existing structure.
Lakatos' first objection is more a matter of the relative 
eagerness of a researcher to dispose of an anomaly than of a clear 
criterion of demarcation. However, his second objection is worth 
further consideration as it reflects many basic disagreements
between Lakatos and Popper. Lakatos wants a dynamic appraisal of 
the set of propositions which constitute the research programme. -
Let us say that such a series of theories is theoretically 
progressive (or ’constitutes a theoretically progressive 
problemshift*) .if each new theory has some excess empirical 
content over its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some 
novel, hitherto unexpected fact. Let us say that a 
theoretically progressive set of theories is also empirically 
progressive (or ’constitutes an empirically progressive 
problemshift ' ) if some of this excess empirical, content is 
also corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads to the, 
actual discovery of some newr fact'. Finally, let us call a 
problemshift progressive if it is both theoretically and 
empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not.^
These conventions do not allow the 'tacking' of a previously 
unrelated theory on to an existing structure because, Lakatos claims, 
for mature science the auxiliary hypotheses are suggested by the
positive heuristic of the programme. Auxiliary hypotheses not/
suggested by the positive heuristic of a genuine research programme
17should be eliminated.
This requirement as to the admissibility of auxiliary hypotheses
afwould be clear if each research programme would correspond to 
exactly one set of prescriptions - its positive heuristic; but 
this is not the case; Lakatos permits the'positive heuristic to 
alter while the research programme is maintained. (An adjustment 
to the positive heuristic could bring the new auxiliary hypotheses in 
line with the suggestions of the new positive heuristic.) '...-it 
occasionally happens that when a research programme gets into a .
degenerating phase, a little revolution or a creative shift in its
positive heuristic may push it forward again. It is better therefore
to separate the ’hard core* from the more flexible metaphysical
18principles expressing the positive heuristic.’
Lakatos does not seem to-realise that by allowing the positive 
heuristic of a given research programme to alter, his criterion for 
the elimination of tacking is severely weakened. Given that the 
positive heuristic may change, then any auxiliary hypothesis may be-
19justified, simply by changing the positive heuristic of a programme.
Now, if neither the auxiliary hypotheses nor the positive
heuristic is constant for a given research programme, then programmes'
*must be identified by the elements of the hard cores; because if 
one is to adjudicate between the development of differing programmes 
over time, it must be between the constant elements of the programmes 
that one judges. But it is impossible to identify the hard core of 
a programme in any unambiguous way; for the hypotheses which some 
practitioners regard as being indispensible may be regarded by others -, 
as being up for exchange.
It is implicit in the methodology of scientific research programmes 
(MSRP) that one classifies under a common programme only those 
practitioners who make indentical decisions as to which propositions 
are included in the hard core (as to which propositions they will'not 
alter). In trying to make such a classification it becomes clear 
that the set of propositions which constitutes the hard core of any
programme may have elements in common with the hard cores of rival
\ ‘programmes. Indeed, it would be surprising if this were not the 
case.
.<The intractability of the concept of the hard core becomes
13
apparent if one practitioner is considered to make a decision to
discard one programme in favour' of a rival, when the difference
*•between the programmes is only one element in the hard core. ' Would 
it not, then, be legitimate to say that the practitioner has - 
replaced an element in his/her hard core? If one admits that a 
practitioner’s hard core can change, why not then say that the 
elements of the hard core are changeable?
This is not merely a matter of selecting the appropriate words. 
The all-or-nothing language of Lakatos encourages a misleadingly 
simple classification of theories and a misleadingly simple 
representation of the choices open to participants in a debate 
between theories. ,
The misleading implications of the classification can be seen
in the attempts by Latsis to apply the Lakatosian methodology to
20the theory of the firm. Latsis identifies two rival programmes. 
The first, wliich is contrasted with behaviouralism is labelled 
'situational determinism'. This, the dominant approach to the 
explanation of business behaviour, goes back to Adam Smith.
The programme of situational determinism is characterised by
the economic unit making decisions which are uniquely determined by
the objective of the unit and its external environment. The
positive heuristic of the programme prescribes the construction of
static, uniquely-determined, models.
• • _
The hard core of the neoclassical.programme may be put
forward in the following four propositions:
(i) Decision-makers have correct knowledge of the relevant
features of their economic situation.’ <i * ' , * ' '
(ii) Decision-makers prefer the best available alternative
- given their knowledge of’ the situation and of the,means at 
their disposal.
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), situations generate their internal 
'logic' and decision-makers act appropriately to the logic 
of their situation.
(iv) Economic units and structures display stable,
2 1co-ordinated behaviour.
The debate in the 1920s as to the equilibrium output for a firm
in a perfectly competitive market serves to illustrate the misleading
simplicity of this formulation. The firm under Marshall's free
competition is not faced with the uniquely-determined equilibrium
characteristic of situational determinism. The size of the firm
(as in Adam Smith and, though this is less clear, in J.S.Mill) is
22not uniquely determined by the model., Clearly, Marshall's theory
\
of the firm does not fit the research programme of situational 
determinism.
A less clear-cut problem is posed by the classification of Pigou 
Until the mid 1920s, Pigou seems to have accepted Marshall's model 
of free competition in which firm size is not uniquely determined. 
However, in 1928, Pigou invested his equilibrium firm with a U-shaped 
long-run average cost curve. As a result of this move, he could
k , V ( .
accept that equilibrium for the firm in the long run occurs at that 23
23output at which'long-run average costs are a minimum.
#• *  ,
According to the categories of Latsis, Pigou, by changing the 
gradient of his firm's long-run average cost curve at the equilibrium 
point, steps into the fold of the situational determinists. Pigou 
may be said to have discarded one research programme in favour of 
another, or to have changed an element in his hard core} but does’
not the former language suggest an all-or-nothing .leap between . 
starkly-contrasting alternatives?
* t
Such language invites misunderstanding. Because the MSRP 
demands that all participants in a programme share an identical hard 
core,'either Lakatosian history will be misleadingly simple, or so
many writers will be labelled with a separate programme that their
, '  ^ *
differences will be emphasised at the expense of that which they 
share.
Normative Standards ■
The following study compares the relative goodness and badness 
of various theories as to the behaviour of firms in product markets. 
Theories will be distinct to the extent that they are inconsistent 
whether this inconsistency lies in higher-level propositions (those 
from which many deductions have been made) or in lower-level 
propositions is irrelevant for the purposes of distinction and 
evaluation. The evaluation will be comparative in the sense that 
no absolute standard of truth will be. usedj but, rather, the 
standard used will be the degree of verisimilitude.
Any small change in an auxiliary hypothesis (i.e,, a lower-level 
l^pothesis) produces a new theory whose relative truthlikeness can, 
in principle, be assessed. If we are to learn about the truth,  ^ v  
we must learn about the truth precisely - and not in terms of 
research programmes. The study will explain the precise differences ,
between conjectures. The study will then attempt to compare the '
different theories with observations.
Popper's standard1of verisimilitude defines the degree to which,
a theory approaches the truth; He defines the truth content (falsity
- > *. * '  \
v." ■ .  • 1 6 ' . r ; ;;a :,
content) of a theory fci as the class of the true (false) logical 
consequences o f iu .
I
Assuming that the truth-content and falsity content of two 
theories and H  are comparable, we can say that is 
more closely similar to the truth, or corresponds better to 
the facts, than fct , if and only if either
(a) the truth-content but not the falsity content 
of exceeds that of ti , £or]
(b) the falsity-content of iu , but not its truth
( 24content, exceeds that of vr .
Time Horizon and Organisation
Economists (perhaps more than is true of the natural scientists)
suffer the burden of studying those relationships among individuals
25which are the subject of wide public discussion. Economics can 
only claim to be a valuable discipline if it can point to those 
true consequences of economic behaviour which seem improbable to the 
untrained participants in public discussion.
Prior to 16(50, writings within the subject area of economics
propounded very little in the way of true, improbable propositions; -
but in the development of economics, as in so much intellectual
2 6history, the mid-seventeenth century is a major watershed. By 
the eighteenth century the old arguments of political. debate were 
.being subjected to a process of careful reasoning»
This scientific approach is primarily to be seen in a growing 
appreciation of interdependencies - one of the most.notable 
contributions from Quesnay and his ,physi.ocra.tic, ' school. Quesnay's 
Tableau traces through sequences of reactions so as to illustrate .
18
an equilibrium of aggregates. Furthermore, physiocratic writings on 
the imposition of taxes on goods and on restrictions on the com 
trade stress the indirect effects of such action on the economy as
27a whole. The growing awareness of the firm as a part of a 
general equilibrium schema culminated in the work of Adam Smith 
and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot in which the firm is analysed as part 
of a general equilibrium sj^ stem. The resulting awareness of inter­
dependencies enabled economists to point to consequences which the 
untrained observer would consider to be improbable. Our study 
begins at the emergence of this scientific approach to economics.
* , f
The study will be divided into three substantive parts. Each 
part will be based on a discussion of a book which is representative* v
of a classical situation in the Schumpeterián sense. Following
Schumpeter's dictum that, '...every classical situation summarises
or consolidates the work - the really original work - that
28leads up to it, and cannot be understood by itself,,...’ the 
study will refer back to the earlier literature in exploring each 
classical statement.
The classical statements chosen will be those recommended by 
Schumpeter, Th e Wealth o f N at ion s, J.S. Mill's Principles, and
Marshall's Principles provide a structure for Chapters II, III, and 
IV. around which preceding and contemporaneous work is discussed.
Each of these chapters considers the motivation of the firm, the 
definitions of costs and the nature of the cost functions employed, 
equilibrium and stability under competition, and equilibrium and 
stability in monopolistic markets.
At every point the extent to which.any theory is inconsistent 
with earlier formulations is outlined. To the extent that there
v
is an inconsistency, any evidence which may; helpf'in deciding the 
degrees of verisimilitude of the theories is presented. The type 
of evidence available has meant that the former task is «tacklecl: 
rather more convincingly than the latter.
Chapter V will consist in a much more cursory analysis of post- 
Marshallian developments. Its structure will be similar to that 
of the three preceding chapters and, once more, a search is made 
for the degree of consistency or inconsistency with the propositions 
in currency at the time of Marshall's death.
' PO
CHAPTER II \ -
ADAM SMITH
Chapter I pointed to the mid-seventeenth century as the
\ . , , * 
beginning of scientific economics. This emerging scientific
approach had man}'- facets - one of which was the attempt by writers
to increase the generality of propositions.
Analysis may well outline the relationship between event X and 
event»j ; but analysis outlining a relationship between class and 
class jj may be more valuable in the sense that there is o possibility 
that, through generalisation, the truth may be more closely 
approached. If the process of generalisation increases the truth 
content, but not the falsity content, of a theory, we are moving 
closer to the truth,^ The process of iterating more general 
statements is a vital component of the growth of knowledge.
One of the characteristics of the emergence of the scientific 
economics which flowered in The Wealth of Nations was the emphasis 
on classes of firms as contrasted with the emphasis by the pamphleteer 
on particular firms - such as the East India Company and the. Merchari 
Adventurers. Instead of paying attention to the price charged by 
a particular firm operating in a particular ’market, hypotheses were 
giyen greater range by referring to classes of,;firms, classes of 
markets, and classes of productive factors.
The generation of hypotheses relating to classes of phenomena 
was complemented by a decline in the emphasis on the personality of 
particular, firms. The type of person in charge of a firm is an 
elusive characteristic for the purposes of scientific classification. 
Eighteenth-century economists paid little attention to personality»as
an element in analysis and paid far more attention to the internal 
structure of firms and to the external constraints within which 
firms operate. ' ,
The firm was disembodied and became a unit in which resources 
congeal in the productive process. When we come to examine the 
equilibrium/value theory of The Wealth of Nations it will be shown 
that, in that context, the firm is little more than a( passive conduit 
which assists in the movement of resources between alternative 
activities. This depersonalised nature of the firm is true also
of the theor}' of economic development embodied in The Wealth.of
” 2 , .Nations.
•. ' » . **
This does not imply that the internal organisation of firms is
irrelevant to Smith. However, the internal structure of the firm
bears on the analysis in a way that the psycho logs' of the participants
in the firms does not. This is clearly the case with Smith's dicta
regarding the division of labour; and perhaps even more apparent in
his references to the joint-stock method of productive organisation.
Eighteenth-century English industrial organisation was 
characterised by the burgeoning of partnerships of unlimited 
liability. The so-called 'Bubble Act' of 1720 had prohibited the 
formation of new joint-stock companies unless especially sanctioned
by act of parliament or crown charter; and this act was not repealed
. # 3until 1825. However the old joint-stock companies survived.
Smith was critical of these companies on the grounds that their 
managementplaying with funds provided by investors\who exercised 
little control, was characterised by 'negligence and profusion*.
It was only their monopoly privileges which enabled joint-stock
21
companies to pursue these paths; without these privileges competition
from private adventurers generally would spell their ruin. Smith's
theme of the need to link industry and effort with reward is a -
. 5  ' "continuing theme throughout The Wealth of Nations. The lesson 
which may be drawn from the remarks on joint-stock companies is that 
even the pivotal hypothesis of profit-maximisation may be rendered 
questionable when the internal structure of firms is of this 
(exceptional) type.
1. THE MOTIVATION OF THE FIBM 
, The Co-ordinator
The charge against the joint-stock organisation is one instance
< •* \
within The Wealth of Nations of emphasis on the co-ordinating and 
organising roles, played by business leaders.
The directors of such [_joint-stock] companies, havv-ever, being 
the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, 
it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private co-partnery frequently watch over their own. ...
..Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more '
. . 6 or less, in the management of the affaii's of such a company.
. . *■' " .
One does not get from The Wealth of Nations, 'the over-all
impres.sion that a business runs by itself'^; but there is no '
explicit theory of entrepreneurship in The Wealth of Nations.
Smith does not attempt to capture the entrepreneurial'function in a'• ✓ ‘
simple definition as so many cither economists have done. Rather 
he Attributes a number of different roles to the business leader. 
Chief among these is the marshalling of resources (particularly
y ■ ■. • ■ ■ ■ •
capital) into those productive activities that appear to be most
\
profitable. In this emphasis on the importance of capital for the
process of production Smith was following the tradition *of Quesnay 
8and Turgot.
Quesnay and his followers constructed their system on the basis
of the influence of the yield of a net product (surplus over cost)
on the level of aggregate economic activity. In a disequilibrium
position, with increasing net product, part of this increase could
accrue to farmers and be channeled into agricultural investment before
equilibrium is restored by the capture of this surplus into the rents
accruing to landowners. But Quesnay was evasive on the important
question as to why competition wipes out the net product in
'9manufacturing but not in agriculture. It was in answering this 
question that Turgot came to stress the importance of the manufacturer 
in the process of the accumulation of capital.
Like the physiocrats, Turgot had no concept of the 
entrepreneurial function. He used the word entrepreneur to refer 
to the industrialist or merchant who heads the firm. The leader of 
the manufacturing or industrial firm must supply capital - 
essential because of the gap in time between the purchase of productive 
services and the readiness cf the product for sale. This person, 
like his counterpart in The Wealth of Nations, plans and supervises 
the activities of the firm and is referred to variously as 'entre-' 
prene.ur' or 'capitalists1.
Following in this tradition of the physiocrats and Turgot, Smith 
refused to produce a definition of the entrepreneurial function.
He was content with a sketch of the functions of the head of a firm.
23
The Entrepreneur as Capitalist. .
Up until the mid-nineteenth century, while theorists distinguished 
the function of a capitalist from that of a business lea.der, the 
world demanded as a pre-condition for one's playing of the latter ( ' ■
role, that one also play the former. Marshall gives Walker the 
credit tor first observing the cracking of this nexus.
Marshall quotes Walker as saying, *as early as 1876', that:
'It is no longer true that a man becomes an employer because he is a
capitalist. Men command capital because they have the qualifications
to profitably employ labour. To.these captains of industry ...
capital and labour resort for the opportunity to perform their 
.  1 2  ■several functions.* r . .
English economists from Smith to Marshall recognised that one 
needed to have one's own finance if one was to be a business leader; 
but this did not prevent them from distinguishing the role of the 
provider of capital from that of the manager of a business. A 
distinguishing feature of the English school is that they did not 
use the words 'entrepreneurial function' to refer to one of the 
functions performed by business leaders to which they wanted to draw 
especial attention within the framework of their theoretical 
systems. '
'  ' v. , .
It is no criticism of nineteenth century English economics that 
it followed this course. The entrepreneurial function is a
, - 4 ■ 4
theoretical concept. English economists chose to erect their 
systems without the aid of such a concept. It is to their degree of 
verisimilitude that one must look in assessing those theories.
, From such an assessment it may emerge that theories which assume the
r ■
key role of business leadership to be correspond more closely to the
truth than those which make no such assumption. However, the 
converse may also be true.
Profits 1
For Smith, profits to the firm refer to the residual remaining
after costs of labour, rent, and raw materials have been deducted
from revenue. In calculating profit, the cost of labour must include
a wage cost imputed for .the labour services provided by the owner-
manager; and the cost of rent must include a rent cost imputed for ^
13the land services provided b}' the owner-manager’s land. The 
resulting residual is gross profit.
Profits are profits of stock and ’bear some proportion to the
14 ' 'extent of the stock’ committed to the enterprise. From these
profits of stock, interest must be paid for the use of money borrowed.
’Clear’ profit (defined as gross profit minus compensation for the
15Noccasional losses ’to which every employment of stock is exposed’ ) 
is twice the current (1776) rate of interest in Great Britain. (This 
ratio is variable across both countries and periods of time.)
The explanation of this ’reasonable’ margin of profit on 1 
interest (where, by ’reasonable’ Smith means ’common or usual’^ )  
accruing to the owner-manager is two-fold: ,
(i) the risk to the borrower who, as it were, insures it to 
the lender; and
(ii) recompense for the trouble of employing the stock.
This two-fold explanation^ is puzzling. For the recompense 
for the service of insurance and for the trouble of employing the 
stock should perhaps be a wage which the owner-managers should impute ' 
to'themselves before they calculate profits. But Smith insists that
profits on stock are 'altogether different* from managerial- returns,.
 ^ ‘ ... ... * ' ‘ i g , .  ■ (
and are-regulated by altogether different principles. " ,
If Smith had catalogued the insurance against risk and the 
trouble of employing stock under the .labour'.of the owner-manager he 
‘ would still be left with some residual (positive or negative) 
due to fluctuations’.in market conditions.
1 Profit is so very fluctuating, that the person who carries 
on a particular trade cannot always tell you himself what- 
is the average of his annual profit. It is affected, .
not only by every variation of price in the commodities which 
he deals in, but by the good or bad fortune both of his rivals 
and of his customers, and by a thousand other accidents to
which goods when carried either by sea or by land, or even
, . 19 ■' /when stored in a warehouse, are liable.
Smith clearly sees that if the net revenue of a firm is 
apportioned between payments to labour, land, and capital there is a 
residual. The question as to whom this accrues and why, is still 
being debated today, •
/ V ' -
One of the most fertile suggestions towards its solution was 
made by Frank H. Knight when he pointed out that the problem is - 
essentially that costs are undertaken before the point of sale.
If the price at-which sale is to take place is uncertain then 
revenue cannot be fully imputed to productive services - not 
even when the services provided by the owner-manager are included, 
Knight chooses to confine the words * pure profit* to this unimputable. V
21 ■residual. Smith tries to impute it to the owner-manager but, m  so 
doing, blurs his otherwise careful distinction between income accruing 
;to the'services of capital and income accruing,to the services 
provided by the owner-manager. * -
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Since the publication of Knight's classic, it has been common 
;to castigate Smith for not seeing from Canti.iIon the importance of 
the residual nature of the entrepreneurial income under conditions : 
of uncertainty. Cantillon, writing between 1730 and 1734, anticipated 
Knight in emphasising the variability in an element of the income 
accruing to the business leader - due to the unforeseen vagaries 
of market conditions. Cantillon attributed this uncertainty to 
the weather (governing’supply in agricultural markets) and 
fluctuations in demand: the sale price is uncertain because the 
quantity to be placed on the market depends on the harvest which is 
yet to be reaped. The future needs and incomes of buyers are.also
unknown - as are the competitive actions rivals are likely to .
22 . . ’ - take. This much is contained m  Smith. «
However, Cantillon is one step closer to Knight in his taxonomy.
Cantillon contrasts the fixed incomes of those on contractual wages
• 23with the uncertain nature of the entrepreneurial income. But,
' t
the use to which Cantillon puts this distinction, in his theories of 
\the allocation of resources and of the distribution of income, is 
as confusing as that of Smith. Like Smith, Cantillon fails to
* ' tacknowledge that the uncertain nature of the income of a business 
t leader has an)' implications for the allocation of the resources of 
business leadership. Like Smith, Cantillon fails to see that^given 
the ex ante uncertainty of business returns, factors ^ will accept those 
contractual arrangements which best fit their propensity to bear 
uncertainty. In the following passage from the Essai the returns to 
business leadership are treated as a Marshallian supply price.
All these Undertakers become consumers and customers one in 
regard to the other, the Draper of the Wine Merchant and vice
■f *They proportion themselves in a State to the Customersversa.
or consumption. If there are too many Hatters in a City .
- or in a street for the number of people who buy hats' there,
some who are.least patronised must become bankrupt; if: r’
' they be too few it will be a profitable Undertaking which 
will encourage new Hatters to open shops there and so it is
that the Undertakers of all kinds adjust themselves to risks
• c -  24 ■ ■m  a State.
Perhaps it should be re-emphasised that the labelling of a 
particular aspect of business leadership as ’entrepreneurial’ fails 
to constitute, by itself, a theory either of the firm or of anything 
else.
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The distinction between contractual incomes and the uncertain 
income of the business leader proved a fruitful starting point for
the deductive constructions of later theorists. Cantillon 
contributed this distinction; but he failed to proceed beyond the 
stage of taxonomy in the theory of the entrepreneur.
Motivational Hypothesis
Along with his predecessors and contemporaries, Smith considered 
that, as a matter of fact, people are motivated by self-interest in 
'their market dealings. The assumption of self-interest is maintained 
consistently throughout The Wealth of Nations, not merely as the 
conditional of an , ’if...then’ hypothesis, but also as a fact of life.
IIis assumption of self-interest is not merely a statement of the 
limits to the applicability of his theory but rather it is a statement 
of fact. Because (not ’if’) people are motivated in this way, 
one can reason in the following manner ...
At one time it was popular to puzzle over the compatibility of 
this statement with the non-egoistic psychology contained in The Theory
29
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of Moral. Sentiments, Whatever one's solution to the puzzle, it'is 
clear that Smith was consistent in his maintainance of the proposition, 
that when people deal in markets they are motivated by self-interest.
From the time of the scholastics, the principle of the self-
interest of business leaders had been equated with the proposition
26that they attempt to maximise net revenue. While this self- 
interest was often condemned, it was thought to be accurate as a 
description of those business leaders who were sinful. - .
C L  . .Aquinas in the Summa quotes Augustine reporting 'the saying of
a certain actor was accepted by alls "you wish to buy cheap and sell 
27dear"...,. But to pay .less than the just price is wicked under, 
divine law and every person should try to '...attain such justice as 
to resist and overcome this desire.,.'. 'Hence it is evident that,this 
common desire is not natural but due to wickedness, and hence is
common to many who travel the broad road of sin.' 23
The English merchant pamphleteers of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were generally free from scholastic influence 
and were concerned very little with the broad road of sin - at
least in their economic writings. However, they agreed with the\
1 * scholastic proposition that business leaders strive to maximise their 
net revenue. ' ■
In A Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England
(written around 1549) it is stated that merchants, '...buy cheap,and
sell dear and won't sell to us if they can get a higher price 
°9somewhere else.
This vie;; is repeated in the Discourse of Corporations (1587-39?) 
again with reference to merchants/ that 'the marchant hath ever eie
., ' ■ - - , *30 'to his gaine' - 'his greatest proffitt.*
On reading this pamphlet literature it becomes clear that the- ’
maximisation of net revenue is the aim not only of merchants, but of;
all traders. 'The chief End or Business of Trade [[defined as the
making and selling of one sort of goods for another]] is to make a
31profitable bargain...* - ,
Cantillon and Quesriay similarly postulate that business leaders
aim to maximise their net revenue. So it comes as no surprise to
find Sir James Steuart referring to self-interest as 'the ruling '
principle of my subject',^ Steuart identifies self-interest with
the desire of business leaders to maximise their net revenue,
Steuart points out that the use of this hypothesis, while generally ,
accurate as a description of reality, has a further justification in
its utility. 'I exclude here the sentiment of charity, ' This
alone, as I have often observed, is a principle of multiplication,
and if it was admitted here it would ruin all my supposition?
but as true it is, on the other hand, that could the poor fellow
have got bread by begging, he would not probably have gone 
33a-hunting.•
/
1 1  Unlike Steuart, Smith does’not choose the net-revenue-maximisation 
assumption for utilitarian reasons. His sole justification are the
V. - >
facts of. the world of trade. But, in aiming for an accurate •' 
description of reality, he places severe qualifications on his 
profit-maximisation hypothesis.
34 .The first qualification is that mentioned above with reference 
to joint-stock companies from which it is clear that, given ,
monopoly power, the leaders of a joint-stock company do not pursues
their self-interest by maximising net revenue unless they are large 
holders of the capital of the firm. Smith's opposition to joint-, 
stock companies is based on the fact that they do not necessarily'
a» ‘
pursue the minimisation of unit costs implied by the maximisation 
of profit. They do not minimise costs because the self-interest of 
those in positions of power does not lead them to maximise the.return, 
on the funds invested in the company. ■ .
But even capitalists do not necessarily seek to maximise their
net return. While Smith insists that: 'The consideration of his
'own private profit, is the sole motive which determines the owner
of any capital to employ it either in agriculture, in manufactures,'
35or in some particular branch of the wholesale or retail trade...,'
it appears ten pages later that he only holds to this statement if
. /
* profit’ is used to mean private valuation. For, even when the 
business leader uses.his own capital, providing there is a margin 
between reyenue and costs, the producer may pursue policies 
,inconsistent with the maximisation of profit. Slaves are a high- 
cost form of labour according to Smithj but because man loves to 
domineer: 'Wherever the law allows it, and the nature of the work 
can'afford it []as is the case with sugar and tobacco]]» therefore,
36, be will generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen,!
The raising of com is insufficiently profitable to support the 
luxury of slaves. '
While there are scattered comments such that the entrants to a 
hazardous industry are attracted by the 'presumptuous hope of 
success' , the distinction between anticipated net revenue and net 
revenue measured ex-post is never explicitly,made. In The Wealth of 
Nations there is a simultaneous emphasis on the factual variability 
of profits, and an operating assumption that, with the exception of
certain ’harzardous* trades, business uncertainty in the Knightian
sense is not a major factor to be considered. It is by such an
implicit operating assumption that Smith is enabled to construct a _
model of equilibrium in markets which is produced by business
leaders entering when the rates of profit are higher than normal .
(and scooping some of this excess profit as expected) and leaving
when the rate of profit is below normal. This process is re-told
as though no thought has been given to the possibility that
38expectations may be confounded,
2. COSTS AND COST FUNCTIONS 
The Division of Labour
The first three chapters of The Wealth of Nations, containing 
Smith’s remarks on the division of labour, are widely known.''
'However, one aspect of this discussion deserves a further airing: 
the relationship between the division of labour and the organisation 
of industry. In particular, this section will examine Smith’s
theorem that, ’the division of labour is limited by the extent of the
39 - ■ • .market*.
fl This theorem has been notably fertile in its offspring. To
quote one of the most successful midwives: 'That theorem, I have
*> , '
always thought, is one of the most illuminating and fruitful general-,
+s 40- isations which can be.found in the whole literature of economics.*
Remarks on the advantages.of the specialisation of labour 
have been recorded at least since the time of Plato, For this 
reason it is easy to discount the objective originalit3r of thèse 
three chapters of The Wealth, of Nations. A formidable list of <
’precursors’ can be compiled from Carman’s footnotes and Viner’s
introduction to Rae*s Life.. Schumpeter.claims•that-Petty anticipated
Smith on the division of labour, ‘including its dependence on the
size of markets'^, However, Petty’s writings give no more than-
, »*
heavil3r-vei led hints towards the discussion we find in Thev Health 
of Rations.^ The uniqueness of Smith's discussion lies in the 
prominence it gives to the relationship between the division of 
labour and forms of industrial organisation.
Categories of Division
Under the heading of the division of labour Smith outlines 
three distinct categories:
(i) division within a plant;
(ii) division within a firm but between plants; and .
Ciii) division between firms.
Biicher suggests that these may be called subdivision of labour,
43division of production, and division of trades respectively.
Each of these three will be discussed in turn.
That Smith chose to draw his example of the division of labour,
from a pin factory rather than from the nearby Carron iron works is 1
a puzzle to T.S. Ashton; but one, he hastens to add, whose solvit ion »1 , ,
is obvious. 'Adam Smith was anxious to isolate the results of the
application of his celebrated principle from those, of the use of
' *nmachinery and power. The pin trade employed only simple.appliances: 
it was almost ideal for his purpose. This particular solution 
to the puzzle, far from being obvious, is incorrect.
The correct solution, as Viner indicates in his introduction to' 
Rae's Life, is to be found in Smith’s own explanation. Smith's 
example was chosen to illustrate the subdivision of labour rather
than the 'less obvious' division of production. . For this purpose h 
needed'a 'trifling manufacture' whose production was confined to a 
single plant. • • ■
...in those trifling manufactures which are destined to supply 
the small wants of but a small number of people, the whole 
number of workmen must necessarily be smallj and those 
employed in every branch of the work can often be collected 
into the same workhouse, and placed at once under the view 
of the spectator. In those great manufactures, on the 
contrary, which are destined to supply the great wants of the 
great body of the people, every different branch of the work
employs so great a number of workmen, that it is impossible to
. 45collect them all into the same workhouse.
The three different forms of the division of labour must be
carefully distinguished when reading the first three chapters of 
; \ ■
The Wealth of Nations. '
The Meaning of thè 'Market'
v The Wealth of Nations, like Marshall's Industry and Trade, " 
uses the word ’market’ to refer to an area of exchange. According 
to the demands of the context, this may be the area of sale of onet i - _
firm, of a group of firms, or of all the firms in the economy.
In Bk.I, Ch.3 - headed, ’That the division of labour is limited' 
by the Extent of the Market’ - Smith gives examples reflating the 
division of.trades to the growth of the economy as a whole, But 
the many, meanings he attaches to the word ’market’ elsewhere in 
Thè Wealth of Nations suggest the possibility that the theorem 
applies to the three forms of the division of labour as limited 
by the area of sale of a firm, of a group of firms (industry?) or 
of the economy as a whole.
(i) That the subdivision of labour is limited by the sales of the fir
' ,'i ' ‘ . ' • ’ • - ,'v- / ■ • " . . .  '
With the refinement of the model of perfect competition following 
the death of Marshall, the factors limiting the size of firms became' 
a matter of vital interest. If homogeneity of, product is assumed, 
together with a large number of producers who pursue no policy but 
that of adjusting the quantities they dump on the market,then clearly _ 
demand does not limit the size of any particular firm. The 
limitation apparently must arise from the rising marginal costs 
encountered by the firm as it expands its output.
As will be seen, Smith’s model of free competition requires 
neither the assumption of product homogeneity nor the assumption of 
'large numbers’.' Smith does not explore the issue of the 
determinants of the size of the firm, at least not within the 
context of his freely competitive model. His usual operating 
assumption is that the scale of each.firm increases as the- industry 
expands. The consequent higher rates of production by each firm 
give access to economies.
The increase of demand, besides, though in the beginning it 
may sometimes raise the price of goods, never fails to lower 
i t it in fhe long run. It encourages production, and thereby ' 
increases the .competition of the producers, who, in order 
to undersell one another, have recourse to new divisions of
labour and new improvements of art, which might never ,
■ » 45i. otherwise have been thought of.
It seems reasonable to ask of The Wealth of Nations why, if firms 
are competitive and have access to lower unit costs through the.expans 
af their sales, do they, not cut their prices prior'to the expansion 
^ the general market and so expand at . the expense of their rivals?
The clear answer to this question from within The Wealth of 
. Nations is that the economies are due, not merely to changes in the-; 
scale of the firm, but also to changes in the firm's production 
function caused by the expansion. In geometrical language, the 
expansion of output may not merely involve a movement along.a - 
long-run average cost curve, but also'a downward"displacement of 
that curve because of inventive activity occasioned by the process 
of expansion. Smith was aware that people learn by doing.
For Smith, the process of the division of labour is 
occasioned by the continued development of manual and organisational 
skills and of technical knowledge, rather than by a firm realising 
that it is marginally profitable to undertake certain activities 
the possibility of which it was always aware. The firm does not , 
cut its price so it can learn by trying to increase its output 
because it does not know that it will learn anything find thereby 
lower its costs.
The historical nature of these decreasing costs explains why 
they are consistent with a competitive equilibrium. However,
Smith does not offer any alternative to increasing costs as an 
explanation as to the determinants of the allocation of output 
among the firms in a market'. The increasing cost solution was first 
offered by Cournot; and Marshall provided an alternative which!is 
consistent with the model of The Wealth of Nations.^*/
(ii) That*the division of trades is limited by the demand for
the product .
This subheading is perhaps a more accurate summary of the text 
of Bk.I, Ch.3 of The Wealth of Nations than is that offered bj'
Smith. His thesis is that people/-can only work full-time at a
37
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particular trade if there is a sufficient,.demand■,at the natural price
to keep them fully-employed. In the
diagram at left, the full-time
specialisation of a nail-maker can
only occur if the demand ofx nails
at a price ^ represents the rate of
output of at least one nail-maker when
working full-time at the making of <
nails. From this illustration it is
. \clear that the advantages arising from 
the division of trades are contingent
on the possibilities the specialist 
has for sale. To secure the widening 
of markets, Smith advocates the abolition of barriers to competition, 
improvements in transportation, and the expansion of colonial 
settlements and of foreign trade.
The localisation of productive activity as a means of market 
expansion was advocated by Edward Gibbon Wakefield in his schemes for 
the British colonies. The schemes were designed to limit, the area♦ i ,
over which productive activities took place in order to lessen the 
costs of trade between producers. The facilitation of trade would
enable the division of trades with the attendant advantages outlined
_• \  ' .
A8in Bk.I of The Wealth of Nations.
. • ' 49Stigler has also written an article inspired by Bk.I, Ch.3. 
Sti’gler proposes that we view the firm as engaging in a series of 
distinct operations, each exhibiting varying cost functions -when 
cost is expressed as a function of the total ’output’ of the firm.
' A s  the demand for the final product expands it becomes profitable for 
.'■firms/to specialise in those operations which are subject to, 
decreasing average costs, He predicts that vertical disintegration 
is the typical development in growing industries, while vertical 
integration will be the typical development in declining industries.
If there are no economies arising from the integration of , 
processes (that is, that the cost functions of the various processes 
are independent), as Stigler assumes for simplicity, then it is 
difficult to see why a process exhibiting uniformly increasing 
returns and undertaken by more than one firm should not be 
specialised, no matter what the rate of sales of the final product 
happens to be. Stigler specif icall}' discounts the defence of the 
high cost of inter-firm transfers but suggests that, 'at any given 
time these functions may be too small to support a specialised firm 
or f i r m s * . G i v e n  his assumptions, it is hard to see why this 
could be so. If the specialised firm can undertake the process and 
offer it at a price lower than the cost of production to the integrated 
firms, why should the specialised firm not be established?
Apart from this a priori objection, it is not clear from 
observation that vertical disintegration is the typical development
•_ i ■in growing industries and vertical integration the typical development 
in declining industries.  ^ ■
Herbert-Spencer*s *law of increasing heterogeneity and 
definiteness'in structure and function* predicts (although the 
reasoning is rather unclear) increasing specialisation of .business 
tasks into separate organisational units as the economy grows over 
time. (Stigler's theor}' implies this proposition.) Beatrice Webb's 
father (a substantial, mid-Victorian entrepreneur) dismissed
Spencer's law in this wise: ’Words, my dear, mere words. v’
Experience tells me that some businesses grow diverse and 
complicated, others get simpler and more uniform, others againgo 
into the Bankruptcy Court. In the long run and over the whole ' 
field there is no more reason for expecting one'process than the 
other.’5  ^ "
The more carefui observations by Laffer of corporations in the
53 'United States for the period 1929-65 yield much the same 
generalisation.
(iii) That the division of labour is limited by aggregate demand
In his chapters on the division of labour Smith was not so ■ 
much concerned with the division of industry-wide markets among . 
firms as with the ways in which the expansion of sales increases 
the wealth of nations, and the effects of changes in costs on the 
long-range movements in the prices of commodities. 'Tor these 
purposes Smith was not overly concerned to distinguish between 
movements within a given production function and changes in the 
production function. Indeed, he explicitly outlines reasons for 
the interdependence between increases in sales and the technical •
54progress which may result from that increased scale of production.
» i , , .
It is the interdependence between the expansion of the 
aggregate.demand for goods and the expansion of aggregate output 
which Allyn Young explores in his famous article { and it is 
from th'is article that the various models of ’balanced growth’ 'of 
the past fifty years have received their'inspiration.55
:■, 3 9 .. ■ . ^
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3. EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY UNDER COMPETITION
The successors to Adam Smith have spent much time and effort 
unravelling his theories of.value. This section will not attempt 
finally to dispose of the myth that The Wealth of Nations contains
57a labour theory of value, that task already has been accomplished; 
rather it will be concerned to outline the theory of the firm which 
underpins the analysis.
Smith's discussion of market price and natural price is conducted 
on the assumption that conditions of free competition prevail. The 
meaning and implications of this assumption will be explored in the 
following section. This section will examine the relationship 
between market price and natural price. .
In the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century 
there came into currency in France and Britain a distinction in 
analysis between the price to be observed in markets (market value 
or price) and the unit cost of production (instrinsic, fundamental,
■ or natural value). While many x^riters adopted this distinction, 
its significance for analysis depended on the problem the writer was 1 
addressing.1
* i 58Nicholas Barbon , one of the first to propose the distinction, 
suggested that the value of things to some 'little' extent reflects 
the cost involved in.their production, 'Little' empirical content , 
is conveyed by this'proposition. The market conditions likely to 
facilitate the approximation are not specified and no mechanism is 
suggested as to how deviations of price ,from unit cost should 
initiate stabilising activity - even if that is what the author 
proposed.
hi.
In his use of the distinction between /intrinsic' value 
(measuring the quantit}' and quality of labour and land used in 
production) and market price, Cantillon did not advance beyond Barbon 
Cantillon assumes that market price in some way reflects intrinsic 
value and then proceeds further to explain intrinsic value by 
means of his famous par between land and labour.
Achilla Nicholas Boisguilbert^ and Sir James Steuart^ 
produced theories in which the relationship between real value and 
price (the relationship reflecting the incentive to produce) plays 
a key role in the equilibrium and disequilibrium of the aggregate 
level of productive activity. However, neither of these writers 
developed an interesting theory of the firm to underpin this analysis 
of aggregate equilibrium.
More interesting, for our present purpose, are those writers who 
used the distinction to generate hypotheses concerning the allocation 
of resources between alternative productive activities. In'this 
connection the work of Joseph Harris and Turgot will be discussed 
along with that of Smith.
Equilibrium and Stability . ^
t t The concepts of equilibrium and stability are central to a 
discussion of the theory of value outlined in The Health of Nations.^ 
An equilibrium position is one from which there is no tendency for 
change. This study will speak of the stability of equilibrium 
in the sense of Samuelson's perfect stability of the first kind: 
an equilibrium position is stable if from any initial conditions all
the variables approach their equilibrium values in the limit as
' * 62time becomes infinite. To determine normal or natural values (as 
with Smithian natural value) certain variables are assumed constant
and natural values can then be computed as,functions of time.
The Wealth of Nations outlines the concept of natural price in 
the following way: 'When the price of any commodity is neither more 
nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the-land, the wages 
of labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing,
and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, the'
i ■ 63 ’ "commodity is then ,sold for what: may be called its natural price.’
Unlike Cantillon’s intrinsic value, Smith's natural price is not
constant through time as in some stationary state, rather it is* an
equilibrium value moving through time. Indeed, the Digression
concerning the variations in the Value of Silver (in Bk.I, Ch.XI) is
concerned to explain such changes in natural price over the course of
the centuries. , ■
However, within the context of his discussion of the allocation 
of resources between.industries (in particular, Bk.I, Ch.VII) Smith 
implicity assumes that natural price (unit cost) is constant for 
changes in output within the neighbourhood of the equilibrium rates 
of production. This does not mean that Smith assumed a production
function with constant returns to scale. In the digression on .
■ , „ \
silver, Smith expresses input costs and technical progress as functions 
i t ' V . ■
of scale, The temporary assumption that natural price is constant ,
for changes in output within.the neighbourhood of equilibrium rates of
production is used to simplify the discussion of equilibrium and
stability.  ^For this reason", while considering'Smith's discussion. 1
of the allocation of resources between activities, it is possible
to imagine Smith's natural price as a Marshallian long-period
supply curve, as in the diagram overleaf. , v
Smith’s natural price is defined as unit cost plus unit normal 
profit computed at the market rate. Profit is not classed as a 
cost but is included in the supply price along with the costs. The 
inclusion of profit on capital as an element in natural price was, 
not acknowledged before Turgot and Smith. Turgot is clear that 
unless the owners of capital gain as good returns in a particular
venture as they could in another, they will not devote their capital
 ^ , 64to that particular venture.
, Smith relates this return to the stock of capitalIt,  is not the
retuiri which governs the decision,of the capitalist, but the rate of * • •
return on capital invested. With The Wealth of Nations that rate of 
return or> capital (the supply price of capital) is used to calculate 
input unit supply prices before these are summed to compute a product's 
natural value. This step is rightly praised by Meek: 'The most significant 
theoretical advance which Adam Smith made over the work of his
predecessors was undoubtedly his inclusion of profit on capital as a
■1 ' ■ . . 65 -constituent element in the supply price of commodities.* , '
It was noted above that for the analysis of resource allocation 
between activities, The Wealth of Nations assumes that natural-price 
is constant for changes in output in the neighbourhood of equilibrium 
rates of production. The constancy'of the natural price of output 
implies.that its constituent parts (the natural prices of.factors) 
are also constant. So no changes in factor prices occur except 
those necessary to cause a movement towards equilibrium from a /
disequilibrium position. The natural prices of factors do not change 
between equilibrium positions. This latter requirement is not 
particularly stringent in the case of labour - whose natural price is 
determined independently of commodity markets. Nor is it upsetting 
in the case of capital; for The Wealth of Nations provides us with 
few clues at all as to the determinants of the rate of profit.
However, in the case of land, Ch.XI of Bk.I explicitly outlines the 
relationship between the scale of production of a commodity and 
changes in rent. It is in this case that the temporary assumption 
in Bk.I, Ch.VII of constant natural prices of factors that the 
greatest leap of the imagination is needed.
i t ,
The demand function represented on the above diagram is 
positioned independently of influences in the commodity market.
Smith does not outline precisely the form of the demand*function; 
but the negative relationship of quantity demanded to price is an 
hypothesis utilised at many points throughout The Wealth of Nations.^
Stabilisation Mechanism
Harris, Turgot and Smith share in common a theory of the 
allocation of resources between industries in which equilibrium occurs
when the market price (the price observed) is equal to the natural 
price. Galiani was another mid-eighteenth century theorist who
outlined a clear notion of an equilibrium allocation of resources.
\ ' * 
'between industries. His Della Moneta (1751) argues that the ;
equilibrium stabilises .in response to disturbances as the system tends
towards an equilibrium position. The analyses of Turgot and Smith' 1
are, similar in this respect.
Galiani supposes that a country entirely Mohammedan is converted 
to Christianity. This creates an increased demand for wine which 
consequently rises in price. Given that they seek to make profit 
’from the base incentive of sordid gain’, merchants will begin to 
import wine. An equilibrium position ma}' soon be resumed, but, 
often, »... so many additional people go into this branch of industry, 
impetuously but too late, attracted by the first reports and the first 
examples, that its value falls below what is just; and then all 
begin to withdraw, each one paying the penalty for his rashness, 
and the just limit is reached again.’ Galiani( mentions the aquatic 
analogy which later becomes a commonplace in the literature of value 
analysis. ’From this two important consequences flow. First, that 
it is not necessary to consider the first developments in a case, but 
the*permanent and fixed conditions, and in that there is always order
and equality; just as water in a vessel, if disturbed, returns to the
1 ■ 67due level after a confused and irregular fluctuation...’
The equilibrium system outlined by Harris has as a condition of 
equilibrium that the price equals intrinsic value plus a margin of
f/  ■profit.
/. Men’s various necessities and appetites, oblige them to part
with their own commodities, at a rate proportionable to the labour
and skill that hath been bestowed upon those things, which 
they want in exchange: If they will not comply with the . 
market their goods will remain on-their hands; and if at 
first one trade be more profitable than another, skill 
as well as labour and risques of all sorts, being taken into 
account; more men will enter into that business, and in. • 
their outcrying will undersell one another, till at length 
the great profit of it is brought down to a par with the
Turgot and Smith outline an equilibrium of resource allocation 
in which'the market price is in equilibrium (corresponding to 
Marshall's market-period equilibrium) and the market price equals the 
natural or necessary price (corresponding to Marshall's long-period 
normal).
\
In explaining his condition for equilibrium of the market price, ,
Smith's language gives rise to confusion.' 'The market price af
every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion between
thé quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of
those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or^
the.whole value of the rent, labour and profit, which must be paid 
% * , 69 / ,m  order to bring it thither.’ In other words, the market price 
is a function of the proportion between the quantity which would be 
demanded at the natural price and the quantity supplied"during the 
time period under consideration.
, This statement, quite unexceptionable in a chapter explaining the 
relationship between market price and natural price, is criticised 
by J .S,Mill.^° Smith was interested in establishing this relationship 
because he was concerned to explain the equilibrium of resource
allocation between industries. Mill demands clarity in the
, . ■ ' ' ' ' ' ' '
explanation of market price: he demands that the condition for 
market price equilibrium be that the-quantity demanded equal the ^ , 
quantity supplied.^
Neither in Reflexions nor in The Wealth of Nations do * '
equilibrium conditions require that the rate of return on capital be
equal between industries. (Ex post and ex ante profit are not
distinguished .) Even given free competition - an assumption implicit
in Turgot and explored at length by Smith - equilibrium in resource
allocation is consistent with those differences in profitability
which are explained by extraordinary factors. These extraordinary
72 73factors are the varying degrees of agreeability or of risk which 
may require or encourage a capitalist to accept a higher or a lower 
return than normal. , Risk is an attractioxi to the Smithian 
capitalist, but a disincentive to that of Turgot.
As with Della Moneta, The Wealth of Nations illustrates the 
stability of the equilibrium quantity of production. If, because, 
of a public mourning, the quantity of black cloth supplied is less 
than the equilibrium quantity, market price will be higher than the 
natural price. The rate of profit in that industry will rise. 
Traditional suppliers or (given knowledge and mobility) new rivals 
will move to capture some of this profit. The returns to labour 
and capital will remain above their natural rates until resources 
flow into the*activity and equilibrium is re-established. The new 
equilibrium will be characterised by an equality between the market 
price of the commodity and the natural price of the commodity, 
equality between the market prices and the natural prices of the 
factors, and equality between the rates of profit on capital between 
industries (making allowance for variations in risk and agreeability).
The stabilising resource flows seem to be such that factor 
proportions are kept constant - at least when this story of resource 
allocation is being told. The flows of resources may take place,, 
within the structure of the existing firms, or ma}’- take the form of 
new firms entering. There is no limit to the size of firms.
However, there may be.impediments to these stabilising resource 
flows; .and it is in outlining these barriers to the attainment of 
equilibrium that the process of decision-making within the firm is 
elaborated. The impediments to the fre'e movement of resources
7/constitute Smith's definition of monopoly. Within The Wealth of 
Nations 'monopoly' is usually taken to mean a barrier to the 
attainment of equilibrium. Sometimes the word is restricted to 
those barriers to the free flow of resources which could be removed 
by government action. The next section will explore these elements 
of market structure. s.
Free Competition
The term 'free competition* is used in The Wealth of Nations 
to refer to that process whereby a party (unimpeded by government) 
acts to achieve a position which is incompatible with that desired 
by5 a rival. ... For Smith, the significance of free competition consists 
primarily in its being the conduit by which resources move to the 
equilibrium’allocation outlined in the previous section. Rivalry 
can either come from a.firm established in the industry or from a 
firm moving into this area of competition; If there is only one 
producer or if there is an agreement between established firms the 
internal competitive process may be thwarted. A government franchise 
may prevent rivalry from outside the group of established firms. 
Whichever way the flow of resources is impeded, the restriction is
labelled by Smith as ’monopolistic*. The Smithian category of 
monopoly is not restricted td a single firm industry, but encompasses' 
any means by which the process of rivalry is lessened. . •
It is important to recognise that the concepts of free competition 
and monopolistic restriction relate to the competitive process and to 
the corresponding resource flows. The extent to which this 
process is free is a matter of degree; and, conversely, so is the 
extent of monopolistic restriction. For this reason it is impossible 
to outline the conditions required by The Wealth of Nations before 
competition could be said to exist. It is also difficult to specify 
the degree of competition which must exist before resource flows are _ 
stabilising. For resource flows take place over time and a mono­
polistic barrier operating at the present (for example, an agreement 
by established firms) may be inoperative next year (when new rival . 
firms may enter the market). However it is possible to outline those 
factors which tend to facilitate or to impede the competitive process.
The number of competitors is likely to influence the degree of 
freedom of competition in that with fewer competitors collusion is , 
facilitated. - '
14 The inhabitants of a town, being collected into one place,, 
can easily combine together. The most insignificant trades 
carried on in towns have accordingly, in some place or other, 
been incorporated; and even where they have never been 
incorporated, yet the corporation spirit, the jealousy of 
strangers, the aversion to take apprentices, or to communicate 
the secret of their trade, generally prevail in them, and 
often teach them, by voluntary associations and agreements,
.to prevent that free competition, which they cannot prohibit
50
by bye-laws. The trades which employ but a small number of
75i hands, run most easily into such combinations.
The smaller the number of producers, the easier it is to combine. 
Combination, both tacit^ and by means of bye-laws, can limit the 
possibility of rivalry between established firms. This facilitation 
of combination is the only way proposed by Smith by which small 
numbers can restrict the process of free competition.
In discussing the inequalities of wages and profit occasioned by 
77the Policy of Europe, Smith often mentions the effect of Policy in 
Restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number 
than might otherwise be disposed to enter them.' But this evil is 
placed alongside those evil policies which ’increase the number beyond 
what it would naturally be’. In this context the policy which 
creates 'small numbers' refers to limitations on the supply of 
productive services, and the number of competitors is taken as a 
proxy for this supply.
While we are given no theory placing limits on the size of firms» 
we must suppose that Smith is referring to small-scale craft workshops 
ln which case an increase in productive services is normally 
associated with an increased number of firms. Whatever the 
Nationalisations made, 'small' is used in the sense of 'fewer than
* r
Would exist under equilibrium conditions', and not in any sense by 
^hich numbers would tend to affect the degree of freedom of
competition.
i
Combinations are often sufficient to prevent competition from 
established members of the industry; but such combinations are 
Niilikely to-be sustained unless competition both from abroad and from 
new local competitors can be prevented. Smith often castigates the
government for establishing such barriers to the free flow of 
resources. Even in cases approximating neo-classical large.numbers'
«
(as in the case of livestock rearing.in eighteenth-century England) 
such restrictions are labelled as ’monopolistic/.
In times of moderate plenty, the importation of foreign 
com is loaded with duties that amount to prohibition.
The importation of,live cattle, except from Ireland, is 
prohibited at all times, and it is but of late that it was 
permitted from thence. Those who cultivate the land, 
therefore, have a monopoly against their countrymen for
the two greatest and most important articles of land
78 :produce, bread and butcher’s meat. 1 -■
Bk.I,•chs.VII and X creates the impression that government policy 
ls responsible for all those immobilities which produce dis­
equilibrium allocations. Turgot creates the same impression,
79deferring to ’statuts sans nombre dictes par 1’esprit de monopole’ j 
aud many early nineteenth-century English economists convey a similar 
attitude.
There is modem evidence'to suggest that today non-government 
furriers to entry are significant.^ But it is important to remember 
°th the ease of raising finance in eighteenth-century England, 
and the ubiquity of- government franchises - many of which had survived 
Slnce the times of'the Tudors and Stuarts. x
One other impediment to free resource movement mentioned by Smith
should be noted; lack of knowledge. Producers who can keep a secret
°f. their extraordinary profits may lessen the threat from rivals for
the duration of the secret. Or, even if the profits are known, they
*
■may De sustained so long as the process of production is kept secret.0
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Perfect Competition .
i It is possible to interpret the above discussion as indicating , 
the stability conditions for a Smithian stable equilibrium. Resource 
allocation will only move towards equilibrium given factor mobility, 
perfect knowledge, and price elasticity of the supply of factors. 
Given this interpretation The Wealth of Nations may be seen as an 
important predecessor of the model of perfect competition which 
emerged at about the time of the death of Marshall. However,
Smith’s model of equilibrium differs from the model of perfect 
competition in two important respects.
In the first place, the structural assumptions made in 
The Wealth of Nations are far less demanding than those of the model 
of perfect competition. Smith's model is consistent with 
product differentiation and does not require large numbers of 
competitors. Providing that there are no impediments to free 
movement of resources, market price will continually be gravitating 
towards the natural price - which itself is some equilibrium moving 
through time. Occasional!}' words are used implying boundaries to 
the areas of competition (the concept of the industry), but the 
concept of the industry is not essential for the analysis.
The analysis of intrinsic: value (cost based) and market price
r
(determined by supply and demand) in Cantilion's Essai is, compared 
with that of The Wealth of Nations, notably free of any analysis of 
the decisions made by the participants in the market. Because the 
contains no analysis of monopoly, no contrast is drawn between 
the intrinsic value / market price analysis and that of monopoly.
T * .  .  .is this contrast in The Wealth of Nations which reveals the 
^ Sa6gregative foundations of Smith's value, analysis. But, as with 
Wraith, we should be careful not to say of Cantilion that he
'reasoned on the hypothesis of the most perfect of perfect
84 • .competitions'. Like Smith, Cantillon's intrinsic-value-equals-
market-price equilibrium is consistent with a wide range of
assumptions regarding market structure. In outlining the bargaining
process involved in the determination of market price, Cantil'lon
explicitly refers to market price often depending 'upon the
eagerness or easy temperament of a few Buyers'or Sellers (d'un
85petit nombre d'Acheteurs, ou de Vendeurs)'. He immediately
follows this with an example of this bar.gaining process in which the 
buyers number four.
The second important difference between Smithian competition . 
and the model of perfect competition is that in The Wealth of Nations 
the significance of the natural value / market value equilibrium 
analysis lies not in the characteristics of equilibrium but in the
trole played by the 'stability conditions'. Hicks notes the 
relationship between stability conditions and laws of change.
The laws of change of the price-system, like the laws of 
change of individual demand, have to be derived from 
stability conditions. We first examine what conditions are 
necessary in order that a given equilibrium system should 
be stable; then we make an assumption of regularity that 
positions in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium positiori 
will be stable also; and thence we deduce rules about the 
way in which the price-system will react to changes in 
tastes and resources.
• Marshall's praise of the value analysis contained in The Wealth 
of Nations is recorded in the P r i n c i p l e s Like Marshall, Smith 
is concerned to outline the way in which the allocation of resources
will alter through time. , Hie question is posed: given a situation 
in time i , what will be the situation in time-period t-H? In 
attempting to answer this question, Smith stresses the nature of 
impediments to the mobility of resources (monopoly) and the ways in 
which those impediments are overcome. This approach may be 
contrasted with the theory of perfect competition which concentrates 
on stating the conditions required for equilibrium. The advantage 
of the dynamic emphasis of Smith and Marshall is that it may yield • 
predictions as to what will happen and when.
An equilibrium solution yields no proposition whose truth content 
is easily testable. Statements relating an equilibrium position to 
observable phenomena are usually invalid inferences from.the theory.
It is not correct to say that the natural price is some sort.of 
average of the market prices observed. Such a statement will 
only be true if the ’shocks* caused by changes in the ’parametrical* 
variables are of a particularly regular type.
Rather, the analysis of the equilibrium position(s) is only one 
step in the direction of a testable hypothesis. Once equilibrium 
conditions have been stated, it is necessary to outline the stability 
conditions which determine the direction (and possibly the rate) of 
change in the variables. If these stability conditions are so
rvague that they merely predict that the system will move from one 
equilibrium position to another, then the prediction yielded by the 
model is merely as to the direction in which variables will change.
However, if by a careful estimation of the stability conditions, 
the model can predict accurately the rate at which variables will 
move over time, the truth content of the model.will have been greatly 
increased;, for the model will then predict the values of variables at 
specific points in time.
It will emerge, as the study proceeds, that the careful 
articulation of stability conditions is a leading characteristic of , 
the English classical school. By adopting this approach, Adam 
Smith and Alfred Marshall have moved the theory of value towards 
greater verisimilitude.
4. MONOPOLY
In the light of the preceding discussion, it may seem strange
that Smith's theory of monopoly comes in for such a battering at 
• •
the hands of the commentators.
Schumpeter declares of The Wealth of Nations: 'There is no 
theory of monopoly. The proposition (Bk.I, ch.7) that "the price 
of monopoly is upon ever}' occasion the highest which can be got" might
be the product of a not very intelligent layman - taken literally, it
88 * 89is not even true.' De Eoover claims that Smith ignored price „ .
elasticity of demand in this remark. Cannan's forthright style
also finds vent: 'Smith seems to have been strangely forgetful of
the meaning of "monopoly" when he declared that the rent of land
was "naturally a monopoly price". By derivation and in ordinary
usage a person who ..has a monopoly of anything is one who is the
90only person who has the power of selling it.'
. r
If the word 'monopoly' is considered to mean that impediment 
to the free flow of resources which permits a differential between 
market price and natural price to persist, the above objections lose 
their force. Moreover, Smith was not merely being perverse in using, 
the. word-in this way. In the centuries before 1776 the disputants 
in debates on English economic'policy had expended enormous energy 
over just this issue o£ semantics.
When Smith mentions that the price of monopoly is the highest^
price that can be got, he is referring-to a situation in which the
supply of resources is limited (by monopolistic restriction); As
91can be seen from the diagram above , given any such quantity, a price 
may be charged between the natural price (average cost of production) 
and the price to be read from the demand curve.' It is the latter 
which, Smith predicts, will rule. The price will be the highest 
that can be got for the limited quantity.
In the light of Cournot it may seem unsatisfying that Smith 
does not predict the rate of production. The rate of production of 
Smithian monopolists would depend on their degree of monopoly power 
and the extent to which they were trying to maximise their net 
revenues. Smith often returns to the theme of their high costs of 
production. He condemns monopolistic restriction for the 
redistribution of income it occasions, for its high costs of 
production, and for the poor allocation of resources between activities 
which results. These ill effects arise from the impediments to 
resource flows and the consequent margin between market price and 
natural price (average cost). In explaining these impediments 
to resource flows the category of the single seller with a government 
franchise is treated as a special case.
* r
Pre-Smithian Analysis
- From the time of Aristotle, writers have related the structure of
markets to the prices charged. Aristotle is thought to be the
originator of the analysis of monopoly (defined as a single seller).
92His. stories of engrossment in Politics and his condemnation of their 
. . 93unjust pricing m  Ethics were both repeated by the schoolmen who 
contrasted the price sej: by a monopolist with the just price.- The
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just price was, in some sense, the competitive price. " ' ,
; i
In the sixteenth century monopsony (although not labelled as such 
until Joan Robinson) was condemned. Sir Thomas Moore noted that 
fewness of sellers (for which he invented the word ’oligopoly’) may 
cause the price to be above the competitive level. Lessius (1554 - 
1623) drew the world’s attention to the importance to the monopolist
94of preventing the appearance of new alternative sources of supply.
Throughout the seventeenth century the debate over English 
monopoly legislation was a key facet to the power struggle between 
the crown (trying to maintain its power to grant monopolies) and 
parliament. Very few participants in the debate were sufficiently 1 
bold as to defend something labelled a monopoly. So the debate 
over what was evil became a debate as to the meaning of the word 
•monopoly’ whose evil character few dared to question.
Heckscher draws our attention to what he calls ’one of the
most far-reaching discussions on monopolies throughout the
95mercantilist era'. In his report on the two so-called free-trade
bills before the House of Commons in 1604, Sir Edwin Sandys uses 
language sounding as a pre-echo of The Wealth of Nations.
The name of monopoly, though tbken originally for personal
' r
unity, yet is fitly extended to all improportionable paucity 
* of the sellers in regard of the ware which is sold. If ten 
men had the only sale of all the horses in England, this 
were a monopoly; much more the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers, which, in effect not above two hundred, have the 
managing of the two third parts of the clothing of this realm,
. 96which,,might well maintain many thousand merchants more.
But it must be stressed that statements such-as this are rare 
in the seventeenth-century literature. Most of the public debate 
centered around whether the sellers in the company colluded on price 
and thereby constituted a single seller. The ethico-legal interest 
in the behaviour of monopolies was, during the time of the scholastics 
and up until the eighteenth century, aroused by the high prices such 
organisations could charge at the expense of consumers rather than 
at the poor allocation of resources which might result. That such 
evil can only be sustained because of.an absence of rivals seems 
an obvious inference to draw. It is also one which makes the game of 
cops and robbers relatively easy. ' It is far more difficult to spot 
the causes of impediments to resource flows than to spot a single, 
seller.
f
Apart from this legalistic discussion of monopoly and Becher's
attempt to link large numbers (that is, too many) with unregulated
97competition ('polypolium') the exploration of the effects of 
numbers of participants in the market process on price yielded little 
fruit until the eighteenth century.
Sir James Steuart
Steuart's Principles seems to be one of the first works written
in English to analyse the concept of competition. Here the failure of'
. * rthe eighteenth century to distinguish static from dynamic concepts -
is clearly illustrated.• For Steuart, competition is the process
of rivalry: 'The term competition is relative to, and conveys
.the idea of emulation between two parties striving to compass the 
’ 98same end.' Steuart is interested in competition because he is 
interested in the process by which market price is settled. The 
numbers of buyers and sellers influence this process. Rivalry from
59
new producers is ignored; so that competition can exist between 
buyers only if there is more than one buyer, and competition between( 
sellers only if there is more than one seller. If both sides of a 
market have more than one competitor, competition is double 
competition. If a single buyer is confronted with more than one 
seller or if a single seller is confronted with more than one buyer, 
competition is single. (Bilateral monopoly is not mentioned.)
Competition is a matter of degree, for it ma}' be classified as small,
99 . . .strong, or weak; but it is unclear whether these classifications
correspond in a uniform and positive way with the number of rivals.
In the process by which market price is settled, competition 
between sellers will put a downward pressure on the initial (high) 
offers of individual sellers; and the competition between bu3rers 
will act as an upward pressure. In the course of this process 
there will be 'vibrations' (variations) in the relative power 
of buyers and sellers; but if buyers or sellers 'unite' the 
vibrations will cease and united sellers will be able to set prices 
according to the demand. Demand is a negative function of price; 
and the form of the function (elasticity') will place limits on 
the extent to which price will rise or fall.
Turgot v.
* f
For the future, of the analysis of market structure and value, 
’.Turgot's contribution is vital. Turgot defines 'valeur estimative' 
as the degree of cstime which a man attaches to the different- 
objects of his d e s i r e T u r g o t  proceeds to provide a solution 
to .the. problem of the rate of exchange between two isolated persons
(given two goods). The final outcome will lie between the esteem
•/
values of-the two individuals. In particular, it will be the mean 
of the -two esteem v a l u e s . T h i s  determinate solution for isolated
exchange anticipates that of Menger. 102
It is particularly frustrating that the article in which these 
propositions occur was left incompleted by Turgot because Turgot's 
writing on multiple exchange in Reflexions seems to contrast the 
bargaining process of isolated exchange with the more quickly 
determined outcome of multiple exchange. The difference- between 
these two cases is not absolutely clear; and different 
interpretations are possible.
However, it often happens that several Individuals have wine 
to offer to the man who has corn: if one of these is not 
willing to give any more than four quarts for a bushel, the 
Proprietor of the corn will not give him his corn if he comes 
to learn that someone else will give him six quarts or eight 
for the same bushel. If the first man wants to have corn, 
he will be forced to raise the price to the level of the one 
who offers more. The Sellers of wine gain on their side 
from the competition between the Sellers of com: no one 
decides to part with his commodity until he has compared the 
different offers that are made to him of the commodity which 
he needs, and’ he gives preference to the highest offer. The 
value of corn and wine is no longer haggled over by two
- r
isolated Individuals with reference to their reciprocal needs
and resources; it is fixed as a result of the balancing of
the needs and resources of the \^ hole body of Sellers of com
104with those of the whole body of Sellers of wine.
We noted above that Turgot was not particularly concerned with 
the analysis of monopoly. But in the above quotation it can be seen 
that he was edging towards the later schema of market classification.
He is far less concerned than Smith with/the time dimension of the 
adjustments towards equilibrium, and with what may be interpreted as
stability conditions - factors (principally 'monopolistic' restrictions) 
which impede the adjustment towards equilibrium.
So, by the beginning of the final quarter of the eighteenth 
century the division of approaches between British and French 
economists, which was to last at least another century, was beginning 
to jell. The British were concerned to explore the impediments 
hindering the attainment of competitive equilibrium. The French 
were concerned to classify markets according to the number of 
participants and to state the conditions of equilibrium for each 
market category as elegantly as possible.
i
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CHAPTER III
J .S .MILL
This chapter will focus on those writers of the English 
classical school who followed Adam Smith. The scope of the 
chapter is defined by the method of analysis and the writers’ 
choice of problem rather than by the time period. Those writers are 
included whose work elaborates the theory of the equilibrium and 
stability of resource allocation contained in Hie Wealth of Rations. 
The work of contemporary writers (such as Cournot, Dupuit and 
Ellet) who developed the seminal ideas of Turgot and elaborated the 
static equilibrium conditions for various categories of markets will 
be discussed in Chapter IV.
The work of these writers in developing conditions for the 
static equilibrium for various market categories was facilitated by 
the discovery that the appropriate technique is that of marginal 
analysis (the differential and integral calculus). Von Thdnen 
utilised the marginal analysis; but his static analysis was not 
applied to a classification of market structures. For this reason 
he straddles both„the group of writers discussed in this chapter and 
that group to be discussed in Chapter IV. Accordingly, his work
1 V
vji.ll be mentioned in both chapters, *
The discussion will again revolve around a ’classic’ statement;
and once more Schumpeter’s suggested classic will be adopted:
\
J .S, Mill's Principles will be used as the classic statement on 
which to hang the discussion.
In his preface to the Principles, Mill states that he has 
attempted to bring The Wealth of Nations up to date. He does this by
including in his book the valuable work which has been presented , 
since 1776. ,
V
Much of the most valuable work on the theor}^ of the firm produced
by the writers discussed in this chapter was suggested by the analysis
of the concrete problems raised in political debate, and by detailed
observations. However, the treatises of the classical economists
were dominated by the Ricardian model. In one of his Five Lectures
on Economic Problems Stigler convincingly argues that, in writing
these treatises ’...classical economists have employed an apparatus
which is different, and in modern .eyes inferior, to that which
they employed to analyze concrete problems...'.^ Some of these
concrete studies were undertaken in response to the burning political
issues of the day. Senior's report to parliament on the plight of
2the hand-loom weavers (rightly praised by Stigler) and Torrens’
3careful discussion of the monopoly power of unions are examples.
The spur to good analysis provided by facts confronted the 
younger Mill rather indirectly. Mill did not present evidence and 
argument on specific economic problems to parliament as McCulloch and 
Senior had done; but he did absorb much factual material through 
reading records of the observations of others. This can be seen from 
the numerous empirical studies cited in the Principles.
r
“ It has been argued that direct experience caused Say to criticise 
Adam Smith's proposition that all profits are in proportion to the 
capital invested. J.S.Mill's modification of the profit-maximisation
hypothesis to allow for the influence of custom seems to spring from 
direct.observation. Both with the influence of custom and with
Babbage's information on economies of scale, observation suggested to 
Mill a conjecture as to the implications of the observation for the 
structure of industry. „ " ,
In extending and applying Adam Smith's equilibrium and stability 
analysis, Mill further increases the empirical content of the 
Smithian model. Mill states that the actual prices to be observed 
in markets will be those for which the quantity supplied equals the 
.quantity demanded; and he points out that, When applying Smith's 
cost-based natural value to products produced jointly, the propositions 
regarding natural value apply only to the products taken jointly.
William Thornton finds that Mill's explanation of market price
is not sufficiently precise to explain the actual behaviour of firms.
4Thornton's experience of business -decisions caused him to extend 
and to modify this part of Mill's analysis.
Marshall, who provides the classic statement for Chapter IV, meets 
Thornton's criticisms of Mill by discussing the immediate determinants 
of the firm's supply decision. In pursuing this suggestion from 
Thornton, Marshall pushed the equilibrium and stability analysis of 
Adam Smith towards a yet greater degree of verisimilitude.
1. THE MOTIVATION OF THE FIRM
Profits de Capitayx and Profits Industriels
The theory of profits contained in The Wealth of Nations is 
outlined in Chapter II. Despite its confusion certain points are 
clear. Profit (along with rent and wages) is one of the elements 
of national income accruing to the capitalist class (the other two 
• classes being the landowners and the labourers). Profits are 
related to the amount of.capital employed and cover interest, payments 
to the borrower to cover the risk of the loss of the capital, and 
recompense- for the trouble of employing the stock.
' 6k
6?
Say was highly critical of Smith's 'neglect of the distinction 
between the profits of superintendence, and those of capital* .**
Say*s criticism was not that Smith did not distinguish between 
interest and returns to business leadership. Smith had been 
careful to distinguish interest from returns for the trouble of 
employing the stock. Indeed, this distinction was not original 
to Smith, It is evident in certain English writings of the 
seventeenth century.^
Say’s criticism was as to causal connection. Smith had claimed 
that all the elements of profit arc profits of stock - having a 
value related to the value of the stock invested - although this 
value does vary between enterprises and between activities,, Say 
claimed that while interest is related to the amount of capital 
invested, profits industriels are not a function of the amount of 
capital invested but of the skill, activity, and judgment'of the 
business leadership.
Ho wonder he ^Smitlf] found himself thus perplexed; their 
value is regulated upon entirely different principles.
The profits of labour depend on the degree of skill, activity, 
judgement, &c. exerted; those of capital, on the abundance
7or scarcity of capital, the security of the investment, &c.
r
It has been suggested that this difference between Say and Smith
may have been due to differences between the industrial environments
observed by the two writers, knight mentions von Mangoldt as
suggesting that the personality of the manager was mere important to
8French., than to English industry. Hoselitz suggests that Say's
9personal entrepreneurial experience may account for his views,
. »
Whatever the explanation as to why Say was 'ahead* of his
English counterparts, it is clear that rapid expansion (involving 
changes in the products and the methods of production) in the English 
manufacturing sector brought into prominence certain industrial 
leaders and inventors - the stuff of school texts on the English 
industrial revolution - and it is not surprising that this emphasis 
on personality should eventually percolate into the analytical 
literature.
The eighteenth-century literature (both English and French) had 
placed little emphasis of the importance of the personality and 
ability of particular business leaders. After Say, the importance 
of entrepreneurs lies in the uniqueness of the.ir decisions. . Each 
decision bears the imprint of the entrepreneur's personality and 
ability.
£Gross profit, though^] it does not vary much from employment 
to employment, varies greatly from individual to individual," 
and can scarcely be in any two cases the same. It depends 
on the knowledge, talents, economy, and energy of the 
capitalist himself, or of the agents whom he employs; on the 
accidents of personal connexion; and even on chance. Hardly 
any two dealers in the same trade, even if their commodities 
are equally cheap, carry on their business at the same 
expense, or turn over their capital in the same time.^
The tone of this passage is markedly different from that of 
Smith and Cantillon. The eighteenth-century writers acknowledge 
that profit rates vary markedly between firms but attribute this 
to differences in the environments those firms encountered.
Mill, following Say, asserts that an important factor governing the 
rates of profit between firms is the personality1 and ability of the 
business leader.
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It was not until two decades after Say that this view was; . ■ 
promoted in the English literature and it took yet more time before, 
it was incorporated into the conventional (English) wisdom. One 
reason for this delay is that the heavyweights north of the channel
\
in the first three decades of the nineteenth century were interested 
in other matters. While Ricardo and Malthus were vitally interested 
in the movements in the rate of profit over time and in response to 
protection, and were concerned to establish that rates of profit are
l
equal between various employments, they were just not interested in 
the question as to why they should vary between firms.
In the published correspondence between Say and Ricardo, there
is no record of dispute between the two as to the determinants of the
component parts of a firm's profit. In Say's notes to the French
translation of Ricardo's Principles, Say mentions the disagreement
in the appropriate places,* but does not claim that this disagreement
affects the validity of the Ricardian model. ^  Both Say and Ricardo
accepted the Smithian proposition that secular movements in the rate
of profit may be gauged roughly by secular movements in the rate of
interest. The reason for this absence of dispute is probably that
both realised that Ricardo's acknowledgement of Say's point might
warrant a footnote in the Principles but it would scarcely be
12 "fundamental to .the model. The irrelevance of Say's classification 
of the component parts of.profits for the Ricardian model largely 
explains the English reluctance to discuss Say's entrepreneurial 
income. The economic debate in England was absorbed with the 
propositions contained in Ricardo's Principles.
- . 13During the early 1820s certain English economists reiterated
the Smithian point that the imputed wages*of the owner manager should
* ■ 14not be classified under profits. William Ellis addressed himself
to the semantic question and chose to equate the word profits with the 
rate of interest - because ownership of capital is rarely combined , 
with the requisite talent for conducting business; but, apart from 
his new proposal for the use of words, he did not contribute to 
the analytical debate.
Thomas Tooke suggested that English economists should adopt 
Say's classification and distinguish between 'profits industriels' 
and 'profits de capitaux'.^ Tooke attempts to outline the determinant; 
of the rate of interest, and to outline the difference between the 
rate of interest and the rate of profit. In particular, certain 
factors may influence the supply and demand of funds but not the 
supply and demand of expected profitable opportunities.
Samuel Read concentrates on semantic issues ~ and follows the
suggestion of Ellis that the word profits should be restricted to the
16ordinary rate of interest. Read's view is that the returns to 
business leadership should be called wages because they are due to 
labour - even though the principles governing the 'wages of masters' 
are quite different from those governing the 'wages of inferior 
labour' - as in the Ricardian model.
J.S.Mill, in his Essay on Profits and Interest, later published 
as one of the Essays on Some Unsettled Questions (but written in 
X829-30) sees the analytical issues clearly and formulates a defence 
for Ricardo. In contrast with the view of Smith and Read, Mill 
argues that the wages of superintendence may be considered as part 
of gross profits because they are governed by the amount of capital 
employed rather than by the degree of hardness or skill of the 
labour of superintendence. The profits of an enterprise equal the 
rate of profit in that particular trade multiplied by the amount of
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capital invested. From this one can deduct the rate of interest 
to determine the wages of management. Such wages vary with the 
amount of capital rather than with the amount of managerial skill and 
effort because, 'the trouble of managing a business is not
proportionally increased by an increase of, the magnitude of the
. . . 17business'.
Scrope, who had reviewed Read's book in the Quarterly Review
(January 1831), classifies profits into various component parts;
but, like Read, he does not provide an analytical reason for this
classification. Ramsay is not so unhelpful. He points to the
usefulness of the French distinction between profits of capital
(interest) and profits of enterprise. He adopts a compromise
between the Ricardo/early Mill view that the profits of enterprise
are a function of the amount of capital employed and the Say/Storch
view that the skill of the entrepreneur also counts. 'Thus the
profits of enterprise constitute a revenue of a two-fold nature,
depending primarily on the amount of capital, and varying with it,
but at the same time liable to rise or fall within certain limits,
according to the intellectual qualifications of those who put it 
,18m  motion.'
By the time J.S.Mill came to write his Principles, the 
hegemony of the Ricardian model was broken. The old ubiquity of 
Ricardian issues was no longer evident. Writers were again 
enquiring as to the component parts of the profits of a particular 
firm. To what extent are they attributable to the size of the 
capital stock, and to what extent to the particular entrepreneur? ,
By what rules do the various participants in a firm distribute the 
revenue? In answering these questions in the Principles, Mill
was far more eclectic-than he had been when writing the earlier essay 
on Profits. Certainly Say’s influence (perhaps partly via Tooke and
i
Ramsay) and that of Senior are evident.
According to the J.S.Mill of the Principles, the gross profits
from capital must suffice for three purposes: ’They must afford a
sufficient equivalent for abstinence, indemnity for risk, and
superintendence. These different compensations may be either paid
19to the same, or to different persons,’
Abstinence
While Senior has no claim to objective originality in this 
respect, he is often remembered as the exponent of an abstinence : 
theory of interest. Part of the profits of a firm are needed to
20’compensate for the sacrifice of immediate personal gratification'
those who forgo present consumption in order t:o provide a firm with
the finance (and resources) for provision of capital. Interest"
theories are outside the scope of this stuctyj and there is a good
21secondary literature on the topic.
Indemnity for Risk
.Schumpeter castigates J.S.Mill for wishing, ’to make risk-bearing
an entrepreneurial function alongside of ’’direction”. But this only
served to push the car still further on the wrong track.' r , ..’It
should be obvious, so soon as we have realized that the entrepreneur’s
function is distinct from the capitalist’s function, that the
entrepreneur, when he employs his own capital in an unsuccessful
22enterprise, loses as a, capitalist and not as an entrepreneur.'
J.f Mill is guilty of this charge, then, so too are many of the 
leading economists»who discussed the question between the time of
Adam Smith and that of J.S.Mill, Say states that the function of
23risk-bearing depends on institutional relationships. However,
i
he claims that under contemporary institutional relationships, the
entrepreneur was the first capitalist to lose his contribution to
the firm's stock. Presumably, other providers of capital would
only lend if the person responsible for the success of the
venture were prepared to undertake at least the same degree of risk
as themselves. If the firm makes a loss, ‘he £the entrepreneur]]
loses, if he has anything to lose: or if he has nothing, those
24lose who have given him their c o n f i d e n c e T h i s  implies that 
the entrepreneur undertakes risk-bearing not as one capitalist 
among many, but as the most vulnerable capitalist.
While both Say and Mill held this institutionalist view, others
seem to be much more ready unreservedl}' to attribute the risk-bearing ■
function to a particular factor of production. Read is quite clear
in his Cantillon-type division of functions. The master, not the
capitalist, receives a residual and must receive a premium to be
25encouraged to do so. Most who discussed the bearing of risk
considered that those who do bear the risk will need a premium to do
so - although few were influenced by the work of Hermann's
Staatswirtschaftsliche Untersuchungen (1832) or by that of von
Thilnen who followed his lead. Von Thdncn proposes that we^distinguish
between insurable-and uninsurable risks. Uninsurable risks are
generally borne by the entrepreneur. Such an entrepreneur will
generally risk all his savings in his own firm and (in return for
26such a gamble) will require some recompense.
Mill's analysis of the. risk-taking function is identical to that 
of Say. * While Mill states that the capital of the entrepreneur 
is normally at greater risk than that of the passive capitalist.
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Mill is at pains to emphasise that the apportionment of risks varies
between firms. It is one of the great themes of Mill's Principles
that, unlike the laws of production, the laws of distribution are,
27largely dependent on human statute and institution. -In his 
chapters on income distribution, the possibilities of various 
arrangements of property rights and risk-bearing are explored - as 
in his interest in various co-operative ventures and profit-sharing 
schemes. However, he always maintains that to entice persons to 
undertake great risk, it is necessary to offer them some premium.
It is notable also that in the writings of the classical 
economists the risk being referred to is always a passive risk. The 
risky situation is not created by the entrepreneur. -Given that the 
ex post profits are not known-ex ante, some scheme must’be agreed 
upon as to the relative vulnerability of capital contributions.
The returns to the maker of decisions is not discussed under the 
heading of risk, but under the heading of returns to entrepreneurial 
skill.
Remuneration for Superintendence
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith was at pains to distinguish the
* v
wage cost an owmer-manager imputes for his labour services from the 
margin of profit on interest which accrues to the owner-manager.* r
Ihe former income, is related to general wage rates, -whereas the 
latter is regulated by the amount of capital employed in the firm 
and the rate of return on capital in that employment.
Say emphasises the wage component in the income of the
entrepreneur but, in contrast with Smith, emphasises the unique skills
of particular entrepreneurs and the premium wage which this enables
*
them to earn. He considers this wage to be regulated by supply
and demand. The supply of entrepreneurial talent is' limited by
lack of capital (a pre-requisite to the performance of the entre-j .
preneurial function) or by lack of ability to borrow capital from
others. The entrepreneur must also possess the art of superintendence
and administration as well as the ability to make calculations of the
28future and to devise expedients to meet new contingencies. To 
the extent that individuals possess these qualifications they will 
be rewarded in business. To the extent that they do not, they will 
receive low rewards and leave - thus regulating the supply of 
entrepreneurial talent.
This contribution from Say was accepted by Mill as the quotation
29 * 'above confirms. However, Mill offers a.hint that:- 'The extra
gains which any producer or dealer obtains through superior talents
for business, or superior business arrangements'... are of a very
30similar kind to other forms of rent. This hint was further 
developed by Marshall.
Marshall mentions Senior and Mill, Hermann and von Mangoldt
Iamong the economists 'of the last generation' who explored the
31relationship between rent and profits.
Quasi Rent and Profits j
Various generalisations of the concept of rent paved tfie way
for Marshall's notion of quasi rent. Von Mangoldt defined rent as
32an}' surplus over costs ; but earlier writers pointed more 
tentatively to the notion of land rent as a scarcity price (i.e., 
one for which price and the unit cost of production are not of the 
same'’money value) or drew analogies between land rents and payments 
to skilled labour more than sufficient to reimburse training costs.
Credit for the initiation of this development is usually given
. . 33to Storch. His statement of this generalisation contains all 
that Mill was ever prepared to concede.
Storch was followed in Britain bj' Bailey, Senior and Mill.
But one 'minor* British writer writing before Storch (Craig) 
noted that scarcity may have a time dimension and, further, that in 
certain cases the relevant time dimension is the time taken for 
producers to increase the capital stock thereby bringing selling
34 . .price in line with unit cost of production. Such propositions 
place Craig within striking distance of Marshall on quasi rent.
John Craig's Elements of Political Science claims that, because
of the constant re-purchasing of circulating capital: 'A common rate
of profit does not so readily establish itself over all the
35employments of fixed, as over those of working capital;' He
proceeds to explain that every time money returns from working
capital, there arises the opportunity of laying it out in a different
speculation if its former placement proved unprofitable. Thus,
fixed capital can earn a rate of profit out of line with the norm
for a much longer period than can working capital. In this respect
fixed capital is like land. But eventually the returns to fixed
capital will be constrained by the cost of new capital equipment; and
36 ^this constraint does not apply to the rent of land. 2
2. COSTS AMD COST FUNCTIONS
During the period under consideration some progress was made in 
the process of distinguishing the functional relationships betweenb'w
-the costs of production incurred by a firm and the scale of the firm, 
technical progress,*input prices and the growth of the economy over •
time. While some improvement in the formulation of these 
relationships is discernible compared with The Wealth of Nations, 
much remained to be clarified.
Historical Returns
The West-Malthus-Ricardo proposition of historically diminishing 
returns in agriculture is discussed in most of the standard texts. 
Most of the English classical economists admitted that such 
diminishing returns (however defined) could be counter-balanced to 
some degree by technical progress in agriculture, but thought that 
this was unlikely. This latter point is prominent in the writing 
of J-.S.Mill and in that of Senior.
However, the tendency of the agricultural sector to diminishing
returns can be contrasted with, ’another category (embracing the
majority of all things that are bought or sold) in which the
obstacle to attainment consists only in the labour and expense
37requisite to produce the commodity.''’ Even though these commodities 
may incorporate some agricultural inputs, their natural prices will 
tend to be stable over time except to the extent that they will 
decrease due to technical progress. While these historical issues 
dominated the discussion of cost functions among the English classical 
economists, some attention was devoted in analysis of concrete
* r
problems and in Mill's Principles to the cost functions of the firm. 
Cost Minimisation
Most of the English writers assumed implicitly that competition
and the quest for profits encourage firms to minimise the costs of
producing their output. However, English economists'of this period
saw few implications in this for the mix of inputs a firm would use.
*
The controversy over the possibility of the technical progress of .the
industrial revolution creating unemployment of labour certainly, 
indicates an awareness of the possibility of the substitution of
t
capital for labour. As early as 1804, Lauderdale states:
That the profit of stock employed in machinery is paid out
of a fund that would otherwise be destined to pay the wages
of labour is evident; because if the proprietors of all the .
capital so employed, would combine to charge a greater sum
for the use of the machines than the wages of labour
supplanted, they would be instantly set aside, and the same
portion of the revenue of the nation again emploj'ed in the
„ payment of wages that was so directed before the machines
38 cwere invented.
This statement forms part of Lauderdale's discussion of the 
unemployment issue in which he illustrates that a firm will choose 
that input combination which minimises its costs. But his point- 1 
that a firm will substitute factors in response to a change in 
relative factor prices was rarely used in the later extensive 
discussion of 'the machinery question'.
39Ricardo, in his chapter on machinery in the Principles, 
admits that a rise in the wage rate causes factor substitution and
consequent unemployment; but J.S.Mill seems to neglect thi^ s
. . .  40possibility altogether when discussing this issue.
By far the most modern performance on the issue of factor
substitution in the period under consideration is that of von Thtfnen.
41The first eighteen chapters of Book One of Per Isolierte Staat
are devoted to a discussion, of alternative factor mixes for a
uniform product. Methods of production may alter as one substitutes
*
grain for town-produced goods. The relative'profitability of the
■ ■. -  ' - *  . ■- 7 6  ■ - , ■
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methods depends on relative input prices which vary as one changes
• - \
location.
Later, in chapters thirteen and seventeen of. Book II, Part I, 
von Thilnen approaches the problem of the optimal combination of 
labour and capital, given that the two are substitutes in production. 
His solution to the problem is partly obscured by an odd model of 
capital formation, in which capital production depends solely on 
the number of man-hour inputs. Looking through this smoke-screen, 
his solution is reasonably clear.
At the laying out of a new estate the advantage of the capital-
producing worker calls for an increase in the number of employed
wage-workers up to the point that the increment brought about
by the last worker employed is absorbed by the wages which
he receives. Likewise it is to the advantage of capital-
producing workers to raise the capital investment to that point
where no higher revenue is forthcoming. • But because one
worker can be replaced by capital and conversely one unit of
capital can be replaced by more workers, then at the margin
at which capital and labour are to be used beneficially the
cost, of the work through human effort and the cost of work
42through capital must be at equilibrium,...
r
Fixed Costs and Opportunity Cost
Writers in the period under consideration were edging their way
towards the later concepts of opportunitj’- cost and of fixed cost.
43It was shown above that Storch, Senior, Mill, and von Mangoidt,
generalised the. concept of rent and drew an analogy between rent and
profit. • J.S.Mill aids our understanding of rent by referring to
*
rent as a scarcity price. A scarcity price is a price paid so as
. 44to lure a scarce resource /from its highest-paid alternative. It can
be seen that Mill's notion of a scarcity price is very close to the
modern notion of opportunity cost. However, Mill denies that land
rent is a scarcity price in the case where there is sufficient land
. 45to maintain a rentless margin.
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The idea that a firm may have fixed costs which do not influence
particular policy decisions may be interpreted as an application
of the principle of opportunity cost. The possibility may also be
seen with the aid of elementary calculus, A constant term in a
function will not enter the first derivative of the function, For
this, reason, Cournot notes in 1838 that if their total costs do
not vary with output, then monopolists will charge the same price
46as if they produced without cost.
The idea of the irrelevance of fixed costs is found in the work 
of Cournot's contemporaries among the works of those German and 
English writers who discussed concrete examples of business policy.
In 1826, von Thifnen's concern with the determinants of business 
decisions caused him only to consider as costs those opportunities 
forgone as the result of a particular decision. For example, 
horses used for fieldwork in the summer may be used for the 
transportation of grain at low cost in the winter. The only additions 
to cost occasioned by such transportation are the shoeing, the wear
and tear on the wagon, and the greater quantity of feed consumed
47 / . 'by the horses. Lardner's book on Railway Economy recommends a
. . .  48similar attitude to sunk costs.
Senior's Letters on the Factory Act (1837) outlines the likely
effects on cotton manufacturing of legislation restricting working
*
hours. If cotton prices were to remain constant and working hours
were reduced bjr one hour per day, Senior reasons, *«. «net profit , 
would be destroyed - if they were reduced by an hour and a half, even
i
gross profit would be destroyed. The circulating capital would be
replaced, but there would be no fund to compensate the progressive
49deterioration of the fixed capital,*
In his Report on the Unemployed Hand-Loom Weavers, Senior notes
that a weaver will keep working so long as the price is sufficient
50to cover the value of new material and the workman's wages; and 
in his 1850-1 lectures he makes a similar point by means of a numerical 
example of an investment project. *It repays the labour, but not 
the abstinence of its producer. And yet even on these terms, if 
he can get no better, he must continue to produce; for his buildings 
and machinery are valueless for any other purpose.'
Torrens' On Wages and Combination uses similar reasoning to
argue that, in times of excess capacity, French manufacturers may-
cut their prices of goods exported to England so long as they cover
52the costs of their floating,capital.
/Economies and Diseconomies of Scale *
Stigler alerts us to J.S.Mill's discussion of the economies of
the firm in two articles. Stigler points out that in Book I,
chapter IX of Mill's Principles, 'is the first systematic discussion
of the economies of scale of the firm to be found in a general economic 
53treatise,*
Adam Smith's discussion of the division of labour had suggested 
a source of economies of scale; and meditations on The Wealth of 
Nations provided a fruitful-springboard for the writers before Mill. 
According to Mill, division of labour is a major source of economies 
for the reasons given by A.dam Smith. But whether Mill is referring ,
54
to average cost or marginal cost as a negative function of scale is 
unclear. He makes statements of the following ambiguous form: f .
'As a general rule, the expenses of a business do not increase by any 
means proportionally with the quantity of business
Mill quotes at length from Babbage's study of the Causes and
/
Consequences of Large Factories. Babbage had noted that a firm *23
will benefit by having a scale sufficient to employ specialists at
their specialty on a full-time basis. It will raise costs to
employ specialists to spend part of their time on tasks for which
36they are comparatively less well suited.
<’ Deriving from Rae, Mill reports another source of scale economies.
If each labourer uses various specialised machines in rotation, the
return on the instruments will be postponed. By allotting each
labourer to one machine (or set of tools) the labourer can exhaust
the instrument more rapidly, thus bringing its yield forward in t-ime
57with a consequent higher rate of return.
Babbage gives three sources of scale economies which Mill 
chooses not to reproduce."^
.1. That a larger firm may generate sufficient by-products that,
rather than adding to waste, their further processing for sale becomes 
* rpossible.
2. A large (established) firm has a name which potential 
customers will trust; and, besides, its financial power will cause 
its customers to hesitate before suing it for the sale of a faulty 
products
3, A large manufacturer with considerable capital, can afford,
*
says Babbage quoting with approval the report of a committee of the
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House of Commons, 'to try the experiments which are requisite, and
incur the risks, and even losses, which almost always occur, in ,-
inventing and perfecting new articles of manufacture, or in carrying
59to a state of greater perfection articles already established.*
In his Essays on Some Unsettled Questions, Mill had claimed
that, *the trouble of managing a business is not proportionally
60increased by an increase of the magnitude of the business,'
Indeed, at one point in the Principles Mill implies that increased
scale enables economies of management to be reaped. The reason
given is that in small firms: 'The principal in the concern.is
either wasting, in the routine of a business, qualities suitable
for the direction of it, or he is only fit for the former, and then
61the latter will be ill done.'
But Mill also says that the magnitude of such savings are often
exaggerated since many small-scale producers compensate for their
administrative inefficiency by accepting a low return so that
62they can continue to be their own master. Moreover, managerial
diseconomies are even a possibility, owing to the 'more watchful
attention, and greater regard to minor gains and losses, usually
63found in small establishments.'
Cournot's -discussion of scale economies when compared « ith that 
erf Mill's Principles is, characteristically, both less specific and 
more precise, Cournot clearly places marginal cost as a function 
of output. Marginal cost may be an increasing (in the case of 
agricultural lands, mines and quarries), decreasing, or constant * 
function of the output of the firm.
For what are properly called manufactured articles, it is* . ; |
„generally the case that the cost becomes proportionally less
as production increases, or, in other words, when D increases
(D) [^marginal costj| is a decreasing function. This comes 
from better organization of the work, from discounts on 
the price of raw materials for large purchases, and finally
from the reduction of what is known to producers as
' 64 . . . .general expense.
It is notable that Cournot mentions pecuniary economies and
diseconomies which are largely neglected by Mill, When discussing
the cost advantages of large-scale compared with small-scale farming,
Mill mentions 'the greater cheapness of buying things in large
quantities'; but he estimates that this (among the other advantages
of large-scale farming), ’does not seem that they ought to count 
65for very much«*
Mill was well aware of the structural implications of his
analysis of economies of scale. He proposes an 'unfailing test*' by
which one can ascertain at which scale average costs arc minimised.
'Wherever there are large and small establishments in the same
business, that one of the two which in existing circumstances carries
on the production at greatest advantage will be able to undersell
the other. Mill admits in his discussion of competition that,
particularly in retailing trades, such ability to undersell may not 
- r
be utilised; but, generally, the firm with lower unit costs will 
undercut the price of the firm \;ithout access to economies because 
of its sub-optimal or supe^r-optimal scale.
Stigler has undertaken an empirical study inspired by Mill's 
'unfailing test'. Stigler proposes that the range of optimal 
firm sizes within each industry may be determined by comparing the 
percentage of the industry's assets in each asset class in various
. 3rp-ars» Those asset classes in which the share of the industry's
assets are stable or increasing are optimal. The various factors
influencing optimal size might be tested by means of multi-variable «
regression techniques.
3. VALUE AND EQUILIBRIUM
The English classical economists’ analysis of the causes of 
value largely consists in variations on a theme by Adam Smith.
That theme is the analysis of value within the context of resource 
movements among competing products. Equilibrium exists when the 
quantity being produced equals the effectual demand, bringing the 
market (observed) price into line with the natural price. Impediments 
to the attainment of equilibrium are analysed under the heading of 
monopoly.
While the later English classical economists varied this theme, 
the theme remains unmistakeable even though the elaborations are 
sometimes substantial. Many words were expended on the problem of 
the relationship between the supply and demand approach and the cost 
of production approach; but this debate reveals differences in 
verbal emphasis" rather than differences in analysis. In fact, if 
one reads the writings on value Lby the British economists from 
Smith to Cairnes for their analyses (that is, the form of their 
functional relationships), rather than for the number of times that 
they mention ’demand’ compared with the number of times that they 
mention ’cost’, then the extent of their agreement is remarkable.
While the supply and demand.framework is used to discuss changes 
in market price, natural price analysis is usually divided into 
three categories.
Mill presents these categories as: , ,
I Commodities in which the obstacle to attainment consists 
only in the labour and expense requisite to produce the commodity
II Commodities for which increased-production necessitates a 
greater cost? and
III Commodities naturally or artificaily limited in supply. 68
Ricardo, while confining detailed attention to cases I and II,
mentions each of these three categories in his Principles. However,
it was probably Bailey who first presented the classification in
69this systematic way.
Before proceeding to examine each of these three categories and 
the controversy over the demand and supply framework, a few points 
should be made by way of clarification.
The first is that the criteria of classification are 
restricted to the form of the cost functions and the barriers 
to entry. They do not include the number of producers. This is 
not to say that the number of producers is irrelevant to the 
consideration of value. Most writers were agreed that the fewer
the competitors, the more likely is it that they will agree to
rlimit production. The use of the supply and demand framework is 
often said to be contingent upon ’a plurality both of competing 
dealers and competing customers' or even upon 'the whole 
supply [_ be ing^ in the hands of a very large number of small holders, 
and the demand £ be ingj- caused by the wants of another set of
persons each of whom requires only the same very small quantity,* 71
But the. reasons given for such assumptions are variously that
large numbers militate against'restrictive agreements, that large
numbers lessen the possibility of quirky results caused by
72discontinuities in the demand or supply functions, or, merely,
as in the case of Babbage, that 'experience? indicates that price is
73higher with a few sellers when compared with very many.
Secondly, while the words ’market' and 'commodity' are freely 
used, they are not defined; and the conceptual problems surrounding 
their use are rarely raised. Caimes questions Adam Smith's use 
of the word 'market', when the latter uses it in the context of 
supply and demand determining market price.
It is not quite clear from the passage in what sense he uses
the word 'market', whether as a sort of abstract term to
comprise all places where things are bought and sold, or as
signifying some one particular or given place of this kind.
I am, for my part, disposed to understand him in the latter -
sense; indeed the former would hardly have satisfied the
74requirements of the problem he had to consider...
Caimes proceeds to claim that, in the latter sense, Smith's 
statement regarding the proportion of supply and demand is 'untrue', 
because overseas markets can cause changes in the prices ruling in 
British markets, even though neither local demand nor local /supply 
alters. Cairnes' scruples in this matter are rare, if not unique, 
among the British' classical economists.
Competition among markets was ignored in much the same way as
was product differentiation within the market. While product
differentiation was acknowledged in industry studies or in inductive
work, it was largely ignored in the treatises. Mill places the
*
influence of vulgar•finery on price differentials between retail
86
establishments in the same sentence as the influence of indolence,
and claims that these influences are largel}' absent from competitive 
75markets. Senior's report on the Hand-Loom Weavers acknowledges 
that better quality cloth fetches higher prices^ (hardly a 
surprising proposition); and Babbage mentions the need for a firm 
to vary price and quality in order to suit the tastes and finances 
of its customers.^
Thirdly, as Mill notes, economists, particularly English
economists prior to the publication of Mill's Principles, stressed
the effects of competition and ignored those of custom. 'This is
partly intelligible, if we consider that only through the principle
of competition has political economy any pretension to the character 
78of a science.' That is, given the hypothesis of competition, the 
economist is able to reason towards propositions of scientific 
precision; but the final propositions are themselves hypothetical.
In making this oft-quoted observation, Mill was not contrasting 
competition with monopoly; but was contrasting a competitive 
situation with one in which the psychology of the market participants 
produces non-maximising behaviour.
I am not speaking of monopolies, either natural or artificial, 
or of any interferences of authority with the liberty of
* r
production or exchange. Such disturbing causes have always
been allowed for by political economists. I speak of cases
in which there is nothing to restrain competition; no
hindrance to it either in the nature of the case or in
artificial obstacles; yet in which the result is not
determined by competition, but by custom or usage; competition
either not taking place at all, or producing its effect in *
„quite a different manner from that which is ordinarily assumed
87
to be natural to it.
The dominance of custom over competition is most often met in
the retail trades where prices are often found exceeding the minimal
average cost at which production is possible. Such situations exist
' because of the non-maximising behaviour of buyers (deriving from
ignorance, laziness or conceit) and of sellers. Large retail
margins encourage the entry of new firms thereby reducing profit
per trader; but they do not encourage reduction of prices.
Competition implies a sltrong valuation of monetary gains over those
of ease or pleasure. 'An enterprising competitor, with sufficient
capital, might force down the charges, and make his fortune during
the process; but there are no enterprising competitors; those
who have capital prefer to leave it where it is, or to make less
80profit by it in a more quiet way.'
The Framework of Supply and Demand
Until recently it was fashionable to praise Say, Malthus, and 
Lauderdale for maintaining that demand influences value in the face 
of the assertion by Ricardo and the Ricardians td the contrary.
Yet it is not clear to what extent the participants in this debate 
differed from each other.
Say seems‘mainly to be concerned with the determinantsf of
market price (over which no one denied the influence of demand),
but also considers the determinants of the Smithian natural price.
As far as the latter is concerned, Say acknowledges that, 'there
are many articles that would not rise in price in consequence of
the Competition [[between buyers], which some people affect to be '
/  ST.al/larmed. at...*. This indicates that'Say considers demand only
*to influence long-run price for those commodities whose supply is
limited by monopoly or for those commodities which can only be 
produced with increasing cost.^ ,
Lauderdale's dogmatic insistence on the generality of the supply 
and demand framework appears to contribute little; but Halthus, 
for all his confusion of exposition, seems to have more to offer.
In particular, Malthus insists that the demand and supply framework 
is applicable to the determination of natural price. This is so 
because changes in cost influence price via their influence on the
83profitability of production and, thereby, on the quantity supplied.
There has been some debate as to whether Ricardo accepted this
point or not. For the goods which Bailey classified as produced
under conditions of equal competition, Ricardo emphasised that 'the
real and ultimate regulator of the relative value of any two
84commodities, is the cost of their production.'
In making this assertion, Ricardo was merely upholding the
Smithian model against the criticism of Say. The only apparent
difference on this issue between Ricardo and Smith is that Ricardo
eliminates rent from the costs which determine’ the natural price,
85In his notes on Malthus' Principles , Ricardo seems to admit that 
cost only regulates price via its influence on supply, as he does in 
a letter to Say: 'You say demand and supply regulates the price of 
bread; that is true, but what regulates suppl}'? The cost of *
production, - the quantity of utility imparted to bread by
. . ,86industry.'
If this is as far as we can go in defending Ricardo against the
charge that he failed to appreciate the insights of Malthus, J,S.Mill
aids in.defending the Ricardians against- a similar charge. In a
*
remarkably pungent piece of abuse published in 3825, the young Mill,
89
still under predominant Ricardian influence, wrote, 'an exceptionally
clear exposition of what the Ricardian theor}' of value really 
87asserted.* Mill is attacking a reviewer of the 'new* (Ricardian) 
school of political economy.
We have already remarked, that the second of the three 
propositions which the Reviewer puts into the mouth of the 
new school, 'that demand and supply have no influence on 
prices and values except in cases of monopoly, or for short 
periods of time', never was maintained by them at all.
They not only allow that demand and supply have some influence 
on value, but they assert that nothing else has any influence 
whatever, except in as far as it ma}' be calculated to affect 
either the demand or the supply. When they say that cost 
of production regulates value, it is only because cost of 
production is that which regulates supply. If there be 
two commodities, produced by equal cost, what is the reason 
that they exchange for one another? The reason is, because 
if one of the two bore a higher value than the other, when 
the cost of production is the same, the profits of the two 
producers would be unequal, and it would be the interest of 
one of them to withdraw a portion of his capital from his 
business and transfer it to the other; thus increasiryg the 
supply of the dearer.commodity, diminishing that of the 
cheaper, until the equal it}'- of values is restored: and 
restored, as the reader will observe, not in contradiction 
to the principle of demand and supply, but in consequence
of it.88
John Mill proceeds to quote from his father's Elements,
2nd ed„, p.83, that the ultimate cause of value is cost, but that
90
the immediate cause is demand and supply, to confirm his defence of 
the new school. • .
Apart from an odd comment in his private notes on Senior’s
89 . • .Political Economy ,, all of J.S.Mill's later output is consistent *I
„ 90with the above passage. It is possible to quote from Scrope ,
91 92Longfield , and Ramsay , to show that they also accepted Maithus'
position. Senior clearly did also and somewhat laboured his view
93that Ricardo did not.
I
Equality or Ratio?
J.S.Mill convinced British economists that equilibrium in a 
market requires the equality of the quantity of the good-, demanded 
with that of the quantity supplied. This precision contrasts with 
earlier vague statements concerning the ratio of demand to supply.
Mill was not the first to claim that the quantity demanded and
the quantity supplied are functions of price. Sir James Steuart
94had made that claim as early as 1767. However, Mill did
emphasise to economists north of the channel that equilibrium entails
not a ratio of demand to supply but equality of quantities. At
prices above equilibrium, the quantity demanded will be less than
the quantity supplied whereas at prices below equilibrium, the
quantity supplied will be less than the quantity demanded. r As
price tends towards equilibrium the quantity supplied tends towards
95the quantity demanded.
Prior to Mill, Thomas Cooper's Lectures on the Elements of 
Political Economy had claimed that when the quantity demanded 
equals the quantity supplied, price will be stationary; when 
quantity demanded is greater than quantity supplied, price will
rise; and when quantity demanded is less than quantity supplied,
96price will fall. Cournot proposed that the quantity demanded and
i
the quantity supplied are functions of price and that the equilibrium
97condition is that these two quantities be equal«.
These precursors compel us to exercise caution in attributing 
great objective originality to the formulation in Mill’s Principles; 
but certainly the clarity of Mill’s explanation far exceeds that of 
his predecessors, and this clarity facilitated the acceptance of 
his formulation.
Joint Products
Mill’s solution to the problem of the pricing of joint products
does seem to be objectively original. Adam Smith's proposition
that natural price equals unit cost (plus allowance for profit at
the going rate) is inapplicable to products whose costs of production
are shared. 'It sometimes happens that two different commodities
have what may be termed a joint cost of production. They are both
products of the same operation, or set of operations, and the outlay
is incurred for the sake of both together, not part for one and part 
98for the other.'
A particularly advanced book-keeping manual of the late 
eighteenth1 century advised merchants,' in the case of such joint 
products, to enquire into the success of the whole operation.
When we import a cargo of different kinds of goods which could 
not well be separated, such as iron and deals; of which the 
one is necessary for ballast, and the other to complete the
lading, it is proper to join them in one accompt, and
/
compute the profit or loss on the whole together. Here
. 9 1  / ‘' ■ ■ ' ; - ,
we open an accompt of goods from Gottenburgh, and distinguish 
the iron and deals in inner columns, which is better than 
to open one accompt for iron, and another for deals. Perhaps 
there might be gain on the one and loss on the other; but 
as we were obliged to import both together, it is the
Q9success of the whole that we should inquire into."
Such joint production means that cost of production does not 
regulate the value of each, only their joint value. 'Since cost 
of production here fails us, we must revert to a law of value 
anterior to cost of production, and more fundamental, the law of 
demand and supply.' So the amount of both will be produced up
to the point where excess profits from the process are eliminated. 
The value of each product will then depend upon demand and supply.
Case I: Commodities in which the obstacle to attainment consists 
only in the labour and expense requisite to produce the commodity.
The value of Case I commodities occupies a crucial position 
in the Ricardian model; and,’as was argued in Chapter II, constant 
costs is the assumption implicit in the value and equilibrium 
analysis in The Wealth of Nations. r
In the Ricardian model it is assumed that constant costs exist
. 10 2 . m  the manufacturing sector. Such an assumption entails
regarding Case III (monopoly) commodities as 'exceptional*. In
doing-this, Ricardo has a strong supporter in J.S.Mill. Mill quotes
a 'happy illustration' by De Quincey in which the latter guesses
■ f
that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the prices of goods in
*
a randomly-chosen shop will be determined by their cost of production 103
The price to which Mill and Ricardo are referring is the
Smithian fnatural price' and not the price to be observed at a
particular moment in time in a particular market. Mill continues
the tradition of The Wealth of Nations in saying that an average of
market values over a 'sufficient' number of years will serve as
104an estimate of natural value. Cannes corrects this statement
(which, if not a tautology, is a mistake), on the grounds that,
'the commodity may exist under conditions which do not supply any 
controlling principle to its fluctuations, and consequently do not 
develop any tendency in these to revolve around a central point
106It was mentioned above , that Ricardo so constructed his
model that rent is excluded from the elements of natural price.,-
This move by Ricardo was one of the dimensions to the debate between
Ricardo and Malthus as to the causes of value. However, outside
the Ricardian model of secular income distribution, rent clearly
does enter into costs, if by rent one means the payment for land
\
necessary to attract it from its best alternative use.
No one can deny that rent sometimes enters into cost of 
production. If I buy or rent a piece of ground, and build 
a cloth manufactory on it, the ground-rent forms legitimately 
a part of my expenses of production, which must be repaid by
* r
the product. And since all factories are built on ground, 
and most of them in places where ground is particularly 
valuable, the rent paid for it must, on the average» be
compensated in the values of all things made in factories. 107
-Is it possible to be more precise as to what these writers mean 
when they refer to constant costs? It seems that Ricardo.considers 
price to be regulated by the marginal producer in manufacturing as
well as in agriculture; . but in manufacturing, costs are constant.-
between producers and so all producers are on the margin of 
108profitability. Unlike J.S.Mill, Ricardo was not concerned with
the amount of output produced by each firm - although not even
Hill was clear as to how output is increased if the market price
rises. Under what conditions will existing firms expand their
production? Under what conditions will the increased output
be provided by new firms entering the industry? These questions as
to the relationship between the supply functions of firms and the
109supply functions of the industry were tackled by Cournot . , but 
not by any of the British economists in the period under 
consideration.
Senior suggests that manufacturing is subject to increasing 
returns which offset the historical tendency for the prices of 
raw materials to rise. Such increasing returns may be attributed 
to the use of, 'better instruments and a greater division of labour'." 
However, such increasing returns are not merely downward displacements 
of cost functions due to technical progress, because the shape of the 
respective cost functions in manufacturing compared with agriculture 
is the reason given as to why-an increase in taxation on manufactured 
products will cause an increase in price greater than that of the
k
tax increase per unit, while an increase in taxation on agricultural
products will cause an increase in price less than that of the 
... H Iincrease in unit tax.
While it is difficult to know what Senior meant in saying that 
manufacturing is subject to increasing returns, the model generally 
used for the value and equilibrium of manufactured commodities was 
that of constant costs. The precursor of this model in Ihe 
Wealth of Nations was used in those circumstances in which no
barriers to the free movement of resources existed. This assumption 
continues with the economists under consideration. ' , - .
Ricardo refers to case I commodities as those, 'On the production
. 112of which competition operates without constraint;' This is
contrasted with monopolistic restrictions on the free flow of
resources; but the phrase 'competition without constraint' is not
otherwise defined. Neither is this phrase explained any further by
Bailey who uses it to characterise one of his three categories of
price determination. Senior makes matters more explicit. He
talks of 'equal competition’, by which he means conditions under
which any person contemplating production can set up with the same
costs as the established producers. ’*"’*"* This means that the only
obstacle to supply is the unit cost of the established natural price -
implying the 'universal accessibility' of all factors to all 
114producers , or 'equal advantages' between all producers end 
potential producers.
The worth of this careful classification and analysis by Senior 
was neglected for much of the nineteenth century - until Richard D,
Ely jolted the memories of those who attended the’Twelfth Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic A s s o c i a t i o n . I n  more recent
years, Marion Bowley has performed the role of Senior's standard
117 * rbearer. But neither of these notable writers has sufficiently
emphasised the continuing tradition of analysis beginning in
The Wealth of Nations, and incorporated in all British value theory
up to 1836, in which year Senior gave the analysis form, and gave
the assumptions precision.
Case IIî Commodities for which increased production necessitates 
a greater cost.
The idea that increasing costs are associated with expanding
agricultural production was not new in 1815 (the idea is quite
' XI8clear in Sir James Steuart's, Political Oeconomy )j but the 
debate over corn prices occasioned by the end of the Napoleonic 
wars certainly rekindled attention in the idea. Increased 
production of 'corn' could be got either by the use of poorer, 
previously uncultivated, land (the extensive margin), or by the 
addition of extra units of labour and capital to the existing area, 
of cultivation (the intensive margin). Similar arguments were 
applied to the extractive industries.
In such circumstances, price will equal the cost of production 
to the producer who is only marginally profitable. In his attempt 
to achieve a consistent taxonomy of value theory, Bailey attributed 
the gains of the intra-marginal producers to a monopoly: 'the 
possessor of the cheaper means of producing it [[such a commodityj
has evidently a monopoly to a certain extent...', 'The same causes
\  _
will be in operation [[as with monopoly], but instead of the value 
of the article having no assignable boundary, it will be limited by
the watchful competition, which is ever ready to act upon rt the
- " . . . . H 9moment it has exceeded a particular point,'
In Bailey's classification, Case II becomes a type of monopoly; 
but it is not classified as a monopoly because,
(i) the price is limited by those extra factors which 
are on the margin of entry; and 
(ii) the marginal producers are making no excess profit.
97
Senior follows Bailey, but classifies Case II as one of his
four species*of monopoly, with the qualification that it is a
120 .Qualified monopoly' or 'unequal competition*. Senior's analysis
of price determination in this case is the same as that of Ricardo 
with the exception that the position of Senior's margin is determined
by the extent of demand, which, in the Ricardian case, is determined
!
by the extent of the supply of labour and capital.
Since Senior's classificatory criterion for monopoly is the 
imperfect accessibility of all factors to all producers (or 
unequal advantages) it is only natural that, given no application 
of the principle of opportunity cost, the intra-marginal gains in 
agriculture should be called monopoly gains.
J.S.Mill refuses this classification of monopol}', but calls
these intra-marginal gains 'rents'. His reason for so doing is
121that the price is governed by cost. He reserves the word
'monopoly' for circumstances in which the supply either is 
absolutely unable to be increased, or in which the supply is 
'artificially' limited as a result of discretion over price by the 
producer. Unless all land (as on an isolated island) is fully 
used, rent payments are not determined by an unalterable or a 
discretionary restriction of production, but by the marginal cost
r
122of production.
Mill's taxonomy is hardly very.neat. Land which is better
than a specified quality is absolutely limited in quantitj' and
attracts a payment according to its relative scarcity for the
same reasons and to the same extent as 'those wines which can be
grown only in peculiar bircumstances of soil, climate and 
123 *exposure'. ' One-may, for reasons of public policy, wish to
distinguish such prices determined by natural scarcity from those 
which result from a deliberate interference with the flow of .
resources. The latter resource allocation 'problem* might be 
solved by government policy, whereas the former cannot. But this
is not Mill's reason for refusing to classify land rent as a
{
monopoly return,.
One may argue that.there is an analytical distinction between 
intra-marginal rents to agriculture and other forms of monopoly 
gains with the aid of Senior's notion of inequality of advantage, ,
In the case of intra-marginal land rents, there is likely to.be a 
fine gradation of rents, because the array of degrees of inequalities 
of access is likely to be fairly continuous. At least, it is • 
continuous under the assumptions of the Ricardian model, which 
envisages certain producers cultivating rentless land at the
i
margin.
These land rents may be contrasted with other cases of monopolyl
gains where the array of degrees of inequality of advantage may be 
quite discontinuous. In the extreme case of a government grant 
to the sole trade in a particular commodity (like the spice, trade 
of the Dutch East Indies which earlier tracts had found such a 
convenient example), the differential of advantage can be quite
• r
extreme. It is this degree of equality of advantage which Senior 
chose to emphasise, - \
' . 98 , - ; / ; ■ .
Case III: Commodities Naturally or Artificially Limited in Supply.
In our survey of the value and equilibrium analysis we have 
seen that, in terms of analysis, the differences between the various 
classical economists are not great. However, the classical 
economists differed markedly in their empirical judgments as to 
the importance of monopolistic restrictions.
It was noted above that Ricardo, while mentioning the presence 
of monopolistic restrictions, chose to base his model on the 
proposition that the prices of manufactured goods are govereried by 
the principle of competition without constraint.
It is this proposition which constitutes one of the chief
' . . 124grounds for the attack on Ricardo by Bailey. Bailey devotes his
final five pages to‘the attack of such, ’false simplification in
125 X 2 6matters of fact'. Both Senior and Tooke support the charge. 
Bailey and Senior seem to adopt this position for two reasons.
(1) They both desire analytical neatness. Both are concerned, one 
might say that they arc concerned above all, with precision of 
expression and completeness of classification. Bailey, and Senior 
both claim that the prices of most products reflect a monopoly 
element in that they contain agricultural products or minerals 
among their raw materials. Ricardo’s model ignores such problems.
(2) Both Bailey and Senior are concerned (and this is explicit in 
their methodologies), to formulate generalisations which broadly fit 
the facts. Both emphasise the distortion of reality inherent in 
reliance upon the constant cost case»
Instead of scarcity, of, in other.words/ monopoly, or . 1
protection from competition, being an unimportant source of
\
value, and the commodities which owe their value to it 
forming a very small part of the mass of commodities daily 
. exchanged in the market, we have seen that it is a most 
extensive source of value, and that the value of many of the
most important articles of interchange must be referred to
, . . . .127this as its origin.
In fact, if one reads Bailey's book, one sees nothing of the 
sort. No empirical information is given. We are merely offered 
Bailey's opinion. But his opinion is that the empirical evidence 
is overwhelming. -
But what of the analysis of Case III?
The analysis of monopoly as 'a limitation of the free flow of
resources permitting a differential between market price and natural
128price to persist', was maintained by all of the classical writers, 
with variations. J.S.Mill is representative of this on-going 
stream. However, it is Senior who stands out for his careful 
definition and clarification.
The references to monopoly in Ricardo’s Principles faithfully 
follow the path established in The Wealth of Nations. An ¿exception 
■"to this faithfulness is .Ricardo's reference to seasonal shortages of 
corn as a monopoly. Mill, following Ricardo, mentions such shortages 
as an example of a price determined by suppl}' and demand and not by
129simple cost of production. But Mill refuses to call it a..monopoly, 
Ricardo prefers to say that a monopoly has a time dimension. The 
extent to which producers enjoy a monopoly depends not only on the 
extent'to which resource flows are restricted, but also depends on
' • . 101
the time taken to release .such impediments.
'The com and raw produce of a country may, indeed, for a time
sell at a monopoly price; but they can do so permanently only when
no more capital can be profitably employed on the lands, and when,
130therefore, their produce cannot be increased.'
This emphasis on (belief in?) the inability of monopolistic 
restrictions to persist, while not an explicit theme in the writings 
of Ricardo, was maintained by certain other British economists of 
this period.
McCulloch's ambivalence towards the activity of trades unions
sprang from a conflict between his sympathy for their, aims and a-
belief that such combinations were, in the end, powerless in the
131face of market forces, Caimes is more outspoken. In his
chapter on trades unions, he argues that unions cannot raise the rate
of wages for any period of time; and, similarly, that Adam Smith's
claim that employers conspire successfully to depress wages is
132wrong - such attempts are futile.
On the issue of the monopoly power of unions, Torrens' essay 
is the most careful. He attempts to outline those few circumstances 
in which such power might be effective in securing a rise in wage
In contrast with the work of Cournot, the English classical 
economists (even those such as Bailey and Senior who stress the 
ubiquity of monopolistic restrictions of the free flow of resources), 
utilise the value and equilibrium framework of The Health of Nations, 
which suggests that a monopolistic restriction is a situation of 
disequilibrium. Disagreements arise as to the likely permanency
of such-a disequilibrium. ■ •
Bailey's discussion of Case III suffers from a lack of clear
definitions: it lacks the type of clarity which gives Senior's
work such precision. However, Bailey does have some interesting'
remarks on the differences between a single-firm and a multi-firm
monopoly. A single-firm monopoly can restrict output; but a
multi-firm monopoly will find such a line of policy to be
impracticable: '...for although it might be to the advantage of
the whole body if the quantity of the monopolized article were
proportionately reduced to each holder,, yet as, by the supposition,
there is no combination of interest, every individual finds it
beneficial to dispose of all that he possesses. ' To destroy any-
part of it, would be to injure himself for the benefit of his
134brother monopolists.' So each firm will produce every unit of
output for which the rate of profit equals or exceeds normal.
Following the publication of The Wealth of Nations, the extent 
of a monopoly had been regarded as a matter of degree - depending 
on the extent to which barriers impeded the free movement of 
resources. Senior's classification of monopol}' types is based 
on the degree to which such barriers exist. In particular, the
classification is based on the relationship between the cost functions
* rof established firms compared with the cost functions of potential
entrants to the industry.
Senior shows that the monopolistic impediments of the English 
classical economises are based on the absolute cost advantages of, 
established firms. Further, he classifies the various forms this 
impediment may take, and the corresponding effects this is likely to 
have on price. Sdnior has a four-fold classification in' his
■ . . • 102 . : ' ; ■
Principles, one class of which was discussed above under Case II.
(1) Senior's first case is: 'Where the monopolist lias not the
exclusive facilities [[possibly due to a patent]] as a producer, and
can increase with undiminished, or even increased facility, the
X 3 6amount of his produce.' In this case, the price charged will be
constrained by the [[minimum efficient scale?]' production costs of 
rival producers. The price set may be less than such average costs 
because, by charging a.lower price, the monopolist will expand 
sales and possibly gain access to economies of scale.
(2) 'Where price is checked neither by the hopes nor by the
fears of the producer, where no competition is dreaded and no
137 . 'increased supply can be effected.' An example is a particular
type of wine. Price cannot be below unit production cost but will 
not be constrained bj' an attempt to gain access to scale economies 
as the amount of land available to produce the wine is strictly - 
limited. The only constraint on price will be the ability and the 
willingness of consumers to pay.
(3) Type three embraces 'those cases in which the monopolist
is the only producer, but, by‘the application of additional labour
138and abstinence, can indefinitely increase his production'.
Again, the possibility of gaining access to scale economies may 
limit the price charged, , Price will probably exceed unit production 
costs and will be constrained by the ability and willingness of
consumers to1 pay
10>+
Thornton’s Attack . ,
139William Thornton's volume, On Labour , and J.S.Mill's.
140response m  the Fortnightly Review , have become classics m  the 
history of economics. They are famous principally for Thornton's 
attack on .the doctrine of the wages fund and for Mill's subsequent 
capitulation, from which many date the downfall of the English 
classical system.
However, our attention will be directed toxv’ards Thornton's attack 
on Mill's formulation of the proposition that price is in equilibrium 
when the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied. Thornton 
gives examples of discontinuous functions for which equilibrium will 
exist when Mill's condition of equality is not satisfied; and 
examples of such functions for which Mill's condition, while
necessary for equilibrium', is not sufficient to ydeId a unique
, 141solution.
However, Thornton's criticism is more probing than a mere 
catalogue of awkward cases. Thornton reminds his readers that the 
theory of supply and demand rests on the assumption, 'that the 
goods supplied or offered for-sale are so offered unreservedly, the
owner or owners being content to let them go for what they will
^ 2  i’-
fetch.' But this condition is almost never met. 'Itrrarely
happens that they [[the buyers."] are prepared to take more than a 
very small portion of the entire stock. Ninety-nine times out of a 
hundred his supply of goods is immensely greater than the quantity 
immediately' demanded at the price at which he offers them. But,
143does he lower his terms? Not at all. He has reserved his price.*
In his reply, Mill concedes that Thornton is right in pointing 
to exceptional cases. These do not invalidate the law, but merely
help us in defining the limits to the applicability of the law.
i  N
These concessions by Hill fail to meet the nub of Thornton's 
very real objection. His objection is that the applicabilit}' of the 
law is almost nil as every sale is a unique contract between a 
buyer and a seller. •
Once goods are taken to market, the producer will sell them 
providing the price covers marginal selling costs. But clearly 
price usually exceeds this lower limit. In fact, the dealer 
nominates a set-up price. 'His object is to get in exchange for his 
whole stock the largest aggregate price which he can get within the
period during which it will suit him to keep part of his stock
- i  j  ,  144 unsold*
The dealer does not ask the highest price which he thinks his
customers would consent to pay rather than go without the goods
because he fears being undersold by a rival producing for the same
market. He cannot charge a higher price than his rival - except
to non-competitive buyers. If a firm has a competitor it will
need to content itself with the highest price at which it will not
be undersold, .* 'All dealers, while considering at what price they
shall offer their goods, consider each for himself the actual state
145and future prospects of the market.’ The lowest price 'so chosen
Becomes the market price.' But it is rare that any of these 
estimates will be ruinously low, because of the tacit understanding 
between traders as to the sort of price needed to sell the amounts 
they wish to sell in this planning period.
Thorn'ton's propositions as to the determinants of market price 
were to prove influential. Mill's Princj.ples had presented the 
condition for equilibrium in market price, but it had not analysed
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the determinants of the quantity supplied in the market period nor the 
behaviour by which market price is settled.
Thornton suggests that any such analysis must take into account 
that supply decisions will be based on uncertain estimates of future 
demand conditions. He offers little comfort for the theorist.
’There is no regularity about competition - competition is not 
regulated at all. If it can properly be said to depend on anything, 
it depends partly on individual necessity, partly on individual 
discretion; and as for the first of these there is proverbially, and
for the other manifestly, no law, .so likewise is there no law of
. . 146 •competition,’
. The suggestions by Thornton were later to be used by Marshall 
in his theory of market price. The great importance of Thornton’s 
value analysis consisted in directing attention to the determinants 
of market price - the prices to be observed in markets. It i's 
to the theory of market prices and of movements in market prices that 
we must go if we are to test price theory against the standard of 
observations.
r
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• - CHAPTER IV 
ALFRED MARSHALL
This chapter covers the period from 1870 until the death of 
Marshall while including some discussion of the work of Cournot,
Dupuit and Ellet which was postponed from Chapter III. Once again, 
the chapter will be based upon Schumpeter's chosen classical 
statement for the period.
First and last, Marshall was, and felt himself to be, the 
great English economist of the period. But this does not 
alter the fact that Marshall's great work £the Principles] 
is the classic achievement of the period, that is, the work 
that embodies, more perfectly than any other, the classical 
situation that emerged around 1900.^
Few would dispute Marshall's claim to be the classic writer„of 
the period - particularly if the reference for the choice is the 
theory of the firm. However, Marshall's work is peculiarly elusive 
for the historian of ideas. Even more than the mature Mill, his 
sources of stimulation are so varied and his product such a complex
tapestry that no single model structure dominates. It is impossible
. . 2to nail Marshall with a single paradigm,
* r
m Marshall was fend of emphasising his debt to the English 
classical school.-as well as to the German historical school, von Thdnen 
and Cournot, At the beginning of this chapter, it is important to 
outline the relationship between Marshall and Cournot; for it is „the 
use ..of the method of Cournot which provides the boundary of 
demarcation .between the writers of the'English classical school and 
the giants of the ¡¡-eriod now being discussed: Walras and Marshall.
1
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THE INFLUENCE OF COURNOT -
3 4 . *Both Marshall and Walras have publicly acknowledged their
respective debts to the work of Cournot, Cournot’s application
of the differential calculus to the function expressing the quantity
of a product demanded as depending on its price so as to derive the
conditions under which a firm will maximise its statically conceived
profits was important both for the work of Marshall and for that of
Walras.
There is no direct evidence pointing to Cournot's possible
influence either on Dupuit or on Lardner. Indeed, it is likely that
Dupuit did not read Cournot’s principal work on economic theory, the
Researches. Dupuit's work on public utilities which spawned his
theory of price discrimination was more immediately practical in its
aim than that of Cournot; and Rene notes that the form of Dupuit's
5analysis is not strikingly similar to that of Cournot.
On the question of Lardner's debt (either to Dupuit or to 
Cournot) x^ e have more cause to be cautious. . Lardner's manual of
Railway Economy was read by Jevons before the latter wrote his
6 7Theory; and the book is praised by Marshall. The book would deserve
a prominent place in the present study whether or not its diagram of
static profit-raaximisation for a monopolist was subjectively
original, Hicks considers that 'it is definitely possible' for
Lardner to have borrowed from Cournot, 'For at the time Lardner
wrote his book (1850) he was living in Paris, and so was Cournot;
and there was at least this link between them, that in 1835, three
years before he wrote the Recherches, Cournot had translated a book on
Mechanics by Lardner into French.'
+
As to the possibility of Lardner's debt to Dupuit, we may
entertain a strong presumption. On page 197 of Railway Economy,
Lardner recommends a series of articles on railway costs which
appeared in the Annales des Ponts et Chauss^es and other periodicals
written by M.Julien of the Paris and Orleans Railway. Now one of
9the most important of these articles was .in the very issue of the 
Annales which contained Dupuit's, 'De la mesure de 1 'utilite des 
travaux publics'. It is in this article that Dupuit describes 
precisely in words and illustrates with an example the bell-shaped 
total revenue curve of Lardner*s Railway Economy. Lardner's other 
references to the Annales indicates that he was a regular reader of 
the journal in the years of Dupuit's contributions.
Ekelund guesses that Lardner probably was acquainted with the 
work of Cournot and Dupuit;^ but Hooks disagrees.
There is no indication that Lardner was aware of the work 
done by Dupuit on utility, for he does not explicitly 
employ the utilit}' theory of value in his demand analysis. 
Rather, he seems to rely on a concept of empirically estimated 
demand schedules in his discussion of the effect of price 
changes on quantity demanded.^
In an attempt to be more specific as to Cournot's influence 
on the theory Qf the firm embodied in the work of Marshall ,and Walras 
four aspects of Cournot's, treatment should be considered:
A, The Use of the Differential Calculus and the Treatment 
of Time;
1 B. Market Structure;
"■ C . Tne Nature of Industry Equilibrium; and ^
D. . The Applicability of Concepts to Empirical Work.
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A. The Use of;the Differential Calculus and the. Treatment of Time
It is often, but truly, said that the use of mathematical methods
by economists has yielded great gains in the precision with which
'old* propositions could be stated. In using a strictly deductive
method, Cournot had to spell out many of the assumptions needed to
arrive at his results. In doing this, he produced models from which
12the element of time is banished.
Marshall's method of operation was to follow Cournot's lead in 
the use of mathematics; but because the element of time was 
difficult to handle with the calculus (and Marshall considered time 
to be crucially important), the results of the mathematics would then 
be qualified to take account of the future and of the past. This 
method of working can be seen most clearly in the Principles, as, for 
example, in the Theory of Monopolies (Book V; Ch. XIV). Here 
Marshall sets out his version of Cournot on monopoly and then proceeds 
to qualify the theory by, among other things, an elaboration of the 
statement that the monopolist will consider his profits over a period 
of time.
Marshall refers to the obligation he owed to Cournot, '...as 
regards the form of thought and von Thttnen as regards the substance.*  ^
During Marshall's working life, it appears that his affection for
* r
Cournot faded while his affection for von Thilnen strengthened. An 
. early note by.Marshall on von Thtlnen has recently been published, and 
the editor, J,K.Whitaker, rightly observes that: 'There is little 
here to suggest why Marshall came to feel that he had been strongly 
influenced by T h i l n e n . B y  1898, Marshall, referring to the
Economics of Industry (1879), is more enthusiastic - claiming that
’/ <
he settled the outlines of his distribution theory under the good 
guidance of von Thilnen, 'Von Thilnen worked out his theory wit.h
- ■■■ •. \ ■ - m '  / ■■ ■■ -. ■. v. •;. ■ " .:.
■ ■ \several curious subtleties, and some perversities but he gave a 
good lead by suggesting symmetrical relations -between labour and 
capital; .the earnings of each being defined by the last profitable 
application of each at the margin.’
However, Marshall's indebtedness to von Thtlnen over his
symmetrical treatment of labour and capital and the substitutability
\
of factors at the margin hardly seems sufficient to account for the 
fulsome praise von ThUnen receives vis-a-vis Cournot in a fragment * 
reprinted in Memorials.^
This preference for von Thtlnen over Cournot seems to be due, 
not to their relative influence on Marshall's analysis, but rather, 
in the first place, to von Thttnen's readiness to deal with the 
detailed problems of business life compared with the heroic 
abstractions of Cournot, and, secondly, to von Thttnen' s ' ardent 
philanthropy'. Cournot lacked both the discipline of the facts _ 
evident in von Thtlnen's work and the generous heart evident in von 
Thtlnen's ethics.
B. Market Structure
Not only did Cournot explicitly formulate the assumptions behind
his various equilibrium solutions but, further, these assumptions 
* /• 
constitute a sharp break with the assumptions of the English
classical school as outlined in the previous chapter.' In particular,
Cournot's classification of markets according to the number of
sellers (and its subsequent development by Edgeworth and Pareto)
is .an. important departure. These writers say little of the
determinants of industry structure; and a particular structure, once
f
assumed, is not allowed to change by activity within the market.
By assuming a given-market structure, Cournot obviates the need
to analyse market behaviour through time - behaviour which may . ■
/
possibly alter the number of sellers. Marshall’s interest in the 
determinants of market structure is congruent with his view of the 
effects of the behaviour of firms through time. In pursuing these 
interests, which he shared with Adam Smith and J.S.Mill, Marshall 
parted from the tradition begun by Cournot, established by Pareto, 
Walras and Edgex%Torth, and continued by Chamberlin, which treats the 
number of sellers as a means of classifying markets - allotting a 
different analysis to each market classification.
It is important to appreciate the relationship between a 
writer’s concern with static equilibrium (rather than behaviour- 
through time) and the assumption of a given number of firms. If a 
market, and all the firms within it, are in equilibrium then the
17.number of firms may be counted using Jevons' law of indifference.
But, if a number of firms is assumed for a disequilibrium situation, 
it is possible that, in moving towards equilibrium, that number may
alter. The establishment of a taxonomy of models according to the
/
number of films presupposes that the models are of the equilibrium 
type. If that were not so the taxonomy may be ambiguous.
From this point of view it is difficult to label the Walrasian 
* r
analysis 'general' in the sense of Samuelson, Samuelson states
that whether equilibrium is partial or general, the method of economic
statics always entails certain cet.‘ par. assumptions.
 ^ The only difference lies in the fact that in the general 
equilibrium analysis of, let us say, Walras, the content of 
the historical discipline of theoretical economics is 
practically exhausted., The things which are taken as data
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for that system happen to be matters which economists have
traditionally chosen not to consider as within their province.
Among these data may be mentioned tastes, technology, the
18governmental and institutional framework, and many others.
Walrasian models do consider the intetrelationships between all 
prices within an economy; but all the subjects of economic 
investigation are not included as variables. The objective functions 
of firms and the elements of industrial structure have been variables 
discussed since before the eighteenth century. This is not to say 
that the assumption of a given market structure is illegitimate, but 
merely that such an assumption rules out certain questions which have
traditionally intereste'd students of economic behaviour.
\  ^ •
C. The Nature of Industry Equilibrium
One major departure by Marshall from many of the other leading 
theorists of the period was over the relationship between the 
equilibrium of the industry and the equilibrium of the firms within 
the industry. The models of Cournot, Walras, and Edgeworth held, 
as a condition for equilibrium of the large group, that all the 
firms within the group should’be in equilibrium. It is appropriate 
to mention Marshall's attitude to this issue at this stage even 
though a fuller discussion is postponed until later. ^
Marshall's observations of business behaviour led him to 
observe that, individual firms within an industry are always expanding 
or contracting; and, further, the fortunes of individual firms will 
wax and wane even when the demand and supply conditions for the 
industry as a whole are constant. The observation of these facts 
of business life caused Marshall to outline conditions for equilibrium
of the industry which do not require equilibrium of the firms within 
the industry. When he required a micro analogue for equilibrium 
of the industry he used the expositional device of the 
representative firm. But more of this shortly.
D. The Applicability of Concepts to Empirical Work
In his Preface to Researches, Cournot observes that, ’...the 
public is so tired of theories and systems that now the demand is 
for so-called ’positive’ matter, i.e, in political economy, custom­
house abstracts, statistical documents, and government reports, such 
as will throw the light of experience on the important questions
which are being agitated before the country, and which so greatly
19interest all classes of society.'
Cournot approves of this empirical trend, but adds that theory
(as distinct from systems) should always have some part, 'small
though it may be', in the study of political economy in setting out
the general form of the important functional relationships.
Throughout his book, Cournot follows this elected path of dealing
with functions of a general form; but occasionally he does note
20some problems of statistical measurement.
Cournot's method of partial equilibrium (the term comes from
rPareto) is more easily amenable to applied work than the sets of 
simultaneous equations contained in Walras' Elements.
Walras recognises the legitimacy of ranking the importance of 
certain variables in equilibrium analysis.
It is all the more legitimate to do this when wc^pass from 
the static to the dynamic point of view, or, better still,
.when we pass from the realm of pure theory to that of
; . ; ■.. ' ' il? , ■
applied theory pr to actual practice, for then the variations
in the unknown quantities will be effects.of either the first 
or the second order, that is to say, effects which need or 
need not be taken into consideration, according as they
21arise from variations m  the special or the general data.
In 1874, Walras wrote a letter to the elderly Cournot in which 
Walras linked Cournot’s interest in probability to the latter’s 
willingness to proceed beyond pure theory to create tools for 
applied work: ’Notre method est la même, car la mienne est la 
vôtre, seulement vous vous placez immédiatement au benefice de la 
loi des grand nombres et sur le chemin qui mène aux applications 
numériques. Et moi, je demeure en de<^ a de cette loi sur le terrain 
des données rigoureuses et de la pure théorie,’
To a yet greater extent than Cournot, Marshall tried to fashion 
tools for applied work. While not ignoring the notion of general 
equilibrium (as in Note XXI of the Mathematical Appendix to the 
Principles), Marshall used notions of competition, equilibrium and 
monopoly power which, he considered, were of far more use in-applied 
work than the tools of Cournot and Walras.
23In ’The Old Generation of Economists and the New’, Marshall 
looks to the new generation of economists to measure the functions
r
the form of which had been established during his lifetime. But 
Marshall defends the English classical economists (with the 
exception of Ricardo) from the charge that they neglected the study 
of facts.
Such a charge seems to me baseless. Most of them were 
practical men with a wide and direct knowledge of business 
affairs. They wrote economic histories that are in their
way at least equal tc anything that has been done since.
They brought about the .collection of statistics by public
and private agencies and that admirable series of parliamentary
enquiries, which have been a model for all other countries, and
have inspired the modern German historic school with many of
24their best thoughts.
Marshall learned from Roscher and Knies the lesson that
generalisations regarding economic behaviour are, to some extent,
contingent on historical, cultural and industrial circumstances.
It was on these grounds that he criticised the method of the English
classical school. He charged that their intimate but narrow
knowledge of the City caused them tacitly to assume that ' ...the’
25world was made up of city men.'
One of Marshall's favourite sayings, and the one which he placed 
on the title page of Industry and Trade, was: 'The many in the one, 
the one in the many'. Throughout Industry and Trade, Marshall 
proposes generalisations relating to particular industries or groups 
of industries. Since the death of Marshall the investigation of 
subsets of firms has become more common. Such studies may seek to 
establish the extent to which their findings are part of a more 
general pattern - 'the manj^  in the one' - and the extent to 
which they constitute a subgroup ~ 'the one in the many'/
THE MOTIVATION OF THE FIRM
Throughout the period under consideration it progressively became 
clearer that the people who made vital decisions within businesses 
often contributed little or none of the capital under their control. 
Francis. Walker's observation that the ownership of capital was no
116
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longer needed for one to fulfil the role of entrepreneur seems to have
' ' 26 been a seminal influence in promoting this recognition.
Certain terrainol.ogical changes were adopted during the first few 
decades after the 'marginalist' revolution. Previously it was 
recognised that any individual could earn income both in the form of 
interest and in the form of wages. But the departure by the 
conventional economists from the 'magnificent dynamics' led to a 
change in the use of words such as 'labourer', 'capitalist', and 
'landowner'. Instead of being a system for classifying people, these 
words came to denote the various functions one could perform in the 
productive process. While J.B.Clark acted as the propagandist 
largely to effect this, more than terminological, change, the change 
is.implied by Walras' distinction between productive services and 
the owner of the capital from which the services are derived.
Let: us call the' holder of land, whoever he may be, a landowner,
the holder of personal faculties a worker, and the holder of
27capital proper a capitalist.. In addition, let us designate 
by the term entrepreneur a fourth person, entirely distinct 
from those just mentioned, whose role it is to lease land 
from the land-owner, hire personal faculties from the 
labourer, and borrow capital from the capitalist, in order to 
combine the three productive services in agriculture, ,industry 
or trade. It is undoubtedly true that, in real life, the same
person may assume two, three, or even all four of the above-
28defined roles, •
• In perfectly competitive equilibrium, each firm, Walras noted, 
will be earning what are now called 'normal profits',' Because Walras 
regards forgone alternative profit as a.cost, he states that each firm
in perfectly competitive equilibrium will'be making neither a profit
_ 29nor a loss.
Edgeworth was never prepared to allow this Walrasian proposition
✓ 30 .to pass unqualified. In his Review of Elements, it seems that'
Edgeworth did not understand the Walrasian notion of costs; for he
advises Walras to seek a more precise statement after considering
the Jevonsian notion of the 'disutility of labour'. However, in
later statements Edgeworth acknowledges that the Walrasian proposition
is roughly true - with the qualification that a particular
entrepreneur might choose to receive less than his marginal product
31m  order that he might remain as master of his own firm. But
he still seems to object that Walras does not allow the entrepreneur's 
payment to be called a'gain. This objection seems to indicate a 
refusal to follow Walras' functional definition of 'entrepreneur'.
The work of J.B.Clark repeatedly emphasises the Walrasian
propositions that, in perfectly competitive equilibrium, each
contributor of productive services will be paid the money value of
its marginal product, and that, in equilibrium, the entrepreneur
32(using the word in its functional sense) receives nothing.
J.B,Clark's equivocation over whether 'co-ordination' was, or 
was not, the sole entrepreneurial function, together with his 
Concentration on the case of the stationary state, stimulated much 
work,at clarification among younger American economists. Clark had 
elaborated the proposition that pure profits arise from the economy 
not being in equilibrium. In equilibrium the product is exhausted; 
but.in disequilibrium receipts are unlikely to equal planned payments 
for the use of productive services. In explaining the distribution 
of the product out-of equilibrium, younger ¿American economists were
118 ■ f
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attracted to the ideas of earlier German economists - Herman, von
33Thtfnen and von Mangoldt.
The Taking of Risks
Of the American economists who attempted to relate J.B.Clark's 
analysis of distribution in the static state to' the economy.cut of
iequilibrium, Davenport may be taken as being representative.
Davenport regards profit as, '...the residual compensation falling to
independent business activity after such apportionment as is possible
has been made for rent, interest, wages, and other outlays.'
...'Thus, profit goes, truly, to him who takes the risk, but does not,
35therefore, go as compensation for the risk or in proportion to it.'
In opposing this view of the entrepreneurial function as the
bearing of risks, Schumpeter maintains that it is the capitalist who
36bears the risks, not the entrepreneur. This difference between 
Schumpeter and his senior American colleagues derives primarily from 
a difference in their time horizons. Schumpeter was concerned with 
the process of competition over 'decades', in which firms both begin 
their lives and die. If the firms' asset values are to decline it 
is clearly those performing the role of capitalists who suffer most. 
But the Americans were concerned with short-run problems of 
disequilibrium and the question as to which function they should
r
assign the 'unimputed' residual. The entrepreneurial function was 
their solution.
The Americans wished to allow for sources of capital which did
not partake of the residual (the fixed interest lender). .But most
of them agreed.that, of risk-takers, 'the most prominent, though
37not the only, species is the investor in joint stock companies'.
Hawley amplifies this statement by noting that labourers and business
organisers (who have contributed no capital to the concern) stand 
to lose if the firm is not successful.
38In more recent times, Weston has argued along these lines, 
noting that the uncertainty of business income implies that some 
incomes will be contractual while others will be determined as 
residuals. He defines profit as the difference between ex ante 
expectations and ex post reality in business income; but he refuses 
to impute the distribution to some ’entrepreneurial' factor.’
As to whose income is a residual and to what extent one's income 
is determined residually are matters contingent on contractual 
relationships.
In Chapter III it was noted that Say and Mill held this view that 
the distribution of risk-bearing was a matter for particular
institutional relationships. In the period under consideration in
39 . .this chapter Wicksteed and Marshall followed this view -
thinking it unnecessary to 'impute' the element of residual in each
income to any one productive service. Marshall held that, 'in
AOthe modem industrial world' , most residual income accrues to 
capitalists; but he does note other possibilities, e.g., profit-end­
less sharing schemes, some de facto form of which exists 'between
41almost every business and its employees...'.
r
« Frank Knight considered this view held by Marshall to be too 
strictly empirical to yield any useful generalisation; but Knight 
also considered that to say that, almost every income contained an 
element of profit was to be too abstract. For this reason he
distinguished between incomes which are basically contractual
Lf) ~~and those which are basically residual.
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The Exercising of Control
iKnight certainly wishes to impute residual incomes to a factor
C/\ Vf ' '
called entrepreneurial: that which bears risks in the face of an 
unpredictable business environment; and he plays all manner of 
semantic games to achieve the result that those who choose to 
specialise in the assumption of risk are those who exercise control 
over the firm in its uncertain environment.
In the joint-stock company, when all managers are on contractual 
incomes, it looks as if the shareholders operate as entrepreneurs. 
Knight says that these entrepreneurs exercise control over the 
company, if control is understood to mean the selection of those who 
make the decisions.
The paradox of the hired manager, which has caused endless
confusion in the analysis of profit, arises from the failure
to recognise the fundamental fact that in organized activity
the crucial decision is the selection of men to make decisions,
that any other sort of decision-making or exercise of judgment
43is automatically reduced to a routine function.
Even if one accepts Knight's (rather odd) definition of 
control, one may still question the proposition that those who bear 
the risks in a*joint-stock company select those who make the decisions.
On the issue as to who controls firms (as with that as to who 
earns the residual), Marshall is firmly empirical. In both the
45Principles and in Industry and Trade , Marshall notes that while 
shareholders usually gain the residuals in modem corporations, control 
over general policy is in the hands of salaried managers: 'The 
expansion of Joint Stock Companies has resulted in the general
122
democratization of the ownership, as distinguished from the control) 
of business.
The Maximisation of Net Revenue
The Cournotesque theory of static equilibrium for the firm 
requires that, in the period under consideration, the firm will, 
maximise its net revenue. Walras is less explicit as to the 
motivation of firms; but his monopoly model as well as his stability 
mechanism in his exchange-and-production model assume static profit 
maximisation.
Marshall and Schumpeter, with their mutual emphasis on the 
judgment, energy and imagination required to produce the most 
successful businesses, take account of the time horizon governing 
business decisions. For Cournot and Walras, a firm will maximise 
its profits on the basis of an objective calculation from 
certain given technological and price constraints. For Marshall 
and Schumpeter, the expansion of a firm through time is largely a 
product of the type of people within the firm who make the 
important decisions,
Marshall maintained that the alert, risk-embracing businessman
was a peculiarly time-bound phenomenon of England in the nineteenth
47century, and that this type was dying. However, he thought that
certain characteristics of large businesses lead to vitality.
' . . . 48Trie increasing size of businesses causes scientific methods to
be substituted for empirical. Further, the growth of
communication between businesses creates an appreciative audience
for-the technical expertise and the imagination involved in the
49employment of advanced methods. But, despite these offsetting
factors, the trend%/as towards the stifling of the vigorous business
, S  v . .  50 •leadershna
123
The owner of a business, when contemplating any change, is
led h}' his own interest to weigh the whole gain that it would
probably bring to the business against the whole loss; but
the private interest of the salaried manager or official draws
him in quite another direction. For the trouble of a new
experiment will come largely on him. If it fails, he will
have to bear much of the blame; and, if it succeeds, only a
very small part of the consequent gain will accrue to him.
So the path of least resistance, of greatest comfort and least
risk to himself is generally that of not striving for
improvement himself, and of finding plausible excuses for
not trying an improvement suggested by others, until its
51success is established beyond question.
COSTS AND RENTS
For a person trained in mathematics, Marshall was peculiarly 
casual when defining terms, and peculiarly inconsistent in his 
use of terms once defined. His explanation was that he wanted to 
use words to mean what the business world took them to mean.
Nowhere are these inconsistencies more apparent than in Marshall's 
use of the various terms relating to costs.
From his early article on Mill, Marshall was clear thivt by a 
firm's 'costs', he meant the money outlays in the form of expenses.
When considering costs from the point of view of the 
capitalist employer, we of course measure them in money;
. because his direct concern with the efforts needed for the 
work of his employees lies in the money payments he must 
make. His concern with the real costs of their effort and
of the training required for it is only indirect, though a
monetary assessment of his own. labour is necessary for some
S3problems, as will be seen later on.
Opportunity Costs
In Chapter III it was shown that the notion of opportunity cost
was widely used in the middle third of the nineteenth century in
writings which were considering the allocation decisions made by
firms. Cournot, von Thdnen, Lardner and Senior use this piece
54of commonsense quite explicitly. The common business sense they 
use is that an outlay is only relevant to a particular decision if 
it varies as a result of that decision. However, in the period
under consideration, generality was claimed for the concept and. it 
was given a clear definition.
Historically, the idea derives from the Austrians - and, in 
particular, from von Wieser. Von Wieser, assuming that the supply 
of productive services is fixed, looks at the value of forgone 
products. Marshall was quite happy to use this notion of 
opportunit}' costs in his Principles from the sixth (1910) edition.
The whole value of his []a businessman'sj business connection 
to him when working it is a notable instance of Conjecture 
of Opportunity value. It is mainly a product of ability
r
and labour, though good fortune may have contributed to it.
That part which is transferable, and may be bought by a
private individual, or by a large amalgamation of firms,
must be entered among their costs; and is in a sense a
55•_ Conjecture or Opportunity cost.
But in this form of forgone products, the notion does not 
incorporate those costs which influence the supply of productive
12*
s e r vi ce s .' T o generalise the concept, a definition in terms of
forgone opportunities is necessary. D.I. Green generalised the
. 57concept in this way and coined the term 'opportunity cost* m  1894. 
The proposition that economic agents will minimise the value of 
forgone opportunities is derived from the many models of resource 
allocation which assume consistency of preferences in the Walras- 
Samuelson tradition. Indeed, the Walrasian equations are almost 
free of motivational postulates. They merely propose that 
quantities demanded and quantities supplied are functions of prices; 
and, in this respect, supplies of productive services are similar 
to supplies of commodities.
This axiomatic view of behaviour has its counterpart in the .
notion of opportunity cost. Indeed, Hicks is not exaggerating
when he states that: 'Walras' equations give the most exact version
that has ever been given of the "opportunity cost" element in 
,58value;...'
Marshall resolved early in his career to devote his time to the 
building of structures rather than to attacking the work of others. 
One result of this decision is that xjq know little of his attitudes 
to the ideas of his professional contemporaries.
However, the proposition that the businessman will minimise
r
opportunity cost implies that all possible alternatives are known
, ' \
and that they can be ranked so that the best may be chosen.
Except as an outcome which firms tend to approximate (in the long 
run), Marshall is always hesitant to propose that firms behave in 
this way. Rather, he considers the behaviour of businesses to be 
based on uncertain estimates of the probable results of alternative 
possibilities.
1 2 6
Time-Period Analysis
For the purpose of outlining his theory of equilibrium price, 
Marshall divides the influence of time into four periods. / He 
refuses to offer a clear criterion of demarcation and this refusal 
is deliberate.
Of course there is no hard and sharp line of division between
•long' and 'short'.periods. Nature has drawn no such lines
in the economic conditions of actual life; and in dealing
with practical problems they are not wanted. ... If it is
necessary for the purposes of a particular argument to divide
one case sharply from the other, it can be done by a special
interpretation clause: but the occasions on which this is. ,
59necessary are neither frequent nor important.
The time-period analysis is an abstraction aimed at clarification
Shove explains the use of this classification when talking of the
long-period supply and demand curves: ’They may serve a useful
purpose by provisionally isolating for separate and preliminary
analysis some of the forces making for change at a particular moment
6 0and indicating the direction of their pressure,'
Marshall talks of these influences as affecting the market 
quantit)’- supplied at any particular moment. Secular influences
r
(due to the gradual growth of knowledge, of population and of capital) 
do not concern the present study so much as the market period, the 
short period, and the long period influences.
A firm deciding on its production policy for the immediate future 
will be confronted by more stringent constraints than^ if it were 
deciding what it would produce in the distant future. Accordingly,
it is possible to classify the decisions a firm makes according to 
the severity of the constraints which bind those decisions. Under 
Marshall’s classification the market period is that period in which 
stocks cannot be increased; the short period is that period after 
which the stocks of goods for sale can be increased but not the stock 
of all tj^ pes of capital goods; and the long period is that after 
which the stock of all capital goods can be increased.
Furthermore, it is possible to imagine each firm making plans
for each of the three periods, with a degree of interdependence 
between the price and production policies planned for each of the 
three periods. Eecause a plan is paired with each of the three 
periods (defined with reference to the nature of production constraints) 
it is possible to speak of a decision relating to a period, e.g., a . 
long period decision is a decision concerning the plan a firm has for 
its activities after that time has elapsed in which it is impossible 
to expand or to modify the plant of the business.
At any moment of time the firm may make price and production 
decisions given the constraints both of the market and of its past 
(long-period and short-period) decisions.
It is some idealised model.such as this that Marshall seems to 
have had in mind when discussing his time-period analysis.
r
Prime and Supplementary Costs
6 2In Chapter III it was noted .that many writers, when discussing 
decision-making by firms made the point that the only 'costs' 
relevant to the decision are those which vary as a result of making 
the decision. This distinction (common enough among businessmen) 
was called, in Marshall's borrowing from the language of businessmen,
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the distinction between prime costs (which are relevant) and
supplementary costs (which are not). 63
If prime costs are defined as the best opportunit}' forgone as 
the result of making a particular decision, then the concept is seen 
to be simply an application of opportunity cost. It is this 
definition which Marshall seems to have in mind when he states that 
the ’line of division’ between prime and supplementary costs is 
'often blurred'; that particular expenses may, depending on the 
decision being considered, sometimes be regarded as direct (prime)
and sometimes as supplementary costs. 64
However, Marshall often wishes to apply his prime cost/ 
supplementary cost distinction to his three-time-periods analysis-. 
When he does this, he sometimes speaks as if prime costs were costs 
relevant to short-period plans while, for long-period plans, 
supplementary costs are also relevant.^ If he were using the 
above definition consistently, prime costs would be, by definition, 
those which are relevant to any business plan. According to this 
definition, it is not the planning horizon considered which 
distinguishes between direct and supplementary costs, but rather it 
is whether the cost varies or not as a result of making a decision.
On page 360 of the Principles Marshall says that 'supplementary
costs are taken to include* (he is not defining the term b£
establishing its bounds) those costs which vary with output given
66that the decision to keep the plant- operating has been made.
But, as if to assert that he agrees with the present writer's
definition given above, Marshall does call capital costs 'necessary'
67if a firm is making a decision concerning capital expansion;
and, in. similar circumstances, he even refers to such costs as 'prime'
But in view of an order for a large number of locomotives to
be delivered gradually over a series of years, some extension
of plant 'specially’ made for the purpose,.and therefore truly/
to be regarded as prime marginal costs would almost certainly
68be carefully considered.
Marshall, using words which are borrowed from the business 
vocabulary, preferred to let the context explain his particular 
meaning rather than to use the terms consistently. In the remainder 
of this chapter the distinction between prime costs and supplementary 
costs will be understood to be that outlined by the present writer - 
a distinction which is at least as true to Marshall as any other 
single distinction.
Quasi-Rent
69Of those writings noted m  Chapter III as exploring the 
relationship between rents and profits, Marshall specifically 
acknowledges Senior, Mill, Hermann and von Mangoldt.^ Even 
though the generalisation of the concept of rent had been proceeding 
throughout the nineteenth century, it was not until the 1890s that 
the generalisation of rent to encompass returns to factors other 
than land became“widespread, Perhaps J.B.Clark and Pareto were
the most influential authorities on this subject - apart, that is, 
from Marshall. * *
In a letter to J.B.Clark regarding the difference between interest 
and profit, Marshall states that his work on the subject dates from 
1868 when he was stimulated by McLeod's criticism of the proposition 
that.cost determines value. McLeod had claimed, that the price of
iron determines wages and profits - a statement with which Marshall
. . - 7 1agrees, providing that it refers only to the short run.
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72In The Pure Theory of Domestic Values Marshall is edging
towards the concept of quasi-rent. The concept emerges in,
' 73The Economics of Industry (1879).
Marshall’s concept of quasi-rent suffers from the same sources 
of misunderstanding as his distinction between prime and supplementary 
costs. Indeed, the reason for the confusing interpretations often 
given of quasi-rent is that Marshall used it to refer to the surplus 
of revenue over prime costs. If prime costs is given the meaning 
proposed in the previous section (i.e., one unrelated to the 
idealised time periods analysis), then quasi-rents clearly arise 
ex post. A decision is made and prime costs are estimated. The 
activity resulting from the decision is implemented. Then the 
surplus of revenue from the activity over (ex ante) costs is 
quasi-rent.
Two quotations from Marshall's article, ’On Rent’, should 
establish this view. But note the last phrase in the second 
paragraph where Marshall suggests that, in the absence of a direction 
to the contrary, the reader should assume’ that quasi-rent is the 
excess of revenue over costs relevant to short-period plans.
Producer's Surplus is a convenient name for the genus of 
which the rent of land is the leading species. Producer's
r
Surplus is the excess of the gross receipts which a producer
gets for any of his commodities over their prime cost;, that
is, over that extra cost which he incurs in order to produce
those particular things, and which he. could have escaped if
74 -he had not produced them.
...If the surplus is derived from buildings or other 
implements which can be quickly made, but last long, it does
130 _ " -
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not enter for moderately long periods? and it'is best 
described as a quasi-rent when there is no special mention . 
of the period under discussion.
But on the other hand, the income derived from such 
machinery and other plant as is both quickl}'- made and 
quickly destroyed enters into cost for all but very short 
periods. It is therefore best described generally as 
profits; though when very short periods come under 
discussion, it has to be regarded as a quasi rent.^
Given the present writer's interpretation of prime costs, it is
clear that, as regards any particular decision, quasi-rents are
irrelevant. The decision to pursue a particular line of behaviotir
is taken providing the discounted expected receipts exceed the
discounted expected costs. But if a plant has excess capacity then
prime costs relating to say, short-period plans will be much lower
than prime costs for a long-period plan which envisages the complete
replacement of plant. In this case, short-period plans will be
expected to yield receipts which, when discounted, at least offset
77discounted expected expenditure.
Marshall's work on business decisions (the extent to which 
they are constrained by past decisions and the extent to which they 
are influenced by future expectations), may be seen as the final 
flowering of many seminal ideas planted throughout the nineteenth 
century. Earlier controversies on-the relationship of interest to 
profits, the generalisation of the concept of rent, as well as the 
absorption of the, uncontroversial, distinction between prime and 
supplementary costs all contributed. , As regards the -influence 
of future expectations, it is probable that W,T.Thornton's book^ , 
stimulated Marshall (as it had stimulated J .S .Mill). While some
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of Marshall's contemporaries (Jevons, Auspitz and Lieben,
Davenport and Wicksteed) considered the influence of expectations 
of the future on present policies, of firms, few can doubt that, in 
this field, Marshall was the tallest poppy.
COST FUNCTIONS AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS
At the outset of this section, mention must be made of an
outstanding, but still rather neglected, contribution by the
American Charles Ellet Jr. In an article published a few pages at
a time over many issues of the Journal of the Franklin Institute 
79dating from 1842 , Ellet constructed a cost function for railway
transportation from detailed observations marshalled with the aid,, 
of a powerful reasoning. He proceeded to test this equation 
against a large variety of differing types of railways, and found 
that it fitted remarkably well.
In the period 1920-1950 it was generally true that
professional economists argued about the form of cost functions
instead of using data to estimate them. Marshall's contemporaries
80tended to assume some form without even a priori argument.
Against the perfqrmance of his contemporaries and his immediate
successors Marshall’s own efforts in this respect are quite
outstanding. For, while his empirical observations are no tv-
available for verification) we have rrecords of the efforts he devoted
to the assimilation of factual information relating to the operation
81of business enterprises. In his search for such information, 
that relating to costs was given a high priority.
The Coumot-Viner view of the firm as adapting its rate of 
output given a blue-print of technological possibilities has caused
economists to direct'their cost studies largely to the relationship 
between output and the cost of production. While Marshall was 
concerned with this relationship, he also attached importance to 
other influences on costs as will be shown below. In the 
Marshallian schema, cost functions have more variables than merely 
cost and output.
The relationship between cost and output under the Coumot-Viner 
schema translates easily into supply functions. For each price the 
relevant dC / A c function is single-valued - yielding a 
determinate quantity to be supplied by the firm maximising its net 
revenue. Marshall’s cost-output functions cannot be translated into 
supply functions in this way for three reasons.
In the first place, Marshall constantly emphasises the empirical 
importance of the ’parametrical’ variables in the cost function,
C:£(o,..... ). If one accepts this empirical judgment, it would.be
misleading to draw inferences about the relationship of price to 
quantity supplied without a consideration of these variables.
Secondly, the Cournot-Vincr view of the firm as a quantity- 
82 .adaptor is not particularly helpful when supply is not a single­
valued function of price. Marshall does not restrict his functions 
8 3in this way , and so generally prefers to speak of the supply price
r
of a particular quantity rather than the quantity that will, be 
supplied at a particular price. The supply price (for the industry) 
is that price which will just maintain industry output at its 
present rate.
Thirdly, even if quantity supplied is a single-valued function 
of price,, the choice between quantity supplied and price as the 
independent variable is still more than a formality. If quantity
iÿ+
is a.,negative function of price (which Marshall claims for many 
manufacturing firms and industries in the long period), then by 
treating price as the independent variable one would get the nonsense 
result that by lowering price, a larger quantity would be-supplied.
Marginal Costs
While talking.in this general way, a point regarding Marshall's
terminology should be clarified. Marshall often used the phrase
'marginal cost' to refer, not to i C / d o , but to the prime costs of an
84 .extra lump of production. That is, he used ’marginal' to refer
to A rather than to ti or to 6. ‘ -This usage of words reflects 
Marshall's desire to picture the decisions of firms (but not of 
groups of firms) as relating to discrete changes.
That part of their production with regard to which such
persons are on the margin of doubts as to whether it is
worth while for them to produce it at the price, is to be
included together with that of the persons who are in doubt
whether to produce at all; the two together constitute the
marginal production at that price. The producers, who are
in doubt whether to produce anything at all, may be said to
lie altogether on the margin of production (or, if they are
agriculturalists, on the margin of cultivation). But as a
rule they are very few in number, and their action is less
important than that of those who would in any case produce 
85something.
Short Period Adjustments For the Firm
/ Marshall's statements of the tendency towards diminishing returns 
are based'on the classical writings dealing with the response of 
agricultural production to the application of increasing amounts
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of non-land inputs in an 'old country*. Like those classical statements
8 6Marshall's discussion is not clearly defined.
The ambiguity in Marshall's discussion is particularly marked 
■when he is referring to long-period input/output ratios in manufacturing 
industry. Pigou proposes that, for this case, Marshall's 
'increasing', 'decreasing', or 'constant' returns should be replaced 
by increasing, decreasing or constant supply priced;. and this 
suggestion has generally been adopted.
But whether Marshall is talking of historical returns to
*
agriculture or of short-period adjustments, the tendency to diminishing 
returns is given a more precise meaning. While Marshall vacillates 
between average and marginal product, he is consistent in referring 
to product rather than revenue when speaking of returns. Marshall 
is also careful never to say that returns (however defined) are 
always declining; but rather he says that they will always decline 
eventuall}’ if the variable input is increased sufficiently.
If a manufacturer has, say, three planning machines there is 
a certain amount of work which he can get out of them easily.
If he wants to get more work from them he must laboriously 
economize every minute of their time during the ordinary 
hours, and perhaps work overtime. Thus after they are
* f
once well employed, every successive application of effort to
88them brings him a diminishing return.
J.B.Clark both clarifies and generalises Marshall's statement.
His 'law of diminishing productivity' refers explicitly to marginal 
• 8 9product, and it was generalised to refer to any homogeneous
. . 90variable factor when applied to a rixed factor. Clark holds that
the law,- if stated in the form that diminishing marginal returns "
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will eventually occur, is universally true. 91 If defined in this
way, and providing it is applied to factors which are of imperfect
(but not zero) substitutability, Wicksteed claims that the 'law' is,
'...really no more than an axiomatic statement of a universal principle
92that applies equally to all forms of industry,...'
If imperfect substitutability is defined so that Wicksteed's
'axiomatic principle' follows, then the 'law' seems to tell us little:
its universality merely depends on the empirical question as to the
existence of imperfect substitutes (as defined). In fact, writers
have been extraordinarily careless in specifying the
93conditions needed for this law to hold.
Short-Period Adjustments For The Industry
Marshall's statement of the tendency to diminishing returns is 
not directly utilised to explain the increasing supply price for 
firms in the short period. In fact, he does not offer an explieit 
generalisation with respect to the supply schedules of firms in the 
short period. Auspitz and Lieben showed in 1887 how individual
marginal cost/supply curves could be added to produce an industr}r
94 .supply curve. The method is to sum the quantities supplied over
all the firms for any given price. But Marshall does not
envisage determinate reactions from all firms within an industry..
* rAll we are offered is a bald empirical generalisation relating to 
the industry, that there exists an '...almost universal law that the
term Normal being taken to refer to a short period of time an 
increase in the amount demanded raises the normal supply price.'95
„ Such a proposition need not have referred to demand 
considerations. Referring only to the supply side of the market, 
it could have read fhat, starting from a position of industry
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equilibrium, producers will only be willing to expand production if 
offered a higher price.
In support of this empirical generalisation we are offered the
illustration of fishing entrepreneurs who, given a short-period
time horizon, cannot train new sailors nor order new ships. To
increase output, therefore, fish producers must consider offering
higher wages to encourage sailors to work longer hours and must
consider '...what old fishing boats, and even vessels that were not
specially made for fishing, can be adapted and sent to fish for a
year or two,' They will only be prepared to pay such higher prices
for inputs or have recourse to such inferior quality inputs if they
96are offered a higher price for the resulting increase in output,
Long-Period Adjustments For The Firm
Samuelson states in the Foundations, that, '...the so-called
method of partial equilibrium consists of nothing more than a
liberal sprinkling of zeros into the equations of general 
97 . 98equilibrium,’ Earlier m  this chapter , it was shown that
models which are generally regarded as 'general equilibrium'
also sprinkle zeros in place of certain variables which other
investigators consider important. When it comes to the determinants
of long-period costs, Marshall (whose qualifications for making such 
* / 
empirical judgments were probably better than any of his
contemporaries) chose to discuss many variables which others did
not even mention. The early Walrasian assumption of constant
returns to scale (implied by production functions homogeneous of
the first degree) removes even the rate of output as a variable
which influencés unit costs.
In this subsection only the relationship between unit costs and
. ■ i38 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' '  ; v
the firm’s output and type of product will be considered. Other 
determinants of unit costs will be considered in the following two 
subsections. By a firm's long-period costs we mean the unit costs 
a firm expects to incur when considering long-period plans. By 
considering costs ex ante one is able to consider the influence 
both of products and of scale on unit costs. Any ex post
observations of costs must confront the problem of the influence of
. . . .  . 99 .capacity utilisation which, as Marshall reminds us, is a
separate problem.
In planning for long periods, the firm will consider the 
expenses of (i) circulating capital; (ii) wear and tear, and 
depreciation on fixed capital; (iii) interest and insurance on all 
capital; (iv) labour costs; and (v) the gross earnings of 
management. The latter item is composed of the supply price times
quantity of the capital contributed by those who run the business, 
the supply price times quantity of business enterprise and energy, 
and the supply price times quantit}' of that 'organization by 
which the appropriate business ability and the requisite capital 
are brought together.*
The relationship between long-period unit costs and the output
of any firm differs as between mining and agriculture on the one
102hand, and manufacturing on the other. Marshall claims'that
there may be economies of scale in mining and agriculture; but 
that these are unlikely to be so empirically significant as to 
play much part in the determination of the size of individual 
businesses. Consequently, he. concentrates his discussion on
manufacturing industry.
Marshall was, of course, aware that access to economies of scale
139
due to production is determined by plant,size whereas scale economies
due to marketing generally relate to the size, of the business as a 
103whole. But this distinction, while clear in Industry and Trade,
is given very little prominence in Marshall's earlier writings,
where generally there is assumed to be a one-to-one correspondence
between firm and plant. The economies or diseconomies to be gained
by_ the aggregation of plants within a single unit of control came to
assume importance in the vigorous debate (particularly in the U.S.)
over the desirability of trusts. The Principles was written while
104this debate was still m  its infancy.
A second reason why Marshall devoted so little attention to the
difference between plant and firm economies may be that he did not
envisage multi-plant control as a means of escaping the diseconomies
associated with large plants. Marshall did not consider that long-
105period cost curves were U-shaped. If there is no forward-rising
section to the average cost curve, there is no need to resort to 
multi-plant control to escape the forward-rising section.
It is possible to find U-shaped long-period cost curves in Mill's
Principles.106 Wicksell used this U-shaped average cost curve to
show that product exhaustion would occur in long-run competitive 
equilibrium; because each firm would be producing that output at
which long-run‘average costs were a m i n i m u m , P a r e t o  cdiisidered
~  108 U-shaped long-run average cost curves to be general , as did
Marshall's pupils, S .J .Chapman and T.S.Ashton in their empirical
study. Ashton and Chapman claim that there is a 'determinate
mechanical unit of maximum efficiency' which may be overcome if a
business has many plants of the determinate size. But such an
arrangement does not mean that diseconomi.es will not occur.
The subjective unit of maximum efficiency, as it might be
termed, is the unit which would be brought about by personal
forces working within a given environment of objective
conditions, when the latter are supposed to impose no limit
of themselves. A straitened supply of initiating,
organising and directing ability, for instance, is bound at
109some point to evoke decreasing returns m  a business...
■ . 3M>
Marshall assumes that technological real economies of scale 
generally are limited; but he does not envisage technological 
diseconomies of scale occurring at high rates of output.
Thus, so far as the 'productive* side of business is 
concerned, it may be concluded that - though the volume of 
output required for maximum efficiency in proportion to 
capital is increasing in almost every industry - yet, at 
any given time and in any given condition of industrial 
technique, there is likely to be a point, beyond which any 
further increase in size gives little further increase in
i cr- • 110economy and efficiency.
The reasons Marshall gives for these real economies are .those cited 
" i l lby Mill and Babbage.
Like Babbage, Marshall notes that the larger firm can Insure
itself against risky activities by engaging in a variety of 
112 113activities ; and, like Cournot . , Marshall mentions pecuniary
economics. Indeed: 'The economies of highly organized buying and
selling are among the chief causes of the present tendency towards 
the fusion of many businesses in the same industry of ,trade into 
single huge aggregates; and also of trading federations of various
kinds, including German cartels and centralized co-operative
~ . f114associations,'
When it comes to the influence of marketing and superintendence,
Marshall equivocates. In general, the larger firms'have great, and
constantly increasing, advantages over smaller firms due to economies 
115in marketing. This is particularly true of multi-product firms
11.6in which case a company's 'own goods advertise one another'.
However, in certain 'specialty' trades, the firm's market may be very 
difficult to expand: further sales might be particularly expensive.^
The existence of diseconomies of scale is most probably caused 
either by transport costs or by managerial difficulties in those 
trades where such diseconomies do occur.
There are advantages to be gained from specialisation in 
management.
On the other hand the small employer has advantages of his 
own. The master's eye is everywhere; there is no 
shirking by his foremen or workmen, no divided 
responsibility, no sending half-understood messages 
backwards and forwards from' one department to another. He 
saves much of the book-keeping, and nearly all of the 
cumbrous system of checks that are necessary in the 
business of a large firm; and the gain from this source 
is of very great importance in trades which use the more
* r
118valuable metals and other expensive materials.
Long-Period Equilibrium for the Firm
In his chapter on monopoly, Cournot states that, in the case of
manufactured articles, marginal cost for the firm (the statement
119seems to confuse marginal cost with average cost ) is generally 
a decreasing function of the firm's output. That Marshall reserved
forward-rising long-period average cost curves for certain special 
cases indicates that he, too, shared this empirical judgment.
When Cournot comes to his chapter on ’Unlimited Competition’
his firms are confronted with horizontal average revenue curves, -
For any firm k , first order profit-maximising conditions require
that f - 0 k (price equals marginal cost), while the second
order conditions require that, for a constant price, 0 ls(Dk)be
increasing at the equilibrium output. So the second order conditions
cannot be satisfied if the firm is producing with 0 decreasing:
in that case the output for the firm is indeterminate. If one
observes a firm with 0‘k ioii decreasing at its current rate of output,
either one is observing a disequilibrium situation (further
concentration within the industry is likely to occur), or the
marginal revenue curve for the firm is forward-falling. Such a
marginal revenue curve is attributed by Cournot to the absence of
120unlimited (large numbers) competition.
Cournot: outlines these two possibilities in the following 
paragrapli.
It is, moreover, plain under the hypothesis of unlimited 
competition, and where, at the same time, the function
should be a decreasing one, that nothing would limit
* r
the production of the article. Thus, wherever there is a
return on property, or a rent payable for a plant of which
the operation involves expenses of such a kind that the
function 0 ’k(£>!.) is a decreasing one, it proves that the
effect of monopoly is not wholly extinct, or that competition
is not so great but that the variation of the amount produced
by’ each individual producer affects the total production of
121“the article, and its price, to a perceptible extent.
1^3
In a letter to A.W.Flux, dated 7 March 1898 , Marshall
explains that he devoted a good deal of his'energy between 1870 and 
1890 to seek for a more satisfactory answer to the problem raised 
by Cournot in the previous paragraph. Marshall seems to have two 
criticisms of Cournot’s treatment.
Marshall's first objection is to the internal consistency of
Cournot's argument. This criticism, which Whitaker refers to as,
123*...a slip one can only attribute to a lapse of memory', is 
that Cournot failed to realise that a forward-falling long-run average 
cost curve (as with Cournot, there is some confusion as to whether 
Marshall is referring to average or to marginal costs) would 
enable one firm to capture the whole market.
Whitaker is too hasty in his judgment of Marshall's memory.
It would be surprising if a person could spend a large part of 
twenty of the best years of his life solving a problem the statement 
of which he then forgets. Marshall probably well understood 
Cournot's attempt to reconcile increasing returns with competition 
as represented by the diagram at footnote 120. But Marshall's 
objection is that the 'equilibrium' there depicted is no equilibrium 
at all; for the firm with a head start will not accept some 'share 
of the market' marginal revenue curve, but will cut its price so as 
to exclude all competitors and so retain the whole of the market for 
itself. . ;
Some, among whom Cournot hirnself is to be counted, have 
before them what is in effect the supply schedule of an 
individual firm; representing that an increase in its 
output gives it command over so great internal economies 
as■much to diminish its expenses of production and they
122
follow their mathematics boldly, but apparently x^ithout 
noticing that their premises lead inevitably to the 
conclusion that, whatever firm first gets a good start 
will obtain a monopoly cf the whole business of its trade
in its district. 124
Marshall claims that 'nearly every' producer is a monopolist 
in a particular market.
Everyone buys, and nearly everyone sells, to some extent in
a 'general' market, in which he is on about the same footing
with others around him. But nearly everyone has also some
'particular' markets; that is, some people or groups of
people with whom he is in somewhat close touch: mutual
knowledge and trust lead him to approach them, and them to ,
125approach him, m  preference to strangers.
Marshall uses the word 'market' such that its sense varies 
126with the context. Every producer has a number of customers which
he regards as his special market; whereas all customers for the 
product (when broadly defined) belong to the 'general market' - 
to which every producer belongs.
In the case of standardised commodities, the particular markets ,
are formed by trust and understanding between buyer and seller.
But in such markets this 'goodwill' is rarely sufficient to command
a premium on price. 'He does not .generally expect to get better
127prices from his clients than from others.' 
distributes buyers among sellers within the market.
The goodwill 
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Because goodwill in markets for standardised commodities does 
not command a premium on price, it is bard for those firms which fail
.. ■ : ' lU? ! ' - \
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to take advantage of scale economies to survive for long periods of
time. For example, steel firms operating under increasing returns
129will probably not be able-to survive.
However, special markets may be formed not merely.by goodwill,
but also by producers catering to special tastes. Such special
130markets are slow and expensive to acquire j and the firm’s output
will be limited by a steep demand curve for its particular market as
131 . .well as by its own supply curve. The latter may be steeply rising
if selling costs are considered.
Over successive editions of the Principles, Marshall seems to
become slightly less keen on the proposition that a producer will be
able to charge a premium on normal expenses by producing for a
special taste. Following the third edition, a section to this effect
. 1 3 2was deleted from the Principles. But Marshall maintained his
opinion that production for special tastes may explain why producers 
are able to produce with forward-falling average cost curves and 
still be profitable in the long run.
Marshall’s second criticism of Cournot's reconciliation of 
competition with increasing returns is that Cournot’s solution has 
‘no near relation to reality.’
You say that, a propos of Increasing Returns, you are r 
inclining to lay stress on the incomplete utilization of 
existing productive facilities, That is of course one of 
my chief hobbies. My confidence in Cournot as an economist 
“ was shaken when I found that his mathematics re I.R. led 
inevitably to things which do not exist and have no near 
relation to reality. One of the chief purposes of my 
Wanderjahre among factories, etc,, was to. discover how
- . • J-JJCournot’s premises were wrong.
Marshall objects to Cournot’s hypothesis that a firm’s costs •
depend solely on the product it is producing and its rate of output.
Such: 'Abstract reasonings as to the effects of the economies in
production, which an individual firm.gets from an increase of its
output are apt to be misleading, not only in detail, but even in
their general effect. This is nearly the same as saying that in
such case the conditions governing supply should-be represented in 
134their totality.' Marshall considers that Cournot's bag of
ceteris paribus contains certain variables which are crucial to a 
right understanding of the long-period equilibrium for the firm.
It has already been noted that Marshall stresses that costs
differ among firms within any industry because the opportunities
(including opportunities for sales) and the resources available vary
among firms. 1 In explaining the variability of firm size to be
observed within any industry, Marshall mentions the resources
X 3 6available to firms. But he particularly emphasises factors
internal to the firm. The ability of its decision-makers to make 
sound judgments, the luck they have and the efficiency of the 
managerial structure are all important factors in determining the 
costs of any particular enterprise.
r
Until the fifth edition (1907) of the Principles Marshall
considered that, for any business, the judgment and managerial efficiency
of the founder would probably decline in his later years; and after
his death, ’ ...the guidance of the business falls into the hands of
people with less energy and less creative genius, if not with less
. . 137 ^active interest m  its prosperity,' This led Marshall to draw
his famous analogy between the life cycle of trees in the forest
and the life cycle of businesses. '
However, from the sixth edition (1910) of the Principles Marshall
qualifies his life-cycle thesis. If businesses are organised on
the joint-stock principle they may expand rapidly when young
138(particularly if they pioneer new productive methods) , but the
declining phase of the ’cycle* will be transformed into one of
139 . .stagnation. Private firms have their rate of expansion limited
by financial constraints and(by the time they take to develop
particular markets. Before they reach that scale where all scale
economies are exhausted they may be in decline - the effort
needed to maintain goodwill and keep costs low may no longer be
forthcoming. But under joint-stock organisation, financial
constraints are much less pressing and the energy of decision-makers
and-managers is not so dependent on a few people. If the product
is standardised and the organisation is joint-stock the industry
may be monopolised. 1
It seems therefore that, if there were no other difficulty 
in the way of the unlimited expansion of a strong 
manufacturing business, each step that the firm took 
.forwards in»supplanting its rivals, would enable it to 
produce profitably to itself at prices below those which > 
they could*reach. Thatis, each step would make the ifext • 1 
step surer, longer and quicker: so that ere long it 
would have no rivals left, at all events in its own 
neighbourhood.1^
Given these conditions, Marshall seems to predict that there 
exists a long-period equilibrium for the firm whose output is 
equal to the putput jof the industry . But not all products are
standardised, not all firms are joint-stock and not all industries
are free from any technical progress. Marshall does not define a
long-period equilibrium for the firm. Furthermore, at any moment
in time, the producers of any product are likely to present an
array of unit costs. If, for any moment in time, the firms are
ranked from those with the lowest unit costs on the left to those
with the highest on the right the result, if drawn continuously,
is a particular expenses curve. This will always be forward
rising - because of the ranking procedure - regardless whether the
long-period industry supply schedule is forward falling or 
141forward rising.
The Long-Period Supply Schedule for the Industry
142As was noted above Marshall's supply schedules do not tell u 
how much the industry will supply at any given price'. The reasons 
for this should be clear by the end of this sectionj but from the 
beginning we will enquire as to the minimum price at which producers 
will be willing to produce a particular quantity rather than the
143quantity they will be prepared to produce at a particular price.
The minimum price at which a group of producers is prepared to 
produce in the 16ng period must cover the estimated average costs
of the highest cost producer. So the long-period supply curve for
. * rthe industry represents how these average costs alter as industry
output expands. In the previous section the internal determinants 
of a firm's costs were explained. -But Marshall says that a firm's 
costs are a function of industry output.
We may divide the economies arising from an increase in the 
scale of production of any kind of goods, into two classes 
- firstly, thoso dependent on the general development- of the
industry; and,- secondly, those dependent on the resources
of the individual houses of business engaged in it, on
f
their organization and the efficienc)*- of their management.
We may call the former external economies, and the latter
144internal economies.
Very few commentators are prepared to defend the expositional 
clarity of Marshall’s discussion of externalities. In his 
discussion, Marshall seems to use the phrase to refer to the 
functional relationship between the costs of one firm and the costs
of other firms. Macgregor observes that these functions can be of
. . 145 ■ . •three distinct types.
(i) A firm’s costs are a function of the general'industrial 
organisation of the country. These externalities take such forms 
as improved transport, communications, subsidiary industries; and 
they should be treated parametrically when dealing with partial 
equilibrium analysis.
(ii) A firm's costs are a function of the organisation of a 
particular geographical centre for the trade of which it is a member. 
It is tempting to say that the localisation of a skilled labour pool 
and of subsidiary trades, and of the ease of marketing if located 
near similar producers should also be treated parametrically;
for they relate to agglomeration rather than to the size of the 
industry as such.- But if the industry is located at a centre 
(due to agglomeration economies), its growth may yield externalities 
which come under heading (iii).
(iii) A firm's costs are a function of the organisation (in 
particular, the size) of a particular trade.' It is only this third 
category which should be treated as a determinant of the shape of the
l>+9
long-period industry supply schedule. Under this heading will- be 
included Marshall’s examples of the expanded manufacture of tools 
and machines with their attendant scale economies as well as the 
expansion of collection and distribution trades, to the extent that 
the expansion of these subsidiary trades depends on the expansion
of the particular industry whose supply schédule is under
.. 146 ’consideration.
Marshall's long-period supply price is not merely dependent on 
present period output and its allocation among firms. It is also 
dependent on the time at which the production takes place. This 
follows from the proposition that certain external economies are 
not reversible in time. Once output has expanded and the 
external economies reaped, such economies (e.g., the establishment 
of a transport network or.labour training) will remain an advantage
for a longer period of time than the time horizon of a long-period
. -| 147plan.
Marshall usually assumes that the supply price relating to any 
point on his long-period supply schedule is that which existed when, 
the corresponding rate of output was in fact produced. Given that 
the output of most industries is thought to expand over time, each 
supply price relates to a.single planning period. It is 
understandable that Schumpeter accuses Marshall of not constructing
r s
a true supply curve (i.e., a series of conditional-static-sequences),
but rather an historical record of how supply prices have alteréd as'
148industry output and time have changed.
Perhaps an even more basic deficiency of the Marshallian analysis 
is that, even given the time to which a particular lej/el of output 
will relate, the determinants of costs are so many and the
connections between them so various, that it would be impossible to 
predict the supply price.., In particular, Marshall gives little 
guidance as to which firms will produce any increase in output.
149 ' 150 -Robertson criticises the treatment of Frisch on the
grounds that,.if the established firms are encountering increasing
costs in the long period, an increase in output may be met by extra
firms replicating the productive efforts of existing firms. But
the implication of Marshall's treatment of the representative f irm'*'“’'*'
is that any increase in output is normally supplied by an expansion
of established firms. If this inference is valid then Marshall's
general opinion was that any expansion of industry output would
give access to economies because of internal expansion which would
generally be reinforced by net external economies; so that while •
long-period supply schedules could be of any shape, they are ,
generally forward-falling. -
The Representative Firm
Marshall's concept of the representative firm is a micro analogue 
of the long-period industry supply schedule. The concept adds 
nothing to Marshall's analysis of long-period supply. In that it is 
a heuristic device adding no content to the prior ideas which it is
-designed to elucidate, Robbins'.comment that it is an 'afterthought*
. , . . 153is certainly apt.
Assessed as an expositional tool, the representative firm must 
be regarded as a failure. Against the onslaught by Robbins, the 
concept crumbled remarkably quickly. Marshall's exposition of 
the long-period industry supply curve implies very little-regarding 
the firms in. the industry - they may be increasing or decreasing 
in size, entering or leaving the industry as the output of the
industry expands. The representative firm is a construction by . 
which the student may seek to understand the behaviour of the 
industry. If it is too complicated to imagine the industry's supply 
price falling as the industry expands, then one can imai-i a firm as 
a scaled-down version of the industry undergoing simila ranges.
It is just this simplification which Robbins considers to be 
unhelpful - indeed he considers it to be quite misleading, 'The 
whole conception, it may, be suggested, is open to the general 
criticism that it cloaks the essential heterogeneity of managerial
ability - just at that point at which it is most desirable to
. . .  . . 154exhibit it most vividly,'
Macgregor presents a diagram which assists in the understanding
155of the properties of the representative firm, ;
Industry supply “ OM. ,
Price = MP.
QR = particular expenses curve, 
SR = high-cost producers with 
long-period average costs 
greater than price. Unless 
these firms lower their costs 
they will decide to leave the 
industry when long-period plans.come to be revised.
QS producers have long-period average costs less than price.
MP- = price-'determining* cost,
S = representative conditions.
The representative firm may be used in the following three ways.
In the first place, its output will alter if and o n ly if the 
output of .the industry alters. Any change-in output will be in the
152
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same direction for the representative firm as for the industry.
So if the industry output is to increase, this must mean that 
price exceeds the representative firm's unit normal expenses of 
production.
Secondly, a firm’s long-period supply price (average of normal 
expenses) includes income forgone by investing capital in this 
particular enterprise. So when industry output is stable, the 
representative firm must be earning its opportunity income on 
capital. This opportunity income is the definition of the normal 
rate of interest or, if earnings of management are counted in, of., 
profit. '
Finally, the representative firm will have a supply curve found 
by the vertical summation of the supply schedules of the factors it' 
uses, when the factor supply schedules plot the amount of the factor 
needed to produce a unit of a given quantity of output against the 
supply price of that quantity of the factor. This exercise
does not give any indication of the supply schedules of firms within 
the industry in question, but it possibly helps to illustrate the 
meaning of the costs of particular factors per unit of output.
For Marshall to put .the concept to these uses he has to give a 
“rough idea of how one would recognise a representative firm if one 
saw one. It would need to be in some sense ‘representative’ 
both of the cost and of the sales position of other firms within, the 
industry. For this.to be true it would need to be ’representative’ 
with respect to its business ability, age, luck, size and its 
access to net external economies. ,
It cannot be stated too clearly that the limitations Marshall 
imposed oq his analysis of the long-period supply schedule are
necessarily placed on his representative f i m  analysis. But the , 
glory of'his long-period supply analysiss his analysis of the 
influence of time on long-period costs and his allowance for a 
great variety of behaviour patterns on the part of firms within the' 
industry, is obscured when the tool of the representative firm is 
used. *
FREE COMPETITION
In the middle 1870s, Marshall, laboured over a volume dealing
with international trade - two segments of which were later
. 159published for private circulation by Sidgwick. In this volume
Marshall speaks of the economist as reasoning in ideal types. The 
division between 'the pure theory of domestic values* and *the pure 
theory of international values' is that the former assumes perfectly 
free competition (i.e,, the perfectly free circulation of labour 
and capital), while the latter assumes imaginary places 'between 
which capital and labour do not circulate at all'.^^
Marshall equates free competition with the process by which
resources move so that the supply price of each commodity tends to
equal its demand price. In referring to this free movement of
resources, he treats the terms free competition and open competition 
, 161synonymously, .
Throughout his life, Marshall continued to base his first
deductions concerning domestic values on the assumption of free
competition. The epithet 'perfectly' was soon discarded so as to
avoid any confusion with the assumptions of the emerging model of
1.6 2perfect competition.
Marshall's free competition is a direct descendent from the
155
mainstream analysis of the English.classical school; and its- ' \
similarities to Adam Smith's free competition and to J.S.Mill's 
Case I ('Commodities in which the obstacle to attainment consists,
only in the labour and expense requisite to produce the commodity')
' 163are easy to see.
In a preface to the second edition (1881) of The Economics of 
Industry, Alfred and Mary Paley Marshall give the following 'formal' 
definition of free competition.
A man competes freely •when he is pursuing a course, which
without entering into any combination with others, he has
deliberately selected as that which is likely to be of the
greatest material advantage to himself and his family. ...
Normal results in Economics are therefore those which would
be brought about in the long run by this active principle,
- if it had time to overcome - as it necessarily would in
sufficient time - custom, inertness, ignorance, and all the
164other passive elements which make up economic friction.
This definition requires individual maximisation of net revenue 
before free competition is said to exist. As with Mill, this
competitive behaviour is contrasted with behaviour dominated by
. . . 165custom and ignorance.
Another close parallel with Mill is that the' number of sellers 
is considered to be relatively unimportant. That the existence of 
free competition requires, independent- behaviour indicates that there 
must be more than one supplier, but we are told little directly on  ^
this question. The young Macgregor is more explicit - and may, 
perhaps, be taken as indicating his master's viewpoint. Macgregor 
grants that, other things being equal, fewness of numbers increases
' the bargaining strength of a group; but he doubts that 'under real. 
‘ ' \ . \ ' ' 
conditions' numbers is 'the sole or preponderant aspect of the
question. ,166
Marshall holds that the key to the achieving of individual
maximising behaviour is that individual businesses have freedom from
constraints to expand or contract, and to enter or to leave particular
activities. Examples of such constraints would be government
regulations, the need to sink capital and effort and the associated
risks, and vis inertiae - 'the opposition to change which is
167 'inherent in human nature and in human conditions'. Such barriers
to the free movement of factors lead to the creation of the
168particular markets discussed above - which may or may not confer 
monopoly power over prices. But such monopoly power is generally 
limited by the independent behaviour of other firms and by the time 
it takes for particular markets to lose their profitability. Indeed, 
it is Marshall's concern with the long period which justifies the 
freely-competitive basis of the bulk of his analytical work.
Stress must be laid on the fact that absolute monopolies
are of little importance in modem business as compared
with those which are 'conditional' or 'provisional's that
is, which hold their sway only 'on condition' that, or
'provided' that, they do not put prices much above the
levels necessary to cover their outlays witlr normal profits.
If they did, then competition would probably make itself
felt; ' unless stayed by authority, as is the case with
169patents, copyrights, and some rights, of way.
\
It is true that profits in excess of normal are less likely to 
be sustained the longer /the period of time one^ considers. For
this,reason, free competition is most legitimate, as an hypothesis 
for models with a secular time horizon* But that excess profits ; 
will eventually be squeezed is a non-falsifiable proposition.
The extent to which one is prepared to put one’s faith in such a
\  ./ 'time horizon depends on one’s judgment, and on, perhaps, one’s 
ideology.  ^ '
The Law of Indifference
Jevons' law of indifference states, ’...that in the same open
market, at any one moment, there cannot be two prices for the
same kind of article. Such differences as may practically occur
arise from extraneous circumstances, such as' the defective credit
of the purchasers, their imperfect knowledge of the market, and- so 
170on.’ This proposition is such a commonplace that one wonders why
Jevons elevated it to the status of a law and why later writers 
credited its statement to Jevons. 1 ^1
The ’law’ might be interesting if one were to spell out what 
one means by ’the same kind of article’ - which Marshall attempted 
in his classification of particular markets. Some interest might 
also be derived from the law if one uses its statement to explore 
the types of knowledge which would be necessary^ for its realisation.
Edgeworth defines a normal competitive field as one which has 
(among other characteristics) knowledge available at almost zero 
costs ’There is free communication throughout a normal competitive 
field. You might suppose the constituent individuals collected at 
a point, or connected by telephones - an ideal ¿supposition, but
sufficiently approximate, to existence or tendency for the purposes
" ' 172 "of-abstract science.’
The problems associated with what lias become the perfect knowledge 
assumption of perfect competition were not thoroughly explored until 
Frank Knight’s dissertation, Risk; Uncertainty and Profit was 
published in 1921. Most of the writers in the present period 
assumed a high degree of knowledge among all economic agents - 
although the precise degree of knowledge was not specified. In 
their analyses of market equilibrium, both Walras and Marshall relied 
on dealers to buy if they could find a selling price below the 
anticipated equilibrium and sell if they could find a buying price 
above it. Indeed, at one stage when he is outlining thé freei
competition model, Marshall states: 'But though everyone acts for
himself, his knowledge of what others are doing is supposed to be
generally sufficient to prevent him from taking a lower or paying a
173higher price than others are doing.'
The Assumption of Large Numbers
Cournot greatly promoted the practice of classifying a market 
according to its numbers of sellers. He defines unlimited competition 
in the following way.
The effects of competition have reached their limit, when
each of the partial productions ftk [^amount of production
by producer k] is inappreciable not only with reference to
the total production ft = , but also with reference to the
derivative F V  > so that the partial production Ok could be
subtracted from ft without any appreciable variation resulting
in the price of the commodity. This hypothesis is the one
. which is realized, in sbcial economy, for a multitude of
■ 174products, and, among them, fox the most important products.
As a definition this seems to be clear and unexceptionable.
Large numbers are sufficiently large that if a firm considers /whether 
to change the rate at which it places output in the market, it will 
operate as if no change in^the price of the product would result.
The definition does not confuse the assumption of large numbers
with the proposition that one firm among a large number will be
. . .  • . 175denied access'to price as a decision variable. •
Cournot’s judgment as to the empirical ubiquity of large-numbers 
industries must be questionable. It is noteworthy that many writers 
at the close of our period held that Cournot’s judgment was true of 
manufacturing industry when he wrote, but that it was not true of 
. the early 1930s,
Government statistics of industrial concentration normally' 
represent nation-wide concentration rather than market concentration. 
For this reason, government statistics do not reflect closely 
changes in market concentration over time - particularly when the 
size of markets is changing rapidly, as occurred in the second half 
of the nineteenth century with improved transport and communication.
Nationwide concentration almost certainly decreased during the• 
century preceding the 1920sj .but systems of transport and 
communication developed during the second half of the nineteenth 
"century expanded markets such that market concentration probably * 
decreased up to the 1880s. However, the spate of mergers from that 
time up to the 1920s probably increased market concentration. It is 
this latter change which seems to have impressed the writers of the 
1920s and 1930s. -Estimates of secular changes in manufacturing 
concentration ratios must allow for wide margins of error. The
evidence for the United States in "the present century indicates a
. ~ . . . '. . 177constant or slightly increasing degree of concentration.
.159
The Proposition of Quantity Adaptor '
‘ The prime use of the large numbers assumption in thé writings of
Cournot, Auspitz and Lieben, and Pareto is-that it causes a firm's
178marginal'revenue to equal the market price. The firm will treat
'prices parametrically and act as a quantity adaptor. Cournot seems 
to treat all.non-monopolistic firms as quantity adaptors. The 
relationship between large numbers and quantity adapting becomes 
clearer with Auspitz and Lieben; but the first full statement is from 
Pareto,
'll y a lieu de faire ici une -distinction fondamentale.
(a) L'echangeur subit les prix du marche sans essayer de 
les modifer de propos déléré\ Ces prix sont modifés 
effectivement par son offre et sa demande, mais c'est a 
son insu. C'est ce qui caractérisé l'état que nous 
appelons de libre concurrence.
(3) L'echangeur, seul ou d'accord avec d’autres, se livre a 
des manoeuvres pour changer les prix du marche. Il prend 
en consideration les variations de ces prix pour établir 
son offre et sa demande. ,K C'est ce qui caractérisé l'état 
des monopies, des syndicats, etc.
. In a footnate, Pareto continues: 'En langage mathématique 
nous dirons que: (a) Pour établir les conditions du maximum, on 
differentie en les prix constants; (3) Au contraire, on
differentie en supposant un ou plusieurs prix variables avec les
✓ - 179quantités que l'echangeur demande, ou offre.'
The use of the assumption of large numbers in order to treat 
prices parametrically is still a widespread practice today.. However, 
it is important to realise that large numbers Only enables this
1 6 0
lèi
parametric treatment of prices if the mechanism for fixing prices is
180of the rather odd type envisaged by Cournot and Walras. They
envisage that producers formulate offers contingent on prices and
consumers formulate demands similarly contingent on prices'. An
independent authority, cognisant of these contingent offers and
demands will fix the price for the period in question such that the
18Xquantity supplied equals the quantity demanded.
Marshall uses the picture of the firm as a quantity adaptor as
a useful abstraction when discussing the marginal productivity theor 
18 2of distribution. When discussing fish markets, he talks as if
each firm treats price parametrically; but this treatment seems to
follow from the institutional arrangements in the market, ar.d there
is no explicit assumption of a large number of producers. This is
made yet more clear when, on page 374 of the Principles,Marshall
talks of large, open markets in which price is a decision variable
for firms; and where, at least in the market period, the consideration
183of price as a decision variable materially influences the analysis.
/ Given that Marshall’s free-competition model, does not assume 
large numbers, but merely individual maximising behaviour by firms 
and the free movement of resources, it is more plausible to propose 
.that firms treat price parametrically the longer the planning period 
they are considering; for in the freely competitive long run price 
will tend towards the average cost of an extra lump of output on 
long-period calculations no matter what any particular firm may do.
However, if firms treat price as a decision variable then, even
t ' ♦ "
given Coumotesque large numbers, firms may have demand curves with 
some gradient. Reder notes that, in the absence of perfect knowledge 
and instantaneous adjustments by consumers, firms producing a
homogeneous product may charge differing prices. Whether a firm 
can-charge a price higher than *the general run* in such circumstances 
will depend on the period of time and the size of the price 
differential. In a market where information is costly, e'.g., 
v second-hand books, or where prices are constantly changing (because 
of inflation), equilibrium may never be approximated and every 
purchase may be a bilateral monopoly bargain.
Arrow develops these suggestions by Reder into a more formal 
model in which firms (in a large-numbers market) operate as (
monopolists or monopsonists under .uncertainty as they adjust prices 
in disequilibrium situations.
In sum then, for large numbers, market prices will only be 
treated parametrically given the odd method of price fixing envisaged 
by Cournot and Walras. While for long-period plans,.firms will 
tend to treat prices parametrically whether large numbers are 
assumed or not - providing that the market fulfils the Marshallian 
criteria for free competition.
EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY UNDER COMPETITION
Equilibrium in the Market Period
Before proceeding to a discussion of equilibrium and stability 
it may be well to repeat the range of our interest with economic 
models. Because our attention is focussed on the behaviour of firms
we shall not venture into those problems of equilibrium and 
stability raised by a qonsideration of reactions among markets. -- 
Such reactions involve analysis of a level of aggregation higher 
than that in which we are interested.
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The historical justification for this procedure is that, while 
equilibrium analysis was ‘generalised* to cover more than one market 
within our time period, stability in multiple exchange was not 
discussed until Hicks* Value and Capital (1939). This worlc by 
Hicks has since been developed by Samuelson, Metzler, Morishima,
Arrow and Hurwicz, Negishi, and a host of lesser lights; but these 
developments have concentrated on the problems raised by the 
consideration of more than one market. The theory of the-firm 
contained in this work is basically that of Walras, If only for 
this reason the stability analysis of Walras (which he explained in 
a partial setting) is worthy of consideration. It is the stabilit)' 
analysis of Walras as compared with that of Marshall which will act 
as a cantus firmus over these next few sections.
Thornton’s criticisms of the value theory of J.S.Mill’s Principles
amounts to the proposition that, if one observes the prices of products
in markets from day to day, they seem to be influenced by chance
occurrences, the expectations of producers and a whole grab-bag of
186inter-related influences. By contrast, Mill's explanation of
yalue seems too simple. Marshall's concern with verisimilitude 
caused him to take Thornton seriously.
It is true that Mill does not explain this [[that price 
expectations influence market-period supply^] in his 
Political Economy. The theory of market values was 
considered by economists as of slight importance, until 
Mr.Thornton's book On Labour appeared. Mr.Thornton's work 
is not free from faults; but he has not received his due 
meed of gratitude for having led men to a point of view 
from which the.practical importance of the theory of 
market values is clearly seen.
, ■; > - - . ■ 163; ; ; " • "
In particular he led Mill
• - to give an exposition of^his views on the subject.
Marshall proposes that, while production cannot be expanded as 
a result of market-period decisions, market-period supply is a 
positive function of price. These propositions relating to 
Marshall's market period are similar to Walras* first model of 
equilibrium of exchange.
However, there is one important difference between the two
models. The •■Walrasian individual considers his own demand for the
product at any particular price. At any price, he will be prepared
to sell the difference between his endowment and his effective
X88demand. In these circumstances, as Wicksteed emphasised, a 
supply curve is merely a curve of net negative demand. This creates 
problems when one comes to stability in the market period; for it 
enables supply curves to be backward rising which may imply 
instability at points of intersection with forward-falling demandi
curves.
Wien Marshall discusses the pure theory of foreign trade-he 
considers these points; because a country may have a significant 
demand for its own products. . However, the firm producing for the 
domestic market has little or no demand for its own product, so it is 
of little use to*consider its supply function as its net negative 
demand. 'There is not in the nature of the case any symmetry
between these two sets of causes Cthose governing demand and those
. t "l »189governing supplyj.'
Marshall always speaks as if his market-period supply curve is - 
190forward rising. The reason for this is that the higher the
present price, the more attractive are sales in the present as
1 9 ] -compared with sales in the future. The sales of any individual ,
165
firm will depend,on its financial position (cash flow) as well-as 
its estimates as to future price trends.
Sidgwick is more precise. He assumes, (1):
...that production and consumption continue at a uniform rate
throughout the year, and (2 ) that the commodity is not one
that will deteriorate by being kept. Then, if we take any
single dealer who has a stock of the commodity, we see that
he will gain by selling it, unless he has reason to expect
that the price at some definite distance of time will be
higher than the present price by an amount more than sufficient
to compensate him for his loss of interest or profit on the
capital locked up in the unsold stock, together with the
192expense and trouble of taking care of the goods.
As represented by the diagram at left, the Walrasian condition
for fo to be called an equilibrium 
price is that the quantity supplied 
and the quantity offered be equal
at that price. This condition
193comes straight from Cournot ,
or from J.S.Mill;
Marshall wishes to call the equilibrium price because it 
represents a price from which there will be no tendency to alter:
The price of 36s . [] above]] has thus some claim to be
called the true equilibrium price: because if it were fixed 
on at the beginning, and adhered to throughout, it would 
exactly equate demand and supply (i.e. the amount which 
buyers were willing to purchase at that price would be just
equal to that for which sellers were willing to take that -
price); . and because every dealer who has a perfect knowledge
of;the circumstances of the market expects that price to be 
194 'established.
Stability
Samuelson’s ’correspondence principle’ states that, ’...the
problem of stability of.equilibrium is intimately tied up with the
. . . • 195problem of deriving fruitful theorems m  comparative statics.’
Following Samuelson’s exposition, writers on exchange stability have
generally been careful to specify ,the time paths of their variables
as they converge.
This was not generally the case prior to'Samuelson; but 
convergence in both Marshall and Walras is an adjustment process which 
takes place over time. Neither of them means by stability the way 
the demand curve cuts the supply curve.
In an early discussion by Marshall of long-period equilibrium he 
discusses stability in the following way.
Thus the motion of the exchange-index is in every respect, 
similar to that of a material particle moving freely under 
the action pf forces which attract it towards OE and OG.
,. .Then this particle will move exactly in the same 
manner as does our exchange-index, so that if we choose to 
assign to these horizontal and vertical forces any particular 
laws, we should obtain a differential equation for the motion 
of the.exchange-index. This equation when integrated would 
give qs the path which on this particular supposition the 
particle would "describe, .
So Samuelson’s correspondence principle did not,teach us that 
stabilisation is a dynamic adjustment; but it did teach us that the 
time pattern of adjustments may influence the path to equilibrium, and 
may even determine whether or not the path is convergent. -
Convergence in the.Market Period
For Marshall, the path of convergence to the equilibrium price
is more heavily damped the greater the degree of knowledge in the
market. If,all buyers and all sellers correctly estimate the
equilibrium price, that price will rule throughout the trading period.
If a seller tries to charge a price greater than pc no one will buy
because he knows that he will be able to satisfy his wants by buying -
at po . If a buyer tries to buy at a price less than p& no one will
sell because each seller realises that he will be able to sell all he
197wants at the price p<> .
However, if expectations are imperfect, trading may take place at 
disequilibrium prices before revised estimates of demand and supply 
encourage buyers and sellers to alter the price in the direction of
lequilibrium.
The stabilisation mechanism is clear. When, at a price greater 
than po , it becomes clear to a*seller that he will be unable to sell 
all that he wishes at the present price, he will reduce the price in 
the direction of po . When, at a price less than pc , it becomes clear 
to a buyer that he will be unable to buy all that he wishes at the 
present price, he will raise the price in the direction of pc* . If 
the price differs from pc , the actions of both buyers and sellers, as 
the3' come to learn the true demand-supply relationship for the market 
period, will push the price in the direction of pc .
Wicksteed elaborates on thi6 process, showing that the benefits
to be derived from knowledgein, such a market form an incentive to
198 ■- v ■ .gam that knowledge.
Like Marshall, Walras discusses stability in exchange when trying 
to establish that real market processes will approximate the 
equilibrium solution of his model. But Walras' process of 
'tâtonnement' (which, Jaffe and Stigler suggest, is best translated 
as 'groping') whereby convergence occurs, does not correspond to the 
behaviour of any market participants. It is ironical that, in trying 
to establish.a link between his model and behaviour in markets, Walras 
merely iterates the conditions under which his model will'be stable.
When [the equality between effective demand and effective offer]
is absent, the attainment of equilibrium prices requires a rise
in the prices of those commodities the effective demand for
which is greater than the effective offer, and a fall in the
prices of those commodities the effective offer of which is
199greater than the effective demand.
These stability conditions for exchange are the same as those of 
Marshall; but Marshall outlines a pattern of behaviour corresponding 
to the conditions whereas Walras does not.
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Marshall does not raise the possibility of unstable equilibria 
in the context of his market-period discussions because all 
equilibria will be stable given Marshall's propositions that demand
stability conditions will not
curves are forward falling and that
market supply curves are forward rising.
However, Walras allows his exchange supply
\
curves to be backward rising as at left.
At a price close to fo the Marshall ~ Walra 
lead to convergence at a price p«> . '
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- ?oi . ■. .V In. a letter to Walras“ . , Marshall ' claimed objective originality
for the doctrine of stable equilibrium. \ The evidence he cited was
the abstract of a paper which Marshall presented in 1873 to the
202Cambridge Philosophical Society. Walras* statement was not
. . 203' published until the following year. Marshall*s paper does point
• to the possibility of both stable and unstable equilibria,* but the 
reference, although only fleeting, is clearly to the stability of 
long-period equilibrium. This latter case, elaborated in the Pure 
- Theory of Foreign Trade, is given a quite separate set of stability 
conditions from those outlined above.
Determinacy of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is called ’determinate' or 'indeterminate'
according as the final position is independent of the route followed 
204or not.
/
Edgeworth had a simple solution to the determinacy problem:
allow no exchanges prior to equilibrium and, because no route is
followed, the final position can not be dependent on the route.
This is his 'recontract' requirement under which contracts at
205disequilibrium prices are regarded as purely provisional. This
solution suggests a way of constructing a model so as to avoid the 
.problem of indeterminacy. However, it does not suggest the 
conditions under which the route followed will yield a uniquely- 
determined solution.
In a masterly article, Jaffe clarifies the controversy as to
whether Walras followed Edgeworth's means of escaping the indeterminacy 
207 'problem. It was not until the fourth edition of the Elements (1900)
that Walras made it clear that trading at ’false’ quantities may affect 
the final equilibrium outcome. Even then, Walras confines this
l?o
qualification to his production model and does not say precisely why :
• ' J. v
trading at false prices may create indeterminacy,.
Marshall’s analysis of stability for the market period
envisages trading at false prices according to the degree of knowledge
among traders^in the market. Marshall states that, providing the
marginal utility of money is constant for each trader during the
208period, the final price will be determinate.
To help clarify Marshall's position, suppose that the market 
period (a day) may be divided into eight hours. Suppose that a 
uniform daily price p* corresponds to a daily quantity demanded of .
¿V . Suppose further that a uniform price for each of the eight hours
C l | I -1 .= fx = ... = fg J corresponds to a uniform quantity demanded for
r «p‘ , q) Ci!each of the eight hours [_( % )v = ( g \  = ... = ( ^ J.
Consider good Q  and money (corresponding to the subscripts 
and ). If trade in good Q  for each trader is very small compared 
with his stock of money, the marginal utility of money (M^) for any 
trader will not alter significantly during the course of the day’s 
trading. Suppose A and ft arcivany two traders. The condition for 
equilibrium is that:
* KU<y = a MUy =.pf ... (1 )
According to Marshall’s stability analysis, the market will
A hi W y*\approach this condition after a number of hours. But, as 
is constant over time, the amount of Q  traded when the 
equilibrium price is attained will be such that:
V\ U rw-»
/\ a h >vt
e H  “ B M U i vi • constant • 09 (2).
* »•
Given the condition of a constant for each trader , the 
price and quantity traded in the hours of equilibrium are determinate. 
Further, once knowledge has been gained to attain the equilibrium price 
and quantities, those equilibrium values will be maintained. But, 
it should be noted that the quantity traded over the eight hours 
is not \ o but rather the sum-of the pre-equilibrium hourly quantities
^  o
plus (-s' ) summed over the hours after equilibrium has been attained. 
o -----
The Short Period
The Marshallian short-period analysis has no parallel in the work 
of Walras. Indeed, the short-period analysis is peculiarly
imprecise. While Marshall does talk of 'normal' (equilibrium?)
prices in the short period, neither equilibrium conditions nor 
stability conditions are proposed.
The application of a short-period analysis to a general equilibrium 
model would involve an herioc attempt at abstraction. Such an 
application would require a period of time for which the supply of
all products could be altered but for which no producers could
. . . 210increase their stock of fixed capital.
The analysis is not only vague and difficult to apply to general 
equilibrium models, but also it is hard to imagine a real-world 
analogue to the short-period normal prices. While market prices 
are roughly the prices one observes in markets, and long-period 
normal prices are those which one would observe in a stationary 
state, short-period normal prices lack such a corresponding reality.
To understand the role which the short-period analysis plays in
Marshall's schema, it.is necessary to understand the raison d'etre
211of the time period abstraction. The short-period analysis isolates
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the influence of short-term plans and, in particular, the influence 
of capacity availability on present policies and on the direction in 
which market prices are moving. ,
Marshall's proposition that short-period industry supply
functions are forward rising seems to be an empirical generalisation
rather than a deduction from the proposition of the tendency to 
. . .  . 2 1 2diminishing returns. This can be seen clearly when he is talking
of the case of excess capacity. Excess capacity will worsen a firm’s
213bargaining strength with respect to its customers.
One would expect that excess capacity would, via this influence 
on relative bargaining strengths, force the price below the prices 
estimated for long-term plans. Following the normal rule, one may 
expect producers to maintain production so long as price covers 
average prime costs. But.this is not the case.
... they generally hold out for a higher price; each man
fears to spoil his chance of getting a better price later on
from his own customers; or, if he produces for a large and
open market, he is more or less in fear of incurring the
resentment of other producers, should he sell needlessly at
a price that spoils the common market for all. The marginal
producción*in this case is the production of those wThom a
little.further fall in price would cause, either from a
regard to their own interest or by formal or informal
agreement with other producers to suspend production for
214fear of further spoiling the market.
It should be noted that this behaviour is consistent both 
with independent behaviour of firms acting within special markets 
and with '^informal agreements’ between firms acting in large, open
markets. The latter, of course, does not envisage oligopolistic 
interdependence, but rather informal social pressure, which may' 
operate even in a market of Coumotesque large numbers, 'It seems 
to be not so much of their trade policy that Marshall's typical 
producer moves in fear, as of their personal behaviour to him 
(and no doubt to his wife) when he meets them outside the chapel 
or in the club.'^“*
The Long-Period Normal
Marshall usuall}' uses the word 'normal' to express those ideas
expressed by Adam Smith's 'natural' value which are strictly.
scientific. For Marshall, normal (as applied to the long period)
refers to the equilibrium which would result if sufficient time
elapsed for firms to be acting in accordance with long-period plans
based on a given set of market constraints. Alternatively, it is
the industry price and output which would exist at any moment, if the
21-6time taken to adjust to equilibrium were zero.
The preface to the second edition of the early Economics of
Industry maintains that the long-period normal outcome is the freely 
. . . 217competitive equilibrium; but when Marshall came to write the
Principles he maintained that normal values are not necessarily 
.competitive.
Of course Normal does not mean Competitive. Market prices 
and Normal prices are alike brought about by a multitude 
of influences, of which some rest on a moral basis and some 
on a physical; of which, some are competitive and some are not. 
It is to the persistence of the influences considered, and 
the time allowed for them to work out their effects that we 
refer vThen contrasting Market and Normal -price, and again
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when contrasting the narrower and broader use of the term
' . 2 1 8  Normal price.
By 'the narrow use of the term', Marshall seems to be referring 
to the normal results of a particular industry - which results may be 
influenced by an element of monopoly. But, in abstract reasoning, 
the long-period equilibrium analysis is based on a 'broader' set of 
assumptions.
The position then is this: we are investigating the
equilibrium of normal demand and normal supply in their most
general form; we are neglecting those features which are special
to particular parts of economic science, and are confining
our attention to those broad relations which are common to'
nearly the whole of it. Thus we assume that the forces of
demand and supply have free play; that there is no close
combination among dealers on either side, but each acts for
himself, and there is much free competition; that is, buyers
generally compete freely with buyers, and sellers compete
219freely with sellers.
Normal Profits and Long-Period Equilibrium
The proposition that normal profit is a constituent element in
220supply pricey can be traced to Adam Smith. With the emergence
of explicitly static models and the clear definition of 
'opportunity cost' in the period under consideration, one would 
suppose that the opportunity cost of finance would be the phrase 
used to express the profit element in any firm's supply price.
This "is the implication of Walras' model of production and 
exchange. For this model, the existence of equilibrium requires
that there be exchange equilibrium (effective offer = effective
demand, and a stationary current price) in the markets for products
and productive services; but there is the extra condition that the
selling prices of products must equal the costs of the productive .
221services that enter into them for every firm.
Thus, in a state of equilibrium in production, entrepreneurs
make neither profit nor loss. They make their living not as
entrepreneurs, but as laud-owners, labourers or capitalists in
their ora or other businesses. In my opinion, rational
bookkeeping requires that an entrepreneur who owns the land
which he works or occupies, who participates in the
management of his firm and who has his own funds invested in
the business, ought to charge to business expense and credit
to his own account [[the corresponding]] rent, wages and
interest charges calculated according to the going market
prices of productive services. In this way he earns his
living without necessarily making any profits or suffering
any losses as an entrepreneur. Surely, it must be evident
that, if he gets a higher ,,or lower price for his productive
services in his own business than he can get elsewhere, then
222the difference represents a profit or a loss.
223To the chagrin of Davenport , Marshall refused to adopt this 
neat model. Marshall's concept of normal profits differs from 
the ideas of Walras for three important reasons.
In the first place, Marshall includes both the earnings of
. 224management and interest payments under profit. When making
long-period plans, businessmen will only undertake a project if
revenue is expected to '...yield a normal rate„of interest (or if
, . 175
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earnings of management are counted in, of profit) on the free-
capital, represented by a definite sum of money that was invested 
225m  producing it.'
Secondly, Marshall's characteristically empirical emphasis on 
differences among firms causes him to reject any model in which 
equilibrium for the industry requires that every firm earns a 
normal rate of return on capital. Pigou quotes Taussig approvingly: 
'Every one knows that fortunes are made in industries strictly 
competitive, and are to be ascribed to unusual business capacity.'
The profitability of firms in a freely competitive industry 
differs not only because of age, but also because of managerial 
rents which are recorded as profits. This consideration led Marshall 
to state his condition for long-period equilibrium as requiring that 
the representative firm be earning normal p r o f i t s . S o  Marshall's 
long-period equilibrium condition, that industry supply price equals 
industry demand price, has its micro counterpart only in terms of 
the representative firm.
The third reason for the uniqueness of Marshall's 'normal profit' 
analysis is his concern for distinguishing ex post from ex: ante 
considerations; and, in particular, his insistence that the 
^expectations of‘businessmen (which determine behaviour) do not 
necessarily coincide with the outcome of that behaviour. So the 
proposition that industry equilibrium requires that the representative 
firm be earning a normal rate of profit means that the expectations 
by businessmen of the profitability of production are such that 
total industry output will not change.
Like Marshall's long-period supply curve and the representative 
firm, normal profits can only be recognised ex post. The tools do
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not enable a precise ex ante prediction of equilibrium output for the 
industry. But, if industry output is constant for given demand and 
supply conditions, then one is able to discover a point on the 
supply curve as well as the sort of profitability picture which 
Marshall would choose to call normal. The only ’condition’ for the 
existence of Marshallian long-period equilibrium is that industry 
output is constant.
Long-Period Stability
In the above discussion of market-period stability it was shown 
that, while Marshall did not consider instability in the market 
period, both he and Walras shared the same stability conditions, 
although the mechanism by which the price moved differed as between
the two writers.i
In this section, stability in production will be discussed
assuming exchange equilibrium, i.e,, for every quantity that is
produced in each market period, the price will be such that the
quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied. This is the
assumption upon which the discussions in Marshall and Walras proceed.
The stability conditions and the process by which production
equilibrium is achieved are the same for Walras as they are for
Marshall. However, this time, the form of Marshall's functions
causes him to consider the possibility of instability - a possibility
228which is not considered by Walras.
In discussing equilibrium of production, Walras always assumes 
that production coefficients are constant. Depending on whether the 
prices of productive services are assumed to be constant or assumed 
to be positively related to the demand for the final product 
(Walras uses both assumptions), supply schedules will either be
horizontal or forward rising. In either case, given a forward -
. . .  22\falling demand curve, production will always adjust to equilibrium. 
The stabilisation mechanism is the following;
In fact, under free competition, if the selling price cf a 
product exceeds the cost of the productive services for 
certain firms and a profit results, entrepreneurs will flow 
towards this branch of production or expand their output, so 
that the quantity of the product []on the market]] will increase, 
its price will fall, and the difference between price and 
cost will be reduced; and, if Con the contrary]], the cost 
of the productive services exceeds the selling price for 
certain firms, so that a loss results, entrepreneurs will 
leave this branch of production or curtail their output, so.' 
that the quantity of the product []on the market]] will decrease, 
its price will rise and the difference between price and cost 
will again be reduced.
The production stabilisation mechanism of Haïras differs from 
that of Marshall in only two respects. In the first place, Marshall 
does not talk as if an excess of industry demand price over industry 
supply price implies that every firm is earning excess profits. 
Secondly, Marshall’s supply price is rather more complicated than 
a mere record of unit costs which are constant among firms.
The major difference in analysis between the two is that 
Marshall considers the possibility of instability deriving from 
the likelihood (for manufacturing industries at least) that 
the long-period supply curve will be forward falling. This
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)possibilit}r raises tiro
alternatives as illustrated to
the left. The conditions for
stability are that '• • • the
demand price is greater than
the supply price for amounts
just less than the equilibrium
,, • ,231amount, and vice versa.*
\ If this were not the case (the
unstable case) then a quantity
less than equilibrium would cause the supply price to exceed the 
demand price. Marshall's representative firm would reduce production 
because, given a long-period planning horizon, it would expect its rate
falling unit cost schedule, a parallel story could be told which would 
be perfectly sound Walrasian economics.
century was largely stimulated by debate over public policy. In 
France, discussion of the pricing and construction of roads, ' 
bridges and railways in the 1840s and 1850s produced valuable work 
on price discrimination (Dupuit) and on the relationship between 
prices and costs and the extent of the market (Lardner). In the 
United States, the controversy over the determinants of railway 
rates lasted well in to the present century while the trust movement 
stimulated much work on the conditions needed to protect monopoly 
prices. Writers in Germany and in Britain further explored the
of profit to be less than normal. Given the possibility of a forward
MONOPOLY
The study of monopol}' in the second half of the nineteenth
themes of railroad pricing and combinations.
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That railway companies provoked fruitful speculation was ' 
probably due to a number of factors. The revolutionary effects 
they had on the lives of large numbers of people, the need for 
newly established firms constantly to make major policy decisions 
rather than to follow established patterns of■behaviour, and the 
vigorous (and sometimes spectacularly profitable) entrepreneurship 
of the railway promoters may account for much public interest.
However, theory largely benefited by the multi-product nature of 
these companies and the adjustments this necessitated to models of 
single product firms if the relationship between prices and costs 
was to be explained.
American professional (and public) interest in trusts was boosted
dramatically by the activities of the Standard Oil Trust, formed in 
2321882. Writings on trusts helped to define both the concept of
competition and the conditions needed to earn monopoly profits,.as
233well as yielding valuable industry studies. Significant writings
on trusts did not come from Britain until the first decade of the
present century. The normative interest in monopoly had yielded 
. . . 23Apositive analysis for centuries, and this normative motivation
*was naturally evident during our present period.
Marshall' s ^ exposition of monopoly is based on a statement of 
Cournot's model. This statement is then overlain with qualifications 
as to the degree of competition to which the monopolist is subject 
(a' function of time) and the time horizon of the firm. Marshall 
begins by considering a single firm. '
At present we consider only those general causes determining 
monopoly values, that can be traced with more or less 
distinctness in every case in which a single person or
.81 '
association of persons has the power of fixing either the.
amount of a commodity that is offered for sale or the price
235at which it is offered.
The use of this model is not meant to imply that the number 
of firms within an industry is of any strategic importance; but 
rather it is a handy way of isolating the decision of a firm with 
a very short time horizon which is presently unconstrained by the 
possibility that other firms may change their rate of sales. He 
supposes that, ’...the owner of a monopoly £fixes^the price of his 
commodity with exclusive reference to the immediate net revenue 
which he can derive from it.'^^
The abstract nature of Cournot's model is made plain in both the 
Principles and in Industry and Trade. Indeed, the interpermeation 
of competition and monopoly is the 'keynote' of Book III of Industry 
and Trade where we are reminded over and over of the rarity of 
absolute monopoly and of the conditional nature of monopoly. Marshall 
envisages that industries could be ranked according to their degree of
monopolistic control. 237 This ranking would depend on two factors:
(i) The extent to which.a firm could price above the average 
long-period costs of extra production undertaken by potential 
competitors; and
(ii) the period of time for which this differential could be
. , 238sustained.
In language anticipating the 'barrier to entry' of Bain, 239
Marshall writes of obstacles to the establishment of effective 
. . 240competition which are the sources of a firm’s monopolistic control
He refers, at that place, only to two such obstacles. The first
■of these is the initial cost of establishing a business - ,the capital, 
risk and effort involved. Secondly, he refers to inertia among 
entrepreneurs who, being opposed to change, do not invade the 
market of the monopolist.
However, at other points, particularly in Industry and Trade, 
Marshall discusses other obstacles to free competition. In the case 
of retailing, he claims that the practice of branding goods lowered 
the obstacles to free competition, for customers were able to trust a 
product by knowing the brand, name rather than being forced to rely 
on the judgment of a trusted retailer. In this way the branding of 
goods assisted the invasion of retailing markets by the co-operatives.
242When discussing Trusts and Cartels, Marshall refers to many
ways in which the behaviour of businesses may be directed towards
the erection of obstacles to effective competition: these are
practices by which potential competitors may be prevented from
entering or by which existing competitors may be prevented from
expanding their output. Such behaviour is destructive competition.
'One runner may outdo his rivals by greater energy as much as he can:
but, if he puts his hand on another's shoulder to pull him back,
while pulling himself forward, that is the unfair competition against
243 * 244which the Anti-trust Act is directed.’ The behaviour to which
Marshall refers, includes predatory price-cutting, price discrimation,
24bexclusive dealing, tying contracts, and aggregated rebates.
That positions of monopoly rest on a business's ability to
compete is set out beautifully in Macgregor’s book on Industrial 
246Combination - - the first half of which analyses the various ’factors 
of competing strength’. As with The distinction between profits and 
rents to institutional advantage,- so the distinction between 
competitive and monopolistic conduct relies on normative rather than
183
positive criteria.
Marshall maintains that, for any but a short-run view,
concentration is secondary to the obstacles to free competition as
247a determinant of monopoly power. Once such obstacles exist,
concentration and the existence of factors which facilitate collusion
, . ... _ 248may be significant.
In this analysis of monopoly, Marshall is firmly in the tradition
i
of the English classical school - wherein monopoly is generally 
considered to mean the limitation of the free flow of resources that 
permits a differential between market price and natural price to 
persist.
While many of Marshall’s contemporaries shared his definition 
249 .of monopoly, the increasing vogue for deterministic models 
towards the close of the nineteenth century favoured the simpler 
classification of markets according to the number of sellers which 
is the Cournot - Walras - Edgeworth - Chamberlin tradition.
Cournot’s Equilibrium Model
Cournot's model is of simple (i.e., non-discriminatory) 
monopoly; the seller quotes a price common to all buyers and the 
buyers adjust their purchases to .the price.
250Using notation similar to that of Marshall,
^  = quantity produced and sold in the period, 
demand price 
average cost =
The monopolist's profit from selling output will be
- X f X fxl.
X i\ (x)
This is maximised when x i\ 6c) t ^  6c j - *6 6c)
Following Joan Robinson, the left hand side may be termed 
marginal revenue and the right hand side/ marginal cost, Edgeworth 
shows that, by changing the signs and. reinterpreting the symbols,
Cournot's formulation may be extended to a 'monopolist consumer* -
•« . « . _ 251a unilateral monopsonist.
Marshall warns against simple statements that the Cournot
monopoly solution results in a lower rate of output than does free
competition. For various reasons, costs are likely to be lower under
252monopoly than under free competition.
Stability Under Monopoly
While Cournot devotes much space to the comparative statics of 
253monopoly, neither he nor Marshall explores the process of 
adjustment towards equilibrium.
In 1935, Hicks established the static stability conditions for
254monopoly in his 'Survey* article. The second-order conditions
imply that the marginal revenue curve cuts the marginal cost curve
from above. P.eder explores the modifications which the consideration
255of interactions between markets imposes. It was left to Lange
to generalise the Samuelson stability analysis to Include adjustments 
* • ?56under monopoly. Lange coins the terms 'monopolistic under­
restriction’ and 'overrestriction' of supply. (One can also talk 
of monopsonistic underrestriction and overrestriction of demand.)
These monopolistic over and underrestrictions perform the roles of 
excess demand and. excess supply in the Walras-Hicks-Samuelscn model.
Arrow claims that the only reason for not supposing instantaneous 
adjustment by the monopolist is that he may not. know his entire demand
1 & 5
curve. Uncertainty is a crucial consideration. As the monopolist
gains knowledge, he converges to Cournot’s equilibrium, earning
257higher profits m  each successive time period.
Qualifications by Marshall
Marshall's restriction of the application of Cournot's model to
the myopic monopolist is at variance with the Arrow-Lange view of the
monopolist's process of convergence - unless that convergence is a
remarkably rapid process. For Marshall, the time horizon of the
258monopolist differs among firms depending on various factors. 
Consideration of the future may influence a firm's pricing policy in 
tx7o ways. A firm may be careful to set the price below that which • 
will encourage entry: 'That is to say, it adjusts its price rather 
closely to the cost of production including profits, on which a new­
comer in an ordinary competitive market would base his calculations.
But it adds to this something for the insurance against extra risk
259which a new-comer into its market would expect to face.'
Secondly, the monopolist may adjust his present prices after 
reflecting, '...that the demand for a thing depends in a great 
measure on people’s familiarity with it; and that if he can increase
V
his sales bv taking a price a little below that which would afford him 
the maximum net revenue, the increased use of his commodity will 
before long* recoup him for his present loss.' ...'This sacrifice 
by a monopolist of part of his present gains in order to develop 
future business differs in extent rather than kind from the sacrifices 
which a young firm commonly makes in order to establish a connection.' 260
Woven into Marshall's discussions of monopoly is a recurring 
emphasis on the influence of the personal ities and judgment of business 
leaders on the policies their firms pursue, , - The age of the business
186
leaders, their sensitivity to public opinion and their taste for the%
Hicksian ’quiet life’ may be important determinants of the
competitive, vigour of an industry. Industry and Trade demonstrates ~
that Marshall found the literature of 'scientific management.' an
important source of information of the internal organization of 
261businesses. As J.S.Mill had learned much from Babbage, so
Marshall could learn from contemporary writers in the field of/
management.
Discriminating Monopoly
The study of railway rates played an important catalytic role 
in the development of the theory of the firm during the century
following the introduction of the railway. The interest in this
»applied issue led to generalisations and clarifications of such 
matters as the differences between pricing under monopoly and pricing 
under competition, the influence of indivisibilities on long-period 
value, the conditions needed for price discrimination, and the
consideration, Dupuit, I.ardner and Ellet made early contributions; 
while later contributions from Edgeworth, Taussig and Pigou provided'
pronouncements were those of*a disinterested spectator of the debate. 
Also characteristic of Marshall was his omnivorous digestion of the 
empirical literature and the strong reliance on inductive generalisation 
of his own. contribution.
Towards the end of our period the Pigcu-Taussig debate served 
to highlight one of the key issues in empirical studies of price 
discrimination: the criteria by which one distinguishes price
discrimination (which, it is usually assumed, can only exist if the 
firm has-some monopoly power) from the competitive pricing of joint;
difficulties of applying the concept of costs. In the period
262much combative interest." As was his wont, Marshall's
187
products. Hicks hints that these influences can be separated in
theoretical discussions by discussing discrimination in the absence of
jointness, i.e., on the assumption that the firm is selling a single
product, the singleness of which, '...consists solely in its various
263 ■ 'units being perfect substitutes on the supply side.* We will
first consider the case of perfect substitutes in production, then 
the case of perfect complements, and, finally, the case of a degree 
of substitutability between zero and perfect.
Perfect Substitutability
The two outstanding early expositors of price discrimination
2 6^* 263were trained as engineers. Both Ellet and Dupuit set out to . 
show how the net revenue (statically conceived) from certain works 
could be maximised. Both acknowledged that cost could influence ' 
profit-maximising prices; but each paid relatively little attention 
to the specification of which costs are relevant.
It is not surprising that neither Ellet nor Dupuit tried to 
disentangle the discriminatory element in the pricing of railway 
services from the joint cost element: both wrote prior to the 
publication of Mill's Principles which first showed that competitive 
joint-product pricing could account for differences between prices. 
Besides, unlike Edgeworth, Pigou and Taussig, Ellet and Dupuit were 
not concerned to explain the pricing policies of private railway 
companies. Pvather, they attempted to advise the relevant authorities 
how, given that discrimination was possible, they should set prices so 
as to maximise their net revenue.
Dupuit's model of a bridge whose crossing involves zero cost may 
be interpreted as a model of the pricing of goods which are perfect 
substitutes in production. In discussing examples of bridge
188
crossings and railway journeys, Edgeworth hints that it is ‘admissible,
if indeed it is not essential’, to suppose that very lew prices do not
266create such demand that a capacity constraint becomes operative,
Pigou classifies the discriminating power of the monopolistic firm 
into three degrees,
1, 'A first degree would involve the charge of a different price 
against all the different units of commodity, in such wise that the 
price exacted for each was equal to the demand price for it, and no 
consumers’ surplus was left to the buyers,'
2, 'A second degree would obtain if a monopolist were able to 
make separate prices, in such wise that all units with a demand 
price greater than ^ were sold at a price * , all with a demand price 
less than ‘jC and greater than «3 at a price *3 , and so on,'
3, 'A third degree would obtain if the monopolist were able to
distinguish among his customers different groups, separated from
one another more or less by some practicable mark, and could charge
267a separate monopoly price to the members of each group,’
In real life, discrimination of the third degree is the most 
common; and it is this which-occupies the attention of Ellet and 
Dupuit. Both acknowledge that a usable classification into Pigovian 
groups may be made either, (i) by means of the products being 
transported (higher value products will generally be able to bear a , 
higher price, cet. par.), or (ii) by means of the wealth of the 
passengers,
Ellet considers how price will vary within categories of ^ 
consumers or products'as the cost (distance) of transportation varies. 
This exposition ma}’ be interpreted as explaining price differentials 
among products which are perfect substitutes "on the supply side by
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focussing on his discussion of the price differentials among the 
categories rather than the discussion of the price differentials 
within the categories.
In An Essay on the Laws of Trade Ellet outlines a model using 
the first means of classification. In his later article, Ellet 
outlines the analogous principle of discrimination amoitg classes 
of passengers.
For each grade of passengers, the following terms may be
gross charge per mile of railroad, 
expense per passenger mile on the railroad, 
toll (or charge in excess of costs) per passenger 
mile on railroad,
distance from assumed origin to tributory, 
number of passengers on the railroad when price 
is zero.
defined:
c
s
c -
T
Assume that for every 1c increase in the charge, the number of 
passengers decreases by t .
i + c .... CD
Gross charge between the two places = 
Number of passengers = *1 - C> Wi
Net Revenue = f ^ -- (2)
Maximise (2) by differentiating with respect to and equating 
to zero.
Net revenue will be a maximum ivhen the charge in excess of
expenses is
\ • • (3)
To obtain the value of gross charge, add expenses,
' C U  - %  ( %  +  u )  .... (4)
’From which we conclude that under the circumstances assumed,
the gross charge will yield the highest revenue on all the travellers
who pass between the two cities, at which they reside, will be
obtained by adding half the actual expenses to a certain constant 
,268quantity.*
Passengers may be classified into groups and for each group the 
\ lyconstant term, 2 ' k* , will vary; so that distinctions among different 
grades of passengers will produce a version of equation (4) for 
each grade.
But, it is probable that such distinctions would be found
productive of inconvenience sufficient, in this country [[the
U.S.[], to limit them to two classes - the. first consisting of
those who regard cheapness as more important than the superior
comforts and more select society offered in the best class of
cars, and the second, of those who are willing to pay
. 269something for these considerations.
Dupuit establishes rules for the maximisation of net revenue given 
a bell-shaped total revenue curve; but gives more suggestions than 
does Ellet as to how a firm might* be able to classify potential 
customers.
Dupuit expatiates on the proposition that product differentiation
may be a device by which the surplus utility of the wealthy may be
captured. So railway companies may need to give third-class
passengers uncomfortable carriages so as to encourage the.wealthy
passengers into more expensive second or first-class seats. Indeed,
one problem for the firm is that categories are not always independent:
’Taken in isolation, it may be worth it to provide cover and
upholstery [[for third-class passengers], but it would interfere with
270revenue from first class and second class.’
As Pigou later emphasised, a .necessarj' condition for price
discrimination is that there exists some imperfection (cost) in the
transferability of the product among consumers, or in the
271transferability of consumers among products.
The substitutability of the products of other producers (both 
existing and potential) may also influence the pattern of market 
division. Ellet lays down a qualification to his equation (4) :
that it ’...can never be applied at [the extreme limits of the sums 
designating the elevations of the grades]; since in practice the
charges can never descend as iow as , or the actual expense of
\conveyance, nor ascend as high as the sum which would justify the
272 . T>establishment of a rival.’ He makes it clear that the fraction
will also depend on the availability of substitutes. Dupuit
illustrates that the price elasticity of demand for transporting
intermediate goods depends, in part, on the price elasticity of demand
for the final product, and, in part on the elasticity of factor 
273
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substitution.
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Monopolistic Power and Discrimination
The policy advice of Ellet and Dupuit is not arranged in the 
form of strictly deductive models with explicit premises; and it 
is only from their choice of illustration and various scattered 
remarks that one can infer that their prescriptions are meant to 
apply to firms with a degree of individual monopolistic poxv-er, In 
the quotation above, Ellet refers to the firm pricing x^ ith an eye 
to potential competitors, and Dupuit's articles refer to his 
discriminating firms as able to earn monopoly profits through being 
sheltered from competition.
Edgexvorth's contract-curve model formally outlines reasons as /
274to why discrimination depends on a limited number of sellers.
One may x^ ell ask xvh}'-, in Pigou's discrimination of the first degree, 
every exchange does not involve bilateral bargains of the type 
suggested by Edgex^orth*s model of isolated exchange? To achieve 
such discrimination, the separability of exchanges must be perfect, 
so the reason must lie in an assumption of zero bargaining power on 
the part of the buyer.
The assumption that the single firm sells to a large number of
buyers implies that the monopolist derives a negligible proportion of
his net revenue- from any one buyer; but it does not imply that the
seller is indifferent between selling and not selling. Foldes
claims that this latter condition is required if the all-or-nothing
275offer of the seller is not to be subject to bargaining.
Alternatively, one could suppose that the seller will always refuse 
to bargain because the cost of his beginning to bargain with all 
those buyers who would prefer to -bargain rather than to lose all 
consumer surplus, exceeds the extra net revenue the firm will get when 
some buyers carry out their threat to refuse the all-or-nothing offer.
Both Walras and Marshall record that they have observed price 
discrimination in more or less competitive situations. Walras' 
examples of such discrimination involve market segmentation by 
means of product differentiation and he qualifies his observation
by saying that the long-run tendency is for competition to narrow
276any difference between prices and costs.
However, Marshall is less cautious. Characteristically, he 
generalises from his intimate knowledge of industry: 'It £the 
classification of markets on which price discrimination by shipping 
companies is based] is maintained in great measure even in an eager 
rate-war for the exclusive or partial occupation of any area of 
trade: rates may be lowered generally; but a proposal to carry
first-class goods at fourth-class rates would be regarded as short-
277sighted even during the heat of combat.'
BILATERAL MONOPOLY
The Theory of Isolated Exchange
278In Chapter II' Turgot’s classification of markets according 
to the number of parties to the exchange was mentioned.
In the period relating to the present chapter, many writers 
subjected the problem of isolated exchange to reconsideration. 
Monger's contribution (and its influence on the formulation of 
Bdhm-Bawerk) must be ranked highly among these reconsiderations. 
Menger supposes that two individuals (A,B) meet to-exchange grain 
for wine. Individual A is indifferent between 100 units of grain 
and 40 units of wine. - B is indifferent between.80 units of grain 
and 40 units of wine. If the price of grain in terns of wine were 
not between 100 and 80 then one of the parties would refuse to
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participate in the exchange. The actual price will depend’upon
'...their various individualities and upon their greater or smaller
knowledge of business life and, in each case, of the situation of
279the other bargainer.'
Menger proceeds to an empirical generalisation.
In the formulation of general principles, however, there is
no reason for assuming that one or the other of the two
bargainers will have an overwhelming economic talent, or
that other circumstances will operate more in the favor of
one than the other. Under the assumption of economicall}7“
equally capable individuals and equality of other
circumstances, therefore, I venture to state, as a general
rule, that the efforts of the two bargainers to obtain the
maximum possible gain will be mutually paralyzing, and that
the price will therefore be equally far from the two
28 0extremes between which it can be established.
Edgeworth's model was a great advance in its simplicity as well
as the care with which the model is specified. His model does not
permit single-valued demand and supply schedules, so an original
specification of equilibrium .conditions is required. 'Equilibrium
is attained when the existing contracts can neither be varied
without recontract with the consent of the existing parties, nor by
281recontract within the field of competition.'
If there are only two players (individual decision-making
units) in the exchange game,- then the only economic moves permissible
will be those taken with the consent of the other party. So a move 
" / 
will only be made .if both parties stand to gain. In these
circumstances, one party requires no information from the other
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(apart from his consent) before making a move. If both players are 
self-seeking, then disequilibrium will exist if and only if one party 
can gain and the other will not lose by a move.
The analysis is most easily assimilated by the contemporar}'
28 2reader when it is presented with the aid of the Paretian box diagram.
There are two individuals,
Vt and X» , X\ ' s 
indifference curves are 
convex when viewed from O X . 
Good H  is measured on the 
vertical axes, and good N on 
the horizontal axes.
Given that point t- represents 
the initial endowments of 
both Xi andy»,^°^ such that 
IC' and IC ' represent the indifference curves of X* and '/i through 
point C , Xt w i n  not accept a position closer to O X  than IC0* , and 
y* will not accept a position closer to o y  than 1 C ° f , If c c 1 is the 
locus of points of tangency of the two sets of indifference curves,
ithen cc contains the set of equilibrium points.
Edgeworth's contract curve is a solution to the bargaining
284problem m  the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern. It
consists of a set of imputations which do not dominate each other; 
but for each point off the contract curve there exists a point on 
the contract curve which dominates it. Edgeworth's solution 
establishes the boundaries to the set of equilibrium points. However, 
there exist a number of equilibrium points - any further reduction of 
which would require a more detailed specification of the model.
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Wicksell suggests that one such specification might be that the 
sum of the utility derived by the two participants is a maximum. He 
notes that such a requirement may lie outside Edgeworth's contract 
locus implying that one party may need to make a loss to achieve
P85this requirement.'
Marshall, in the course of his search for the conditions for the
detcnninacy of stability in the market period, notes that pure
exchange between two individuals of two goods will be determinate
if one of the commodities has marginal utilities for each of the
28 6parties which are constant between transactions. The purpose of
Marshall's Appendix on barter was to show that the inde term inac}' in the 
two person / two good model is caused by the varying marginal 
utilities as transactions occur rather than by the fewness of the 
parties.
However, Edgeworth suggests that the indeterminacy is due to the 
fewness of the parties and offers a proof for this proposition by 
introducing further pairs of X and y (they happen to be identical 
to and V« - but this is not necessary) which narrows the range 
of the contract locus. Edgeworth claims that with the addition of 
further parties the system will converge to a single point on the 
contract curve.
The contraction of the contract curve occurs in the following 
287 / v/way. Introduce Xa. and tz with preferences identical to those
of and %  respectively.
Allocation c is an equilibrium point in the two-person case.
But y, prefers to ^  will attempt to get to point ^
by offering Xi and_Xa. F D Gf M  t in return for  ^ of , of 
which each X will provide ' X , If they accept this offer, X-, and
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Xa will be at point H - at a higher indifference curve than 
But Vx will be left with his initial endowment;, so he will give a 
counter offer to both Xi and Xx , Because of this rivalrous 
behaviour, point c win not be an equilibrium possibility when four 
parties are being considered.
It is important to note that, as a result of the counter-offer 
by y*- both Y» and )/x will be on less preferred indifference 
curves than if they had both accepted the original point c . So, 
in making the first offer to Xi and X* > /i must be extraordinarily 
myopic - in that he can't see that this will encourage Yz to make 
his counter-offer. If this myopia were not present, then there 
would be no reason to suppose that point c would not be an 
equilibrium point for quadrilateral exchange. Thus, without the 
implicit assumption of myopia, the-contraction of the contract 
curve through the addition of traders would not occur.
Complementary Monopolies
'Bilateral Monopoly' may be used to refer to two different
industrial structures: complementary monopolies which will be
considered in this section, and two-stage monopoly which will be
considered under the following heading. (Under the latter, the second
firm is a monopsonistic buyer of the product from the preceding
stage.) Zeuthen points to certain similarities between this
successive monopolies case and that of Cournot's ‘complementary
monopolies where two inputs (each of them monopolised) are used in
fixed proportions by a competitive industry. Zeuthen uses the
term 'bilateral monopoly' both for two-stage monopoly and for
288Cournot's complementary monopolies.
Cournot's model has two inputs, copper (XO and zinc (3f*)
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whose sole use is in the production of brass. ' Wicksell presents 
an illustration of Cournot's model by supposing that the demand for 
each of the inputs may be represented by a linear function:t
= V” f i ” fz Costs are assumed to be zero. Cournot
wants to say that price is the sole decision variable for the
producers of Xi and . The reason for this is presumably that,
if producers are assumed to act independently and if quantity were
the decision variable, then they may choose to produce quantities
which do not satisfy the fixed proportions requirement. Such an
outcome would not be an equilibrium decision for that firm which was
%
left with unsold stocks. In such circumstances a realisation of 
interdependence would be imposed on the producers. However, Cournot 
wants to construct a model in which each producer reacts in a myopic 
maximising manner to a given demand function.
If the owner of ^t decides on a certain price, fi , then the 
most advantageous price for the owner of X \ will be that which 
maximises px (l - pi-pi) . Thus p* is set at .
When he adopts this price, the owner of •*» will adjust to
*^* f ^ P xy  " 3 P i /
X  * t + '"H* * then the owner of X \  will adjust to - 1 /$ etc
The second term in these expressions approaches zero, and can
therefore be neglected. The first term approaches ^3 - the price ~
of *1 and * A which will be approached by this stabilisation process.
Such prices will represent an equilibrium for they satisfy the
simultaneous equations:
. <" - ^  ,
~ i, XWith pi = 3 and /->i = 3 , the total price JLs 3 of that price
which would have prevented all sales. The producers will sell one- 
third of the quantity of goods which would have been consumed at a
price of zero. This will be less than the outcome of a price and
\
quantity of half a unit which would have resulted from joint 
profit-maximisation.
Marshall was sceptical of the use of such 'abstract reasonings 
of a general character* when applied to the conflicts and alliances 
between monopolistic associations. He maintained that Cournot's 
model was particularly unrealistic in supposing that the input 
producers had a precise knowledge of the demand functions for the 
products they were producing. Besides, the notion of absolute
29'monopolies m  long-period equilibrium seems very unlikely to occur. 
Two-Stage Monopoly
By attributing simple, mechanistic decision rules to the firms, 
one can construct a model for the monopolisation of successive stages 
of production similar to that of Cournot's model of complementary 
monopolies. It was on this basis that Zeuthen argues for the 
similarities between the models.
Ellet had illustrated this similarity ninety-one years earlier
in his discussion of two adjoining transport networks. The model,
remarkable for its similarities to Wicksell's illustration of Cournot
292on complementary monopoly, uses the differential calculus to 
arrive at the following (Cournotesque) conclusion. '
If the proprietors of the longer of the two works were to 
establish their toll without reference to the other, they 
would appropriate the half of this balance [[between unit cost 
and the maximum price chargeable without excluding the 
traffic^] for their profits, and leave the residue for the
199
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encouragement of the trade. If, then, the owners of the 
shorter line were to establish the tariff for their work, 
they would levy upon the half of this residue, and leave 
but one fourth of the original tax in shape of the toll, 
which the trade would bear, to go to the increase of the 
tonnage.
But the consequence of this would be, to cause the first
company to reduce its toll down to one half the amount not
taken by the second company, and thus give opportunity to
the second, again to increase its exactions. And the
ultimate result would be, if there were much disparity
between the lengths of the lines, to cause two-thirds of the
whole toll which might be levied without excluding the trade,
to be charged upon the two lines, and to leave but one-third
293for encouragement of the business.
Following the publication of Edgeworth*s model of isolated 
exchange, many writers on both two-stage monopoly and on complementary 
monopoly opted for a statement that the only correct general 
statement was that the final outcome depends on a number of factors 
peculiar to any industrial situation. This was the attitude of 
Pareto, Marshall, and of Marshall's pupil, A.L.Bowley.
In his Mathematical Groundwork, Bowley showed, rather tersely,
294how exchange under two-stage monopoly is indeterminate. ' Under
295pressure from Wicksell's review of the book ‘ (which supported
the determinate, Cournotesque approach to the problem), Bowley
296outlines his vievrs m  an article. He shows that one can achieve
various uniquely-determined solutions by assuming thati (i) the 
buyer dictates the price while the supplier adjusts the quantity?
(ii) that the supplier dictates the price while the buyer adjusts the 
quantity; or (iii) that they agree to maximise joint gains and then 
divide the spoils. The particular extra assumptions favoured by 
Ellet and Wicksell have no more to commend them than do any others.
In the field of bilateral monopoly, as in so many other sections
of the theory of the firm, the old methodological tensions were to be
felt well after Marshall’s death, Marshall and his followers were
to suffer a temporary eclipse by those who wTere eager to build 
%
sample, deterministic models of the world which, Marshall had taught, 
is exceedingly complex.
DUOPOLY
The Importance of Behavioural Hypotheses
In his Manual, Pare ho emphasises that 'the problem' of duopoly
is not one problem but many. The nature of the problem posed varies
. . 297according to 'an infinite number' of circumstances. Depending
on these circumstances, as to how the two firms choose to use their
monopoly power, a variety of solutions can be generated -
including collusive monopoly, price leadership, product competition,
a fight to the death, etc.
This, Paretian, attitude to criticism of duopoly models became '
fashionable in the late 1920s and the 1930s when a number of writers
spelt out ..the propositions implicit in the models of Cournot and
Edgeworth (et, al.), and the way in which differences in behavioural
298hypotheses yield different results. But, until Bowley's bool; 
(published in 1928), no duopoly .model had attempted to incorporate
into formal behavioural functions anticipations of the reactions 
of the rival to the move being considered.
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Cournot
: Having expounded his monopoly model in chapters V and VI of
Researches, Cournot proceeds, in Chapter VII, to develop his duopoly 
model and to use the model to deal with a number of sellers larger 
than two.
Cournot assumes a homogeneous product so that the total sales
of the market are divided equally between the two firms. Thus, any
solution other than the (unique) joint-revenue maximising solution of
simple monopoly will imply a loss in revenue to each of the firms.
This further suggests that any solution other than joint-revenue
maximisation (assuming, with Cournot, that costs do not vary with •
output) conflicts with Cournots maximisation dictum: '...that each
one seeks to derive the greatest possible value from his goods or his
labour ... £and]] to deduce the rational consequences of this 
299principle...'. But Cournot's firms possess no foresight beyond
the time period in which their decision is made: '...for in the moral 
sphere men cannot be supposed to be free from error and lack of 
forethought any more than in the physical world bodies can be
300considered perfectly rigid, or supports perfectly solid, etc....'.'
This myopia of each firm permits Cournot to construct, for each 
firm, a static decision function. But this does not prevent him 
from exploring certain dynamic properties of the model. In each 
successive time period the firm is confronted with a set of parameters 
which forms the basis of its peculiarly myopic decision. The myopia 
hypothesis and the process of price formation are the two elements of 
Cournot's model which have borne the brunt of the frequent criticism 
levelled at the model.
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Myopia Hypothesis
Cournot’s dynamic pattern of stability adjustment is of 
consecutive time periods. Each time period in the process of 
adjustment to equilibrium contains a decision by one producer.
• The producers take decisions alternatively. It is assumed that 
each producer knows the market demand function and that the 
adjustment of quantity demanded to changes in price takes place 
within the time period in which the decision is made. The decision 
will affect the amount supplied to the market which in turn 
influences the price and the quantity demanded.
The failure of firm 1, in taking a decision in time period £i,
301to consider the likely move of firm 2 in time period tz, has been 
roundly condemned. Fisher, H,L .Moore, and Wickse! ! ^ * 4 are 
among the condemnors. Pigou claims that the Cournotesque duopolist 
is inconsistent, in that he believes that by varying his supply the
price will alter, but he also believes that his rival’s output will
4 305not alter.
Amoroso, a consistent champion of Cournot on duopoljr, offers a 
defence of the myopia hypothesis on the grounds that, while life is 
naturally more, complex than the model, the hypothesis is required in 
order to obtain a determinate result.
In the mathematical theory of duopoly it is a question not of 
what ..the one or the other monopolist will do in a given 
circumstance - because this is a matter not only of 
formulae, but of knowing whether wo have to do with a 
violent man, or shrewd one, or a submissive one - but 
rather of finding cut what action would be to the best 
advantage of both if both were pure and -perfect specimens of
homo oeconomicus. . ..The true homo oeconomicus makes cool
and conscious calculations and has no long-term projects.
The future is always in the lap of the Gods and is a matter .
of imagination as much as of cold measured reasoning.
Economic Man manoeuvres quietly, with no great ambition or
306hopes, and tries to better his position little b3r little.
It seems odd that Amoroso's cooly calculating homo oeconomicus
does not look beyond his nose. However, Amoroso is expressing
Stigler's concern that to deal in anticipated reactions requires,
307'...that we deal only with special cases.' Stigler's worry is
that the truth-content of a catalogue of special cases may be 
minimal. However, the falsity-content of the Cournotesque 
generalisation may be very great.
The Process of Price Formation
Cournot's model envisages that the decision variables for the 
producers are the quantities they each supply. In each period, 
quantities are decided and placed on the market. Price is then 
fixed, by an independent authority, such that the quantity demanded 
equals the quantity supplied. Equilibrium will occur when neither 
firm thinks that it can gain by varying the quantity which it places 
on the market,.
It is not clear why Cournot denied to the firms the 
possibility of varying price directly. Certainly, the time period 
analysis with full adjustments by consumers in the period of the 
decision would cause very odd results if firms producing a homogeneous 
product were to taka turns to fix their prices in alternative periods. 
The producer with the lower price would capture all the sales in a 
particular period. To introduce a degree of-realism into a price-
initiator model, it would be necessary to suppose some friction in
308the adjustment of consumers.
. 20J
Equilibrium
In his monopoly model, Cournot assumes a linear demand function 
of the form <a- l>0 . The firm maximises
Cournot has a closely analogous model when he comes to duopoly,
• 4 9
O  is replaced by + Da/Oand each firm maximises independently.
For firm 1
f = <\ - (  Di « O x )
T R r. D t - <\ 0 , . b P
4c VTsuXy l I'v'tis tl
> cl *
■"a p .
= a -  Jl  h  P *  H - l i D a (?)♦ • • • / 9
Note that Tft» is differentiated with respect to D-. . This 
implies that Pi is the only decision variable which firm 1 operates. 
Similar maximising conditions may be derived for firm 2.
a  -  * b P* + \> Pi  S o . . . .  ( 3 )
P» - Pa
D, =. Ot  s D/;,
(4), from (2) & (3) 
from (1 ) & (4).
equations (2) and (3) become a - ^  +■ k ^  - o
, A . tD  - (, %.! -
“/ t  = o -  %-
■z«/b = 3 D
¡ H e :  D4 I ^
P» = Da S -4 c.
Each firm produces less than it would were it a monopolist;
Zbut total production of the product is "3 c - compared with the outcome
tunder monopoly of \ C  ,
Stabilitj'
The producer making a decision in time period fc- will assume 
that his rival maintains his output of time period , Cournot,
b}r means of words and graph, outlines an adjustment process of the 
following form. On the assumption that it is trying to maximise 
revenue in time period , firm 1 will have a reaction function whose 
implicit form is the follox^ing:
•f C Dv t + D 2 t - 1  } y Di t-i) : o,
A similar function can be constructed for the decision of
•jr. J , 309firm 2 m  time period t-v 1 .
Such functions (hypothetical examples of which are given in
310much of the secondary literature ) are stable in the sense that 
the output- levels and price converge to the equilibrium, no matter 
from which point the system commences.
Alternative Processes of Price Formation
It is intriguing to speculate on the causes of the reputations 
of past economists. Today, Bertrand is often credited with the
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production of a duopoly model as an alternative to that of Cournot,
In fact* all that can be attributed to Bertrand on this score is a V/'
. . . . 311singularly confused paragraph m  his review of the Rec.herches,
In this paragraph he refers to Cournot’s duopoly model; „but he 
refers to the Coumotesque duopolist as having power to name the 
price at which he sells. Given alternative decisions, that myopic 
duopolist whose turn it is to make a decision will shave the price 
to capture the whole market. In the following period, the rival 
will shave the price yet further. The price will fall until it 
equals average cost (presuming this to be the same for each firm).
The importance of these few sentences by Bertrand lay in the 
stimulus they provided for Edgeworth, As if the naive boy’s 
explanation that the Emperor had no clothes sparked off a coup d'Etat 
which ushered in the reign of Edgeworth. Bertrand can be credited 
with a confused cry, Certain^ it was Edgeworth who reigned 
supreme in the field of duopoly theory for the next twenty years; 
the only opposition being provided by the dexterous guerilla action 
of Amoroso,
Edgeworth
Edgeworth’s duopoly model is oddly titled in that the pattern of •
behaviour it represents is not contingent on the number of sellers.
However, as*it was originally presented as a duopoly model, it is
312 •convenient to discuss it. under this section.
The uniqueness of the model lies in its assumption regarding the 
cost conditions facing producers. The 1897 version has each firm 
facing constant costs up to an absolute capacity constraint. The 
cost functions need not be identical between the firms; but. each 
producer must know the other’s cost function." Furthermore, the total
. 20 7
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capacity constraint of the two producers operates at a level of
production less than that which would supply the total market demand
313at prices equal to the average costs.
The producers take alternative decisions - one decision being 
taken in each time period. As in the Cournot model, the producers 
are unredeemably myopic and the possibility of the entry of new 
firms is not considered. The producers fix the prices to which 
consumers respond. Producers fix their prices on the assumption 
that consumers’ preferences between the products are so slight as to 
be overridden by any slight price difference.
Moreover, the response of consumers to changes in price, both •
in switching between producers and in adjusting their aggregate'
consumption, occurs within the time period of the decision to change
the price, Machlup points to a further hypothesis necessary for the 
314model, Tins is that all consumers are uniform. If this were
not the case, then those consumers who were willing to pay less may
i
be clustered around the producer who is pricing so as to utilise his 
full capacity: while those consumers who are willing to pay more may 
be left to the producer charging a higher price. But if this 
distribution of consumers were reversed, the producer charging the 
higher price would sell less. In fact, Edgeworth operates his model 
on the assumption that the market demand function is single-valued.
The outcome of this model is that there is no equilibrium point: 
there is no pair of prices from which one producer will not wish to 
move. If one firm sets a Coumotesque monopoly price, there will 
occur the alternate shaving of price envisaged by Bertrand. This 
shaving will continue' until one producer realises that, rather than 
a further shave, it would be more profitable to leave his rival with 
all the customers he can supply and to charge the Cournotesque
209
monopoly price for the rest. But this move will encourage the rival 
to start the shaving process once again,
315Machlup mentions that because two different prices exist 
during one time period, there is a possibility of arbitrage 
operations. Such operations are unlikely to cover costs while 
• prices are being shaved by small amounts. They may be significant 
during the period in which one firm (say 'Secundus') charges a 
low price capturing sufficient customers to utilise his full 
capacity while the other firm ('Primus') decides to charge a 
monopoly price,
Edgex/orth di-d not claim any precise applicability for his model. 
The leap of a firm (Secundus) up to the monopoly price may not ‘ 
follow the precise Cournotesque calculation.
Practical considerations may induce him to make a less 
violent jump. For Primus it will then be a matter of 
deliberation whether he should cut the price fixed by 
Secundus, or, jumping to a still higher price, deal 
separately with the custom left to him by Secundus. We 
cannot foresee what the jumps will be; theory predicts 
only that the jumping will go on for ever, as long as 
the monopolists are uncombined.
It was stated at the commencement of this section that the
solution to Edgeworth's 'duopoly* model is not contingent on there
being only two firms. If we increase the number of firms in the
model towards infinity and maintain all the other assumptions, a
similar solution will be obtained- A.J.Niohol constructs a simple
Edgeworth--type model and shows that as the number of firms increases,
317the range within which prices may fluctuate actually increases.
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Looking Towards the 1930s ~
Throughout the period we are considering the problem of duopoly
was approached in terms of the framework established by Cournot and
Edgeworth, But in his 'Pure Theory of Monopoly* paper (1897),
Edgeworth had already likened the case of competing monopolists
producing complementary articles to that of a game of chess,
'And, as in chess, when only the two kings and one of the inferior
pieces remain on each side, may not the two monopolists go on making
318moves against each other to all eternity?*
Even Edgeworth questioned the myopia hypothesis in this case,
Fisher’s article on Cournot (1898) applied the game analogy to
319 320 321 322duopoly, and Kotany, Moore, and Pigou, all acknowledged
that some consideration by a firm of decisions to be made in future
time periods must be incorporated into duopoly models,
However, these seeds fell on barren ground. The seed which.
finally germinated was planted by A.L.Bowley, He gave a 'simple
example' so as to illustrate a possible approach to the problem of
duopoly, Given a market demand function and cost functions for the
two firms, each will vary his output ( or 0(% ) in the
Cournotesque manner so as to maximise his own net revenue. One
can differentiate firm 1 ’s net revenue equation with respect to 3a
and that of* firm 2 with respect to X x  . But, added Bowley: 'To
solve these we should need to know as a function of 3ft , and this
323depends on what each producer thinks the other is likely to do.'
32 ABowley's book, and its subsequent reviews by Wickscll and 
325Allyn Young , clearly influenced many writers whose work was 
based on the hypothesis of non-zero conjectural variation. The 
incorporation of this hypothesis into formal models characterises the 
'oligopoly' theory of the post-Marshallian age.
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CHAPTER V
MARSHALL AND THE POST-MARSHALL IANS
In his Presidential Address to Section F (Economic Science and 
Statistics) of the Annual Meeting of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science of 1861, William Newmarch noted the 
increasingly empirical foundation of economics since the time of 
Adam Smith.
,, ,ve have learned that in these enquiries the only sound 
basis on which we can found doctrines, and still more the 
only safe basis on which we can erect laws, is not 
hypothetical deduction, however ingenious and subtle, but 
conclusions and reasoning supported by the la7:gess and most 
careful investigation of facts. This vital change of 
method, this substitution of observation and experiment 
(and for our present purpose the two words mean very much 
the sate thing) for deductions, arrived at by geometrical 
reasoning, seems to me to be the most prominent fact of the 
last thirty or forty years, as regards the progress of the 
branches of knowledge which more immedic.tely interest us in 
this section.“
Kewmarch proceeded to list those previously dominant doctrines
2which had been modified as a result of experience- and observation ;
and he urged hi audience to continue with empi leal work.
Sharing J ,S ,Mill’s optimistic opinioni 
considered that empirical work in this
of exchange theory, 
field would yield
N ewraaren 
little
other than confirmation or received knowledge «
Kevin arch* s observation of the growing significance of empiricism
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for the thirty or forty years to 1861 could be applied to the whole 
period since he spoke - and particularly to the period following the 
death of Marshall. This empirical work has, despite the predictions 
of Newmarch, led to significant modifications being made to the theory 
of exchange, particularly as that theory applies to short-run 
adjustments. The recording of observations has enabled us to reach 
some tentative judgments as to the degree of verisimilitude of the 
theory bequeathed to us by Marshall as compared with its subsequent 
developments. These judgments form the subject of this final 
chapter.
THE MOTIVATION OF THE FIRM
A recurring issue in the methodological debates among economists 
is the extent to which an inconsistency between observations and the 
’assumptions' of theories is a cause for concern. During the 1940s 
and the 1950s this issue was focussed in a debate as to whether the 
assumption that firms maximise their net revenue was either a 
realistic proposition or a useful assumption. The focus was provided 
by the report of a survey undertaken by Hall and Hitch of the methods 
by which a sample of thirty-eight businesses (principally engaged in 
manufacturing) set their prices. The authors considered that the 
most striking feature of their survey was that the firms interviewed 
failed to set prices by equating marginal cost with marginal revenue. 
While pricing methods varied among the respondents, many seemed to 
set price at direct cost plus certain percentage additions to cover 
overheads and profit.
This innocent article (which incidentally provided evidence 
that those surveyed considered both demand and cost conditions when
setting prices) provoked a major debate. However, it was not4
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alwajrs clear that the disputants were clear as to which assumption 
of economic theory was being challenged."' Their observations were 
not inconsistent with Marshall's hypotheses as to motivation. 
Marshall's firm has no unique maximum which it aims to achieve.
Indeed, the increasing size of businesses and the resulting formation 
of policy by salaried managers imply that firms may not always seek 
out that policy option which maximises expected net revenue. The 
degree to which a firm strives to maximise its net revenue, is, for 
Marshall, dependent on the internal organisation of the firm and the 
personalities in positions of power.
But if the observations of Hall and Hitch did not contradict 
Marshall, neither did they contradict the static maximising 
assumption of Cournot, Walras and Joan Robinson. The timeless 
maximisation of net revenue in these models (together with the 
appropriate stability conditions) facilitates a qualitative prediction 
as to the direction in which change will occur in response to a change 
in parameters. The stability conditions of such models yield no 
predictions as to the speed at which change will occur; so the 
models yield no predictions as to the policies firms will be pursuing 
at any point in time. It might be that the full-cost pricing 
observed by Hall and Hitch is quite consistent with movement towards 
the equilibrium positions predicted by Cournot, Walras and Joan 
Robinson.
The observations by Hall and Hitch could only have been 
inconsistent with a maximising assumption which was specific as to 
the time path of the firm in moving towards equilibrium. Indeed, 
the reason their article provoked such a reaction was that they were 
seen to be attacking the assumption of myopic maximisation;
Up to the time of Marshall*s death the utopia assumption was of 
little importance. As seen above^, this assumption was used by- 
Cournot, Edgeworth, and Amoroso when constructing models of duopoly; 
but the assumption was attacked by Fisher, Kotany, H.L.Moore, 
Wicksell, Pigou, Bowley, Allyn Young, and Chamberlin. By the time 
of Hall and Hitch the ^ assumption was held to be' inapplicable to 
oligopol3r theory.
However, in the 1920s and 1930s the myopia assumption was 
incorporated, as if by stealth, into a stability analysis for the 
emerging model of perfect competition. This analysis consisted in 
elaborating the large-numbers model of Cournot and Walras so as to 
spell out a time path of movement towards equilibrium along the.lines 
of the Marshallian time-period analysis. Given a parametric 
change, firms would move over time'to a new long-run equilibrium 
having first traversed a market-period and a short-run equilibrium. 
Because each of these equilibria were positions of maximisation for 
each firm in the industry, the analysis implicity required that the 
firm be a n^opic maximiser but one confronted by constraints which
7differed according to the lapse in time since the parametric change.
One of Machlup's responses to criticism of the hypothesis of the 
myopic msxhniser is to admit that it is not universally true, but 
to claim that it is a sufficiently good approximation to the actions 
of firms under competitive conditions to yield predictions whose 
degree of verisimilitude is greater than that of contending models. 
Under competitive conditions, firms are compelled to take advantage 
of brief opportunities to increase their net revenue because they 
can never hone to trade lower returns now for returns higher than 
normal over a long-tine span,
It was just this latter point which was urged by E.A,G.Robinson
oin his review of P .W .S .Andrews* Manufacturing Business. Robinson 
questioned Andrews* proposition that the time horizon of firms was 
such that they would not take advantage of short-lived opportunities 
to capture quasi-rents in excess of average fixed cost. Andrews 
claims that such action (to be expected from,a myopic maximiser) 
would lessen the valuable goodwill the firm has striven to establish 
with its purchasers. The analysis by Andrews explains the findings 
of the Hall and Hitch survey in terms of the rational conduct of 
businessmen who are faced with a market into which entry can be 
quickly effected and in which customer goodwill largely determines 
the division of market demand among firms.
9Sir John Hicks characterises as ’snatchers' those who weight 
immediate profits highly compared with future profits and as 
'stickers' those who weight future profits highly when compared with 
immediate returns. Hicks does not meet Andrews and Harrod on their 
own ground because he does not consider the case in which firms have 
discretion as to price. If firms adjust quantities in a Walrasian 
competitive market, they are unlikely to allow the possibility of 
potential entrants to influence their present policies; but in a 
market where firms deal directly with their customers such a longer- 
term outlook may be expected.
As to whether firms are snatchers or stickers and to what 
extent they are, is an empirical question. It appears that the 
businessmen interviewed by Hall and Hitch and by' Andrews were solidly 
sticking. But other behaviour has been observed. If we only 
desire a theory which will yield the type of comparative static 
predictions expected by Machlup, then this empirical question is 
not particularly important; but if we desire to predict the rate at
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which variables move towards equilibrium values then this empirical 
question becomes important.
Despite the spirited defences by Machlup, the work of Andrews, 
and of other Oxford economists, has not been the only development 
facilitating some consistency between motivational assumptions and 
survey findings. In the last few decades increasing evidence of 
the influence of imperfect information and of uncertainty on business 
- decisions has encouraged further qualifications to be placed on the 
assumption of profit maximisation.
Investment, Uncertaint3'r and Knowledge
While there exist differing conjectures as to the time horizon 
of firms in making pricing decisions (as ..is seen by the debate 
between Andrews and E,A,G.Robinson mentioned above), there are few 
such differences when it comes to investment decisions, A firm 
making an investment decision is unlikely to be a myopic maximiser; 
rather, it will adopt a Marshallian long-period horizon.
That a firm is faced with uncertain future demand and future cost 
functions is not a proposition new to economics, A return for the 
bearing of risk is acknowledged in the distribution theory of the 
eighteenth century; and Galiani’s equilibrium and stability analysis 
incorporates the h3'pothesis that the expectations guiding new 
investment ma3r be confounded,^ The distinction between insurable 
and uninsurable risks is to be found in the German literature of the 
first half of the nineteenth centum.^ ^
The complication to the assumption of the maximisation of net 
revenue caused by the need to specify a firm's willingness to bear 
risk and to embrace uncertainty is a more recent development. These
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recent developments follow Marshall *s lead in seeking to explain and 
to predict the determinants of market structure, Marshall's time- 
Period analysis, together with the concept of quasi-rent, formalised 
the way in which the time horizon of a firm changes as the variables 
subject to decision change. The more distant the time horizon the 
roore uncertainty the decision involves. Consequently, Marshall 
refuses to predict the direction in which the investment policy of 
any particular firm will lead.
The need to make decisions relating to an unknowable future ■
suggests that actuarial principles may be employed. Irving Fisher
devotes a carefully-written chapter and Appendix in his Nature of
12Capital and Income to an outline of the subjectivity of all 
probability estimates and the way in which such eestimates may be 
used to discount future returns.
G.L.S.Shackle's Uncertainty in Economics proposes that actuarial
principles cannot be applied to many market decisions (for example,
to investment decisions) because, in the first place, their
uniqueness means that no large number of sufficiently similar events
can be found for the estimate of a probability; and, secondly, the
firm usually will not be offered the opportunity of repeated trials
if it fails at first. Shackle proposes that in such circumstances
a firm's decision will be based not on a distribution of subjective
probabilities but on a pair of particularly significant possible
outcomes chosen both for the gain or loss they would occasion and
13for the degree of surprise they would cause.
Alchian is quite explicit as'to the incompatibility of decisions 
made under uncertainty with the hypothesis of profit maximisation.
Under uncertainty, by definition, each action that may be
Q¿.IO
chosen "is identified with a distribution of potential
outcomes, not with a unique outcome, . Essentially,
the task is converted into making a decision (selecting an
action) whose potential outcome distribution is preferable,
that is, choosing the action with the optimum distribution,
1since there is no such thing as a maximising distribution."
, Alchian proceeds to argue that while it is meaningless to 
operate with the hypothesis that firms seek to maximise an objective 
function, firms will, in some long run, only survive if they do 
realise positive profits. So, for long-run, aggregative predictions 
it is safe to say that only profitable firms will survive. For the 
purpose of the qualitative, aggregative predictions yielded by the' 
comparative static analysis under conditions of heavy competition, 
the qualifications to the profit-maximiser hypothesis are of little 
importance. It the theory is used to predict, merely the directions 
of adjustments to prices or quantities traded then the theory will 
predict well providing firms are aware of changes in the demand or 
cost parameters. But if theory is to yield predictions as to, 
the speed of adjustment and as to changes in industry structure, then 
the hypothesis as to the motivation of firms may be crucial.
Alternative Motivational Hypotheses
If-the maximising hypothesis becomes meaningless when applied 
to long-period decisions relating to an uncertain environment, is 
there any class of decisions to which it can be applied'? Pricing.
decisions, or market-period decisions as to output, arc the obvious 
contenders. If the time horizon of a firm making these decisions is 
a matter of weeks rather than months, uncertainty might be negligible
and the hypothesis way have seme meaning even if it be incorrect.
Very few economists are prepared to accept the myopic-maximiser
. . .  . . 1 5hypothesis except m  circumstances of ’heavy competition'. But /
the use of the myopic-maximiser hypothesis for the market-period
decisions of firms under heavy competition entails a rejection of
\
the evidence offered by Andrews and Harrod as to the harmful effects 
of short-sighted maximisation on long-run returns in those industries 
in which firms deal directly with their customers. Perhaps the 
hypothesis is applicable to market-period decisions undertaken by 
firms which do not deal directly with customers, but rather deliver 
their output to a central selling agent.^
The increasing disenchantment with the maximising hypothesis
since the death of Marshall has been facilitated by documentation of ,
rhe process by which control over the goals of firms’has been
moving from holders of equity to management. ' Adam Smith had
observed that joint-stock companies allowed investors little control 
17 .over policy. Following the removal m  1825 of restrictions on the
free formation of joint-stock companies, this form of company
organisation grew in importance, J.S.Mill and Alfred Marshall
considered this growth to be significant for the goals businesses 
18would pursue. The study by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means of the
200 largest non-financial corporations in the United States documented
19 rthis process of the separation of ownership from control.
The hegemony of the manager and frequent observation of the
preoccupation of managers with sales rather than with current profits
led Baumol to propose that firms with market power tend to maximise
sales subject to the condition that profits do not fall below some 
. . .  20specified minimum value. In his second edition Baumol proposes 
that managers seek to maximise the rate of growth of sales while 
trying to generate funds for investment which will yield growth in
the future. The pricing policy'- predicted by the models is closer to 
the long-run competitive level than is that predicted under the 
assumption of the myopic maximisation of net revenue.
That it is possible to gain insight into the motivation and
policies of firms by reading the literature on business management is
"not a recent suggestion. ’ Marshall clearly benefited from his
21reading of books on ’Scientific Management’. In the 1930s and 
1940s the London School of Economics (as a product of the interfaces 
at that School between economics, accpunting and management studies) 
3rielded both much work on the application of the concept of 
opportunity cost to decision-making within firms, and Thirlby’s
attack on the economist’s firm as controlled by an omniscient
. . 22decision-maker.
In the 1950s and 1960s the interface between management studies
and economics was most fruitful on the other side of the Atlantic.
At the Carnegie Institute of Technology, the work of Herbert A.Simon,
23and its more formal statement by Richard W.Cyert and James G,March 
developed a more truth-like model of the process by which the firm 
generates decisions. The*firm is pictured as a coalition of 
individuals. The goals of the firms will change over time in 
response to the changing power of the various members of the coalitiop. 
The significance of such changes for the policies of the firms would 
not seem to be great. For the purpose of comparisons of market or 
short-period decisions, changes in the power structure would not be 
significant; and for long-period policy the constraints of the 
capital market would ensure that the firm must pursue profits.
(This latter point does not imply a maximising goal,)-
The significant advance in the Cyert and March model is the
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statement of the determinants of the type of information-which is 
sought and the degree to which it is pursued. Empirical studies 
undertaken by members of the Carnegie Institute suggest that firms 
faced with an uncertain environment which they cannot regulate 
immediately (by, for example, understandings between firms) will v 
avoid long-period plans by using short-period decision rules reacting 
to short-period feedback'from present policies. By use of a 
computer simulation model, Cyert arid March concluded that such a - 
firm operating in a duopoly will have its (market-period) behaviour 
influenced by parameters internal to the firm.
The prohibitive search and computational costs which would be
entailed in seeking some ideal maximum leads Simon to his hypothesis
that firms may be content with some satisfactory standard of profit 
24performance. The improvements m  the period since the second
world war in the techniques of operations research have increased the
ability of firms to make decisions with limited information and
computational abilities. The application of linear programming
methods is justified, not on the grounds of the existence of linear
production functions, but on the grounds that working with this
approximation is less costly than the alternative of discovering the
true production function and applying more complex techniques.
Bauraol and Quandt suggest that firms may be considered to maximise
the net revenue yielded by the gathering of information and the
25refining of calculations.
Empirical studies of the ways in which firms make long-period 
decisions given limited knowledge (bounded rationality in the 
jargon) of an uncertain future have recently been used to yield 
important, testable propositions as to the structure of industries.' 
Much of this work uses a profit-seeking hypothesis rather than a
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profit-maximising hypothesis. A brief mention will be made of its 
results in the following section,
2. COST FUNCTIONS AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS
During the 1920s and 1930s, many articles and books were devoted 
to the determinants of the firm's costs and to the determinants of 
total industry supply, Much of this writing on costs and almost all 
of that on supply functions was presented within the context of the 
model of perfect competition. This model, which is an elaboration 
of Cournot's static, large-numbers, quantity-adaptor model, was 
married to Marshall's time-period analysis after the death of Marshall. 
Cournot's static model with its timeless cost functions was adapted 
for the short-period normal and for the. long-period normal.
This elaboration on Cournot's static model caused an alteration
to his hypothesis of the maximisation of profits. The static
maximisation hypothesis became the proposition of myopic 
2 6maximisation. At each point in time the myopic maximiser,
confronted by a revenue function and by a cost function, will choose
that quantity which would be an equilibrium quantity for the firm.
For each point in time there exists a unique equilibrium price/quantity
27supplied relationship for the firm. As price is uniform among r 
firms in the industry at any point in time, there will always exist 
a unique price/quantity relationship for the industry.
The emergence of the quantity-adaptor, perfect competition model, 
led to a preoccupation by professional economists with the nature of 
the function expressing average cost and marginal cost as a function 
of the output of the firm. Cournot and Marshall had spoken 
ambiguously of~average cost.and marginal cost^6; but Edgeworth
demanded clarity on this point. Edgeworth's call for precision .
may have derived, at least in part,,from the demands placed on his
\
reasoning by the debate as to the determinants of railway rates. •
It was this policy concern which had attracted J.M.Clark to the 
subject of overhead costs; and Clark served greatly to clarify the 
distinction between returns to the variable factor and economies 
of scale.^
Marshall spoke of the tendency to diminishing returns in terms
of product and was aware that ex post estimates of scale economies
must confront the problem of variable rates of capacity 
. 31utilisation ; so he cannot be convicted of gross error on this
score. However, J.M.Clark remains throughout his book clear on this
distinction. He states that decreasing returns to the variable
factor (decreasing average product) may be associated with falling
average costs when the rate of fall with respect to output of
average fixed costs is more rapid than the rate of increase of
32average variable costs.
These distinctions, together with their application to the
quantity-adapting firm in a perfectly competitive environment, were
! 33incorporated into Vmer's article of 1931 - a model of
expositional clarity. Viner shows how cost/output graphs for the 
short run and for the long run may be used to derive, for any given 
price, both unique equilibrium outputs for the firms as well as a 
unique rate of production for the industry,
Shore-Period Cost Functions
During the 1920s and 1930s it came to be accepted that the firm’ 
short-run marginal costs were‘positively related to its rate of 
output. This belief was held to be the general result of the
25
application of extra units of a variable factor to a given quantity
. >•. . n. 34of fixed factor ( m  a two-input model). As with the statements
35of this principle by J.B.Clark and Wicksteed , the proof of this 
deduction was rather careless. It was not clear just which 
assumptions were necessary to reach the conclusion; nor was it 
clear how the deduction proceeded.
In two articles in the Zeitschrift fdr Nationaldkonomie (1936),
K.Menger demolished the 'axiomatic' acceptance of the forward-rising 
short-run marginal cost curve. Menger shows that the 'deductions' 
by earlier economists are simply invalid. It is not possible to 
deduce a diminishing marginal product from a diminishing average 
product; and the strongest principle that can be deduced from the 
subhomogeneity of a production function (i.e,, a function for which 
equi-proportional increases in both inputs will not increase output 
more than proportionately) is that the average product of the 
variable input will diminish. lienger proceeds to urge that 
'...the crucial issue for economics [is] as follows: Are the 
return laws true or false, i.e., are they or are the3r not 
empirically confirmed? 1-Jhether they do or do not follow from 
certain other propositions is-only a secondary issue.
Unfortunately, both Monger's reasoning and his methodological
prescription are still being largely ignored. Empirical evidence
on the form of short-period supply functions is notably scarce.
Marshall's empirical generalisation as to the rising nature of the
short-period supply price is given without detailed supporting 
37evidence. His arguments that firms will need to pay overtime
rates to labourers and to have recourse to inferior quality inputs
* 38to increase supply in the short period are disputed by Andrews,
Andrews (who was, unfortunately, unable to present his raw data)’
argues that businesses plan to run with excess capacity so that,
(i) they do not lose(possibly irretrievable) customers in times of 
high demand; (ii) they have the capacit}' to cover contingencies 
for breakdowns and of machines being idle for repairs; and (iii) 
they can take advantage of any opportunities for the capture of 
growing markets. • .
In general, average direct costs per unit of product will
be expected to remain constant over large ranges of
output, so long as the business continues to employ the
same methods of production, and the total of such costs
will vary wTith total output. The specification of the
product will call for so much of each material to be
embodied in the finished product, and the quantity of the
materials so used must necessarily be constant per unit 
39of product.
These conclusions, based on the studjr of a number of
manufacturing firms, have been confirmed by a number of studies of
. . .  . 40the regulated public utilities of the United States.
Long-Period Cost Functions
To a large extent, the verbal explanations of the shape of
long-period -cost functions has remained unaltered since the writing
of J.S.Mill, Following the death of Marshall the indivisibilities
of capital equipment has been mentioned as an explanation of
41technical scale economies and more attention has been paid to
the influence of scale on the cost of sales effort and the gaining 
42of knowledge. However, most economists would agree with Marshall 
that technological real economies of scale generally are limited; 
and that if diseconomies of scale are to occur they will probably
22?
be caused either by transport costs or by managerial factors.
If technical diseconomies pf scale are possible, they can be 
avoided by the planning of a multi-plant firm. One question of
debate since Marshall's death is whether managerial diseconomies
/
of scale may similarly be overcome by decentralisation. Given a
static model of a perfectly competitive market, increasing long-
period marginal costs must be the explanation why firms do not plan
an indefinite expansion and thereby alter the structure of the
market. Applying the implications of such a model to the real
world, Amoroso argues that because the size of firms does not
expand indefinitely, the long-period marginal cost curve must be 
44forward rising,
J.M.Clark argues that organising power is the chief limit to 
firm size, but the best-known formulation of this proposition comes 
from the first edition of E.A.G.Robinson's, Structure of 
Competitive Industry. Robinson argued that the problem of co­
ordination limits the size of films. Florence bases his criticism 
of this position on evidence from the literature of business 
management. Florence distinguishes the logic of internal 
organisation from that which occurs in practice. The logic of 
organisation consists in latest knowledge, skillfully applied:
'Apart from economists, however, those who have made a special study 
of organisation come to the conclusion that no limit is set to the
size of the organisation if correct principles are adopted to
45enable the single leader to delegate control,'
Despite the testimony of'many of those who study internal 
organisation, and'the apparent ability of even the largest firm in 
the world to escape scale diseconomies by means of a divisional
226 ' ■ ' '
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organisation^, many theorists continue to draw U-shaped long-run
average cost curves. Such U-shaped long-run average cost curves
47were used prior to the death of Marshall , but they became
widespread in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, Pigou adopted
48them for his equilibrium firm in 1928 ; and in 1931 Harrod showed
the relationship between this curve and the short-run average cost
. 4 9curves in the now-familiar envelope construction.
Even as an inference from the postulates.that technical 
economies of scale are limited and that problems of co-ordination 
eventually impose diseconomies, the U-shaped long-run average cost 
curve is not acceptable. Given these postulates, there is no 
reason wh3r the curve should not have a lengthy horizontal section.
The U-shape was not derived from the postulates, but was drawn so 
that the size of the firm could be uniquely determined in the long-run 
equilibrium of the omniscient, quantity-adjusting firm.
It is little wonder that observations provide little support
for the U-shape. E.A,G.Robinson, whose name is usually invoked'
in its defence, notes that there is much practical and theoretical
evidence to suggest that long-run average cost curves first decline
. . 50and then have a large horizontal section before finally rising.
Those who have undertaken empirical, studies, and there have been
quite a few in the last twenty years; have discovered cither L-shaped
51 'curves or curves which rise after a long horizontal section. 3
3. COMPETITION AND THE SIZE OF FIRMS
Given a Cournotesque large-numbers model 'with the motivational 
hypothesis adjusted to that of. myopic maximisation, equilibrium for 
the firm in the short period, requires that short-run marginal cost
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be equal to price with marginal cost increasing at the equilibrium
quantity. Given a change in price the existing firms will adjust
their outputs such that short-run marginal cost (on the forward-
52rising segment of the marginal cost curve) equals price.
' If, at this new equilibrium, each firm were not to earn the 
normal rate of return on capital in the long run, then either entry 
or exit will occur so that long-run rates of return are adjusted to
normal. This long-run stabilisation process is similar to that of
53 . .Marshall and Walras. Indeed, the long-run competitive output as
that at which returns are normal is a version of Adam Smith’s model 
in The Wealth of Nations. This model of the natural price has 
never been discarded. It has been invested with increased 
empirical content (not always corroborated) by elaborations to more 
immediate time horizons and allowances for more complex motivational 
hypotheses; but the basic structure of the model remains to this da}'.
One feature of the model of perfect competition is that
S R M C
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(unlike the models of »Vice/
/Ceil
Marshall and Walras)
the output of each firm
is uniquely determined in 
54the long run. The 
output will be that at 
which long-run average 
cost will be at a minimum,
(See the figure at right.)
This uniquely-determined 
output is contingent on 
the postulate that the long- 
run average cost curve is
* ^
.aV
AR = average revenue 
MR -- marginal revenue 
LRAC = long-run average cost 
LRMC = long-run marginal cost
U-shaped
The Long-Run Industry Supply Curve
Marshall's long-period suppl)7 schedules do not show the
quantities which will be supplied by the industry at any given
price, Marshall does not offer a set of conditions which would
enable us to judge whether an industry has reached the 'normal'
position at which it would be located on its long-period supply 
55schedule,
However, in the model of perfect competition each firm is always
in, at least a temporary, equilibrium. In the long-period normal
each firm will be at an equilibrium as pictured in the figure
above. For each price the (unique) equilibrium outputs may be
summed to yield a point on the long-period supply schedule. Changes
in output will be occasioned by the entry or exit of firms. If
each firm is at long-period equilibrium then some of Marshall's
explanations of a changing long-period supply price are eliminated.
It is no longer possible to rely on increasing access to technical
56economies (internal or external) as the industry expands. If
the long-run supply price is to change with changing output, the
reason musL be found in pecuniary economies or diseconomies which
57are external to the firm. As Joan Robinson argues, if the 
resources absorbed by one industry are to increase in a time of full 
employment, -then the extra resources must be transferred from other 
industries. It is possible that the expanding industry will 
require factors in a mix different from those activities which are 
shrinking. So, depending on the degree of idiosyncrac)7 of the 
expanding industry, and the possibilities for input substitution in 
the expanding industry, external pecuniary diseconomies (rising 
factor-prices) will be the cause of any forward-rising gradient 
discovered in long-run supply curves.
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The Size of Firms under Competition - - .
At least since the publication of The Wealth of Nations
economists have acknowledged that the size of the firm may be
limited by the extent of the market. This theorem became important
in the monopolistic competition literature of the 1930s and 1940s.
Even for standardised commodities, Marshall stressed that when the
firm deals directly with the customer, goodwill will influence the
58allocation of output among firms. These factors could not be
utilised for the theory of perfect competition in which standardised 
products were dumped on a market to be sold by some Walrasian 
tâtonnement process. In such a market direct contact between buyer 
and. seller is impossible.
The U-shaped long-run average cost, curve was adopted to
explain the size of firms under perfect competition;' but the chape
of the curve is inconsistent with observations. As Hicks
explains: ’The elements which limit the size of firms in practice
are very largely d3rnamic elements; it is therefore not surprising
59that static theory has had so much trouble over the matter.’
In 1934, Kaldor objected, on a priori grounds, to the 
explanation of the forward-rising section of the LRAC curve in terms 
of co-ordination problems. His objection is that co-ordination is *' 
only required when the firm needs to change. No co-ordination is 
needed when every function is to be replicated from the previous 
period.
For the function which lends uniqueness and determinatencss 
to the firm - the ability to adjust, to co-ordinate - is an 
essentially dynamic function; it is only required so long 
as adjustments are required; and the extent to which it is
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required • (which, as its supply is 'fixed', governs the 
amount of other factors which can be most advantageously 
combined with it) depends on the frequency and the magnitude 
of the adjustments to be undertaken, ...There is thus no 
determinate ideal or 'equilibrium' position which a firm is 
continuousl}r tending to approach, because every approximation 
to that situation also changes the ideal position to which it 
tends to approximate. 60
In the revised edition of his Structure of Competitive Industry,
61Robinson admits this point.
Kaldor's hypothesis that firm size is 1 united by management's.
inability to handle the co-ordination problems raised by rapid
change, is a basic idea behind Edith Penrose* Theory of the Growth 
6 2of the Firm. This bock points to the teamwork needed for
management. The management team cannot be expanded rapidly or else 
this cohesion is threatened. Mew members of the team take a while 
to gain confidence in and knowledge of other team members and of the 
work needed for planning.
63Kalecki proposes that,- rather than lack of knowledge of the 
internal environment, it is lack of knowledge of future market 
conditions which limits the growth of firms. Kalecki claims that, * 
an entrepreneur (or creditor) will limit his investment in a 
particular venture at any point in time because larger investments 
incur increasing marginal risk. The larger the investment the more 
one's wealth position is threatened by failure; and the larger the 
.investment the greater is the danger of personal illiquidity caused 
by owning assets (like capital.) which are illiquid. There seems 
to be some evidence that the. more uncertain the market environment,
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the smaller do firms tend to be. 64
The effects on industry structure of the uncertaintj^ caused by 
lack of knowledge is a topic the implications of which have been 
increasingly explored in recent years. Williamson proposes that 
the size of firms can be explained by efforts to gain knowledge or 
by efforts to cope with a world where knowledge is limited. His 
basic proposition in Markets and Hierarchies is that the organisation 
of productive units is determined by transactional factors rather 
than by technology. By intra-firm co-ordination (as opposed to 
co-ordination by means of the market) administrators use long-term 
contracts with resources to adapt to uncertainty in a sequential 
fashion. Long-term contracts for the products of resources arc much 
less flexible. Information sought'through resources internal to the 
firm is less likely deliberately to be made misleading than is 
information purchased in the market place. Although this book 
suffers from, the identification of monopoly power with the number of 
sellers, it is a fertile source of hypotheses which, using a little 
ingenuity, could be tested.
Observations of business motivation have yielded a far more 
complex picture than that of the myopic maximiser postulated in the 
model of perfect competition. Models are being built on the 
foundation that businesses grope in .an uncertain environment to gain 
knowledge of profitable opportunities, and form their internal 
structure and behaviour so as to assist this search and to allow 
flexibility to respond to a constantly changing picture of the 
market. This- view of firms iterating decisions in the face of an 
uncertain environment is the basis of the Marshallian reservations 
concerning the static maximising view of Cournot and Walras. 
Marshall’s interest in the determinants of business size has been.
re-kindled in new minds following the clear inadequacy of the U-shaped 
long-run average cost curve explanation. The new hypotheses may he 
more difficult to test than those incorporated in the model of 
perfect competition (their variables are rarely found in government 
statistics); but they are testable in principle.
EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY UNDER MONOPOLY
Marshall's analysis of monopoly is planted firmly in the
tradition of Adam Smith and J.5 .Mill. The extent to which an
industry is monopolised is the extent to which the free flow of
resources is impeded. Given this definition it is possible to rank.
industries according to their degree of monopolistic control. Such
ranking depends on: (i) the extent to which a firm can price above
the long-period unit costs of potential competitors; and (ii) the
65period of time for which this differential can be sustained.
This model has never been completely discarded, although the 
perfect competition theorists, Joan Robinson, and Chamberlin, did 
their best to achieve this end. At the death of Marshall, the model 
needed important work. In particular, the key parameters 
representing the impediments to the free flow of resources needed 
to be identified and estimated. This work has been furthered by 
those, such as Bain, who would claim to be following the perfect 
competition/Chamberlinian tradition.
Bain's Barriers to New Competition attempts to quantify the 
barriers to the entry of new firms (compared with resources) into an 
industry. Bain succeeded in promoting the Marshallian idea that a 
firm's awareness of potential„competition limits the extent to which 
it is prepared'to exercise monopoly power.
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Bain defines the
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'condition of entry' as '...the advantages of established sellers in 
an industry over potential entrant sellers, these advantages being 
reflected in the extent to which established sellers can persistently 
raise their prices above a competitive level without attracting new 
firms to enter the i n d u s t r y . B y  careful argument and empirical 
investigation, Bain establishes a strong case for the significance 
of such conditions of entry on the pricing policy of firms.
Others have developed this theme of the influence of barriers
. . .  . . . .  67to entry on pricing policy. Sylos-Labim's model of limit pricing
is constructed for a homogeneous product for which the cost function 
is identical for all films. The barrier to entry is economies of 
scale, so there are no problems of imperfect knowledge (all firms 
have the same cost function). Accordingly, while Sylos is exploring 
the effects of barriers to entry, his assumptions preclude any 
consideration of many of the issues of expectations, degree of 
monopoly, time horizon, etc. suggested by the Marshallian analysis. 
The lack of congruence between Sylos and Marshall is explained by 
the hegemony of market classification in the 1930s and 1940s,
Classification
The continuum from absolute monopoly to free competition in the 
models of the English classical economists may be contrasted with 
the approach to monopoly taken by Cournot. Cournot classifies 
markets according to the number of sellers and draws conclusions 
as to the pricing policies which will emerge. Because a study of 
the long-run implications of policy must include the possibility 
of the entry and exit of firms (and thus the destruction of the 
system of taxonomy) the models explored must envisage a short timerf *
horizon. The-exception to this rule is the case of large numbers 
for which entry and exit can be considered without considering the
23?
possibility of a change in market structure 68
These comments apply not only to Cournot, but to all those who 
follow the method of classification. This method was widely accepted 
following the publication of Joan Robinson’s Economics 'of Imperfect 
Competition and Chamberlin’s Theory of Monopolistic Competition.
Joan Robinson developed the Cournot-Edgeworth static theory of 
monopoly - developing theorems of comparative statics, the difference 
between the outcomes of monopoly and perfect competition, and the 
literature of monopolistic discrimination among markets. Chamberlin 
proposed a two-fold classificatory system: that markets be classified 
both according to the number of sellers and according to the 
existence or non-existence of product differentiation. Chamberlin is 
largely responsible for the elevation of oligopoly to a subject of
widespread interest. His development of additional market
. . 69categories stems from a study of the Pigou-Taussig controversy as
to railway prices and discrimination; and.the impossibility of
deciding the question as to whether monopoly or competition with
. 7 0joint costs explains the formation of the prices.
Chamberlin’s problem in dealing with the Pigou-Taussig debate 
serves to illustrate the poverty of empirical content caused by the 
method of classification. The problem derives from the difficulty 
in deciding which model to apply. If the rules for application 
are not made explicit, the models become difficult to test. It 
is for this reason that Friedman pleas for the articulation of the 
rules for application. ’But, £he proceedsl no matter how 
successful we may be in this attempt, there inevitably will remain 
room for judgment in applying the rules. Each occurrence has 
some features peculiarly its own, not covered by the explicit
rules. 71
Chamberlin's 'solution' to his problem raised in the Pigou- 
Taussig debate is also interesting. Given an inapplicable range of. 
alternative models he added to the range so as to increase the 
'realistic' possibilities available. Following his lead, Bain 
further added to the range by including barriers to entry as a 
criterion of market classification. Bain, always keeping an eye 
on empirical content, warns against the proliferation of structural 
models. However, the proliferation has continued such that the 
price theorist is now confronted with a bewildering plethora of 
models from which he may choose the one to apply. This development 
may be seen as a classic conventionalist methodological strategem.
'If this model doesn't fit, restrict its range of applicabilit3r 
and add a new model to fill the gap;'. In this way, models can 
always avoid the test of verisimilitude.
Conventionalist methodology uses strategems to explain the lack 
of congruence between the theory's consequences and experiential 
propositions. Any congruence is hailed as a triumph. 'The 
conventionalist ethic is: use the theor}^  where it is applicable. 
Different theories may be required for different problem situations 
within the same problem area." The question of their truth or 
falsity, or even truthlikeness, does not arise. Theories are tools 
for predictions.1'7^
This taxonomic trend exposes the writing of Chamberlin as
leading 'towards an expanding range of theories' rather than
'towards a general theory of value'. In an essay by this latter 
73title, Chamberlin explains his quest.
I must begin by making clear that I am using the term
monopolistic competition in its broad sense to include
all situations where elements of both monopoly and competition 
are present - both product heterogeneity and oligopoly, and of 
course all combinations of the two. In this general schema, 
pure competition and pure monopoly appear as limiting cases 
•where one or the other of the ingredients is zero. The 
purpose of the theory is to do a better job of explanation by
presenting a continuum between two extremes rather than two
. . . . . 74sharply distinguished and mutually exclusive categories.
Shortly after Chamberlin's book had been published, Machlup
75outlined his classificatory system. Mason's 'Price and
Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprises',^ proposed that
from the various elements of industry structure, the behaviour of
the industry can be explained. Many industry studies have since
utilised this organisational schema - an early landmark being
. . .  77Wallace's study of the aluminium industry.
One outcome of this taxonomy of markets according to seller
concentration, product differentiation and barriers to entry has
been a refinement of the concept of the industry. One cannot
measure a concentration statistic unless one knows where the
industry starts and finishes. Triffin's suggestion that the degree
of interdependence between firms could be measured by cross
78elasticities of demand produced a debate in the early 1950s as to
whether and hoxv an industry could be defined using statistical 
79measures.
Monopoly, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly
The static theory of monopoly pricing was developed in the 1930 
the contributions"of Joan Robinson and von Stackelberg being 
pre-eminent. . Joan Robinson's, Economics of Imperfect Competition
represents a'"determined effort to extract theorems of comparative
statics from Cournotesque monopoly theory. Von Stackelberg tackles
the problem of equilibrium for a monopolist producing joint 
80products. These two writers are also the most fertile in the
field of price discrimination, Joan Robinson develops the Dupuit-
Edgeworth-Pigou analysis of a monopolist discriminating between
separate markets. Von Stackelberg opens • the analysis to Pigou's
discrimination of the second degree, where the monopolist is able to
81segment a market vertically.
Again, it was theorems of comparative statics which dominated
the early discussions of Chamberlin's model of large numbers with
product differentiation, Chamberlin's models are essentially
timeless; and his famous prediction of excess capacity derives
from the tangency of the average revenue curve with the average cost
curve at an output at less than that of minimum efficient scale.
Harrod argues that misleading structural and motivational hypotheses
in Chamberlin's model are responsible for this prediction.
Chamberlin's assumption that all firms are located at a point (the
symmetry assumption) side-steps the issues raised by product
differentiation. If the symmetry assumption is discarded then
individual firms will discourage others from encroaching on their
markets by pricing at the minimum of long-run average costs. The
only circumstance in which this would not occur would be if the
firms were myopic. In this case they may attempt to extract
'monopoly profits', thereby attracting entrants who would reduce the
size of the market and thus the original (myopic) firm will be left
8 2with capacity which it is unable to utilise.
• * *
This dynamic explanation of excess capacity is reached via a 
route very different from that of Chamberl-in. For Harrod, the
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consideration of time raises the issue of the film's time horizon 
and of its knowledge. Further, the structure of the relevant 
'market* may alter through the entry of new firms, so it is impossible 
for static theorems of behaviour to be deduced from hypotheses as to 
market structure.
Following the death of Marshall, the literature on oligopoly
8 3pursued Bowley's suggestion that firms will consider the likely 
reaction of a rival before making a move. This hint was developed 
by Frisch^, Zeuthen^, Chamberlin^, and von Stackelberg^.
Naturally, by varying one's hypotheses as to anticipated reactions a 
whole series of variant models can be produced. The growth of 
available models between which to choose followed the path to be 
expected from the taxonomic procedure advocated by Cournot and 
Chamberlin.
Chamberlin's justification for treating oligopoly as a set of 
market structures bounded by pure monopoly on one side and the case 
of large numbers on the other is that only when numbers are few do 
firms recognise their interdependence with other firms. In a 
misleading extrapolation frpm the model of pure competition, where 
large numbers coupled with the proposition of the firm being a 
quantity-adaptor (which excludes the possibility of contact with 
purchasers),“Chamberlin claims that the existence of large numbers 
causes any one firm to be oblivious to considerations as to the 
likely reactions of competitors. As the number of sellers increases 
there comes a point where such anticipations are excluded.
Evidence
The discontinuities .in market behaviour between different market 
structures as predicted by Chamberlin and Cournot may contain some
empirical content so long as observed markets can be unambiguously 
classified. This requirement entails that industries can be 
unambiguously defined and that structural characteristics recognised. 
These tasks are not easy to accomplish.
In fact, most of the empirical work in recent years directed to
the testing of alternative hypotheses in the theory of the firm has
been to determine the significance of various variables in explaining
88differences in rates of return among industries. Such cross-
sectional studies yield little by way of evidence to decide between
the taxonomic approach and that of Marshall. Both of these
approaches would lead one to expect that both concentration and
certain proxies for entry barriers would be significant variables
in explaining differences in rates of return among industries,
although Marshall would lead one.to expect that concentration is
89not a major influence. The models of the English classical school 
imply that markets differing in numbers of sellers do not exhibit
behaviour differing in kind. They do not deny that fewness in
. . .  90numbers will facilitate collusion.
A major barrier to deciding on this quantitative issue is the.
high degree of collinearity between concentration and technical
. 9i \barriers to entry. George found that the inclusion of
concentration as a separate variable added nothing to the degree of
explanation of inter-industry rates of profit and concluded that
differences in concentration exert a significant effect on
profitability only within the very high barriers to entry class of 
92 -industries.
Marshall's model moves us.towards predictions as to whore certain 
industry variables will be at particular points in time. For the
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evaluation of this model, cross-sectional data is of little help. - 
Neither is cross-sectional data very useful in assessing the type 
of qualitative predictions which Machlup would expect a theory of 
the firm to yield. While the taxonomic approach has led to a 
. multitude of models to which it is very difficult to apply any 
tests at all, it is clear that these models demand a type of test 
which has rarely been conducted.
In their present forms, both the models of the taxonomists and 
those of the Marshallians yield merely qualitative predictions. 
However, the potential degree of verisimilitude of the Marshallian 
approach is greater than that of the taxonomic approach for two 
reasons.
In the first place, the taxonomic approach easily eludes any 
assessment of verisimilitude. It is elusive because, if an 
implication of the theory is contradicted by observations, then a 
person wishing to conserve the theory can claim that the theory is 
inapplicable because the structural assumptions of the theory do 
not correspond to the structural, characteristics of the observed 
market.
The second reason why^the potential degree of verisimilitude 
of the Marshallian approach exceeds that of classification is that 
Marshall spells cut in far greater detail than market category 
models the time paths by which various variables will approach a 
new equilibrium. If these stability conditions were to be 
quantified (i.e,, if their parameters were to be estimated) they 
would yield predictions as to the value of variables at specific 
points'in time. •
In his address 'The Old Generation of Economists and the New’, 
Marshall stressed that economists must search for a small number of 
basic principles to explain the complexity of social phenomena.
He considered that many of these principles had been discovered, 
and pleaded for an effort to quantify the parameters. If
V
Marshall's performance is to be assessed fairly, then his disciples 
must put their minds to the empirical programme which he outlined.
CHAPTER VI 
SOME REFLECTIONS
IT)?? period from 1776 to the death of Marshall witnessed successive 
elaborations on the equilibrium and stability model presented in 
The Wealth of Nations. The model proposes an equilibrium in which 
price would equal unit costs plus the opportuni.t}r cost of capital.
At such an equilibrium all firms would be, earning similar rates of 
return on capital after allowance is made for differences in riskiness 
and agreeability. Impediments to the achievement of this equilibrium 
are labelled as monopolistic restrictions.
The preceding chapters have considered this model of equilibrium 
and stability: the way in which it has been modified over time and 
the alternatives which have been offered as a challenge. The theme 
of equilibrium and stability may seem rather passe to certain 
economists of the present day. However, the empirical importance 
of analysis of equilibrium and stability lies in the analysis of 
stability,
Statements postulating .equilibrium positions have a zero truth- 
content, They use language (e.g., the long run) which does not 
correspond to an observable reality; so their degree of 
verisimilitude cannot be assessed. Efforts by Adam Smith and 
J.S.Mill to say that natural (long-run normal) values correspond 
to an average of observable (market) values are misleading, if not 
wrong. But this is not to say that equilibrium models are without 
value.
• ¡*3
The assessable propositions yielded by such models derive from
This analysis yields propositions as to thethe stability analysis.
direction in which variables.are changing .and, less frequently, the 
rate of change of such variables,' It is these propositions which 
can be compared with observations so as to assess verisimilitude. 
This is true both of models in the English classical tradition as 
well as of those in the Cournot-Chamberlin-Mason tradition of the 
classification of market structures.
Models convey the greatest degree of verisimilitude if they 
yield the most correct predictions as to the direction in which, and 
the rate at which, variables are changing. If both of these 
dimensions are known, then prediction of variables at a point in the 
future is possible. For this reason, Machlup’s well-known defence 
of marginalism is unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory because it 
is complacent: it expects too little of economics,
Machlup’s defence of marginalism is that it fulfils the
requirements of a. theory of the firm: it predicts the direction of
changes in prices and outputs of particular products resulting from
some other change, While this qualitative comparative statics^ is
the best that is yielded by much economic theory, it should only be
accepted as an intermediate -stage in our approach to the truth.
* In the absence of complete quantitative information, it is hoped to
be able to formulate qualitative restrictions on slopes, curvatures,
etc., of our equilibrium equations so as to be able to derive
definite qualitative restrictions upon the responses of our system to
2changes in certain parameters.’ To increase the truth-content of 
predictions, we must estimate the parameters of the stability 
conditions.
The acceptance of Popper’s standard of verisimilitude implies 
that one will value ’conjectures’ as to the time path a firm or
market travels'towards.equilibrium. 'Marshall's' distinction between 
prime and supplementary cost, his concept of. quasi-rent, and his 
time-period analysis were all efforts towards an articulation of 
this time path.
The Importance of Observations
Popper's standard of verisimilitude defines the degree to which 
a theory approaches the truth. Me defines the truth-content 
(falsity-content) of a theory ti as the class of the true (false) 
logical consequences of k*.
Assuming that the truth-content and'falsity content of two 
theories t-i and t-a. are comparable, we can say that ^  is 
more closely similar to the truth, or corresponds better to 
the facts, than l'i , if and only if either
(a) the truth-content but not the falsity content of tx
exceeds that of , £orl
(b) the falsity-content of*kt , but not its truth-content,
3exceeds that of tx,
In seeking to approach the truth, it is important that 
scientists record their observations so that others may check the 
validity of their judgments. The modifications to Adam Smith's 
basic model to be found in the work of Mill and Marshall were 
effected largely as a result of the conflict between the inherited 
theor)r and observations. But despite Marshall's constant visits to 
factories and discussions with managers there is no record of the 
resulting raw observations which caused him to modify received 
hypotheses.
’♦ *
Compared with Marshall (and Senior, McCulloch and William 
Thornton among the classical economists) M-iil seems to have, derived
i- 2*4-6 ,
less stimulus from the conflict between received theory and 
observation. Mill seems to have become aware of such conflict 
more through the writings of his contemporaries than through personal 
observation.
Both Marshall and Mill (as he grew older) were hesitant publicly 
to dismiss a theory when it conflicted with observations. Bather, 
their willingness to record the man)'- facets of the truth caused them 
to modify inadequate theories. But to modify a theory is to replace 
it. All changes in theory (no matter how 'significant' or 
'insignificant') must be assessed b3r the same standard. The 
conciliatory style of Marshall and the mature Mill should not conceal 
the real changes they effected in the theory. Their style of 
writing and their failure precisely to record their observations 
should not lead us to believe that they proceeded other than by 
alternating conjectures with refutations.
In this process of conjecture and refutation it is frequently 
impossible to distinguish the alterations to a theory occasioned.by 
conflict between received theory and observations from the process 
of induction. The conflict,, between received theory and 
observations causes the theory to be altered so as to fit thé facts 
more closely. When Popper*denies the possibility of induction he 
is, of course, not denying the occurrence of this process. Bather, 
he is denying that theories arise from un-prejudiced observations.
One must.have some prejudice; for it is this which guides one's 
•selection cf observations.
The Rejection of Verisimilitude
If- the way to greater verisimilitude is Through the analysis of 
stability, then the 1920s and-1930s signalled a rejection of
verisimilitude. In these two decades it became increasingly popular 
to classify markets, primarily according to the number of sellers, 
and to derive equilibrium patterns of conduct for each category.
This is the basis of Archibald's criticism of Chamberlin.^
While the bulk of the work with each category has been directed 
towards the specification of assumptions and to the derivation of 
equilibrium conditions, the models have yielded certain predictions 
as to the directions in which change will occur given certain 
parametrical changes. It is these propositions which should be 
comparable with observations.
However, the ambiguity of the classification of markets permits 
the proponents of the models always to escape such assessment.
Because it is impossible unambiguously to place an observed market 
within a particular theoretical category, the proponents of a 
particular category can always avoid a comparison with observations 
by claiming that the observed market structure does not fit the 
particular category. The propositions derived from such models as 
those of pure competition, single-firm monopoly, large-numbers 
monopolistic competition, Cournotesque oligopoly etc., cannot be 
compared with observations because no market corresponds precisely 
to the structural characteristics of any of the models.
This work on the classification of markets according to 
structural elements not only robbed price theory of empirical content, 
but it also diverted the profession's interest away from work on 
the determinants., of the size of firms and of the size distribution 
of firms within the. industry. This work, to which Mill and Marshall 
had made significant contributions, did not fit easily into a 
classificatory schema based on the hypothesis that elements of industry
structure determine:the behaviour patterns to' be observed. If the 
models were to acknowledge behaviour which modifies the-structure, 
the schema of classification would be rendered ambiguous.
The Re-acceptance of Verisimilitude , - -
The, strategy of classification became quite ubiquitous following 
the death of Marshall. The proponents of the strategy, when 
confronted with awkward observations, had recourse to the conventions 
expounded by Machlup. In the last two decades the Machlupian 
conventions as to the scope of economics and as to the characteristic 
of good economic tbecrjr in ere asinglj'- have been discarded in favour 
of a more ambitious approach. The determinants of organisational 
stincture and of motivation are being revived, as subjects to be 
explained. For this expanded range of theory a wider range of 
observations is necessary, • '
While some of these observations have been more or less direct - 
through interviews or through questionnaires - many have been 
indirect - through reference to those who study the internal 
organisation and the management of companies. This managerial 
literature has suggested’"that. the process by which firms make 
decisions is largely determined by the availability of knowledge.
This proposition has been incorporated in the resumed study of the r 
determinants of firm size and. the pattern of firm growth.«
Furthermore, studies of decision-making within particular firms
recently have suggested many hypotheses as to the timopaths by
which firms move towards equilibria. While some 
on this suggestion is presented within the framcwc- 
classification,^ it does atteif.pt to produce far 'mo 
propositions so that contradiction by observations
of the work based 
•rk of market 
>re precise 
is more easily
accomplished than would be possible under the conventions proposed 
by Machlup.
The best work leading to the emergence of the theory of the firm 
has arisen largely from a careful procedure of alternate conjecture 
and refutation. The foregoing study has illustrated the need -for 
discipline by the facts. If we are to approach the .truth, each 
step on our way must be.checked lest we stray from our chosen path.
2.50
ENDNOTES.
The following abbreviations will be used:
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by W.J.Ashley (London: Longmans, 1909);
Marshall, P ,, for A.Marshall, Principles of Economics, Variorum 
Edition (London: Macmillan, For the Royal Economic Society, 1961); 
and
Marshall, I, and T., for A.Mar shall, Industry and Trade,. 3rd cd. 
(London: Macmillan, 1920).
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